The Iraq Quaqmire: The Endless War Against Terrorism
ÂÂÂÂ By Eric Leser
ÂÂÂÂ Le Monde
ÂÂÂÂ Friday 14 November 2003
ÂÂÂÂ At the moment when Iraq attracts more and more young Islamists who want to fight the United States, Americans recognize that their planetary struggle against terrorism is far from being won.
ÂÂÂÂ "We lack the means to measure whether we are winning or losing the global battle against terrorism. My impression is that up to now we have not made any truly decisive progress.â These sentences come from a two page memorandum on the war against terrorism addressed to his closest collaborators on October 16 by American Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld.
ÂÂÂÂ A document revealed in the daily USA Today, the pessimism of which stunned Americans. Mr. Rumsfeld acknowledges that the jihad (holy war) against the West in general and the United States in particular has not retreated since the September 11, 2001 attacks. On the contrary, itâs made new converts in the Muslim world. And the intervention in Iraq has significantly contributed to this phenomenonâ
ÂÂÂÂ According to American intelligence agencies, hundreds of foreign combatants have entered Iraq since the end of the summer. They have for the most part come from the Middle East (Syria, Lebanon), but also from Yemen and North Africa. They are described as âyoung, not generally well-trained, and motivated by anti-American rhetoric which they hear all day long.â
ÂÂÂÂ John Esposito, Professor of Islamic Studies at Georgetown University (Washington), considers that âIraq has become a magnet for enemies of the United States, much as Afghanistan was during the Soviet occupation.â Didnât Osama Bin Laden designate Iraq as the new front for the jihad on the video cassette broadcast in September by the television station Al-Jazira? "I say to our brothers, the fighters in Iraq, that I share their concern and their pain. I congratulate them for participating in holy war,â declared the Al-Qaeda boss.
ÂÂÂÂ Again according to American sources, the organization is supposed to have brought together a certain number of leaders in Afghanistan in April, shortly after the fall of Baghdad, with the objective of inserting militants into Saddam Husseinâs country. Terrorism specialists, convinced that the network no longer has the operational means it disposed of in 2002, doubt its capacity to establish a real organization there. These same experts note that, in spite of everything, Al-Qaeda has succeeded in Iraq and elsewhere at adapting itself and gaining popularity.
ÂÂÂÂ Daniel Benjamin, responsible for counter-terrorism at the National Security Council during Bill Clintonâs presidency and a member today of the Center for International Strategic Studies, shares this analysis. âThere are two levels in the war against terrorism,â he explains to Le Monde. "A tactical level- military operations and day to day intelligence- and another strategic, one could call it ideological, level, the battle for hearts and minds. This last seems poorly begun. On the other hand, on the tactical level, successes have been more numerous than we could reasonably have hoped after September 11. The influx of resources and the vast cooperation of many countries have allowed us to hit Al-Qaeda hard.â
ÂÂÂÂ About two thirds of the organizationâs leaders have been killed or captured. The most well-known are Ramzi Benalshibh, apprehended in September 2002, Abdel Rahim al Nashiri (October 2002), Abu Zubaida, (November 2002), Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (March 2003) and Riduan Isammundin, called Hambali (August 2003). Others have been eliminated, like Qaed Senyan al Harthi, killed in Yemen in November 2002, or Mohammed Atef, who died in Afghanistan in December 2001. Altogether, close to 3,000 members of the network have been arrested. The Taliban regime, which gave them sanctuary, has been overthrown and the American Treasury has seized $140 million that belonged to Al-Qaeda.
ÂÂÂÂ The collapse of the Taliban also allowed the seizure of a quantity of documents, video cassettes, notes, manuals, and computersâ âAl-Qaeda was sufficiently diminished to have not been capable the last two years of launching another attack on American soil, even though numerous plans existed,â emphasizes Danielle Pletka, Vice President of Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
ÂÂÂÂ The CIA and the Pentagon still havenât, however, ever succeeded in determining the true size of the organization. The only certainty: it has a depth that few in the West imagined in September 2001. About 100,000 men passed through its camps during the 1980s and 1990s. Most went home to Arab and Muslim countries, a few to Europe, and some to the United States. They often form the base of a local group like Jemaah Islamiyah, the Islamist movement in Southeast Asia responsible for the attack on Bali (Indonesia) in October 2002 (202 dead).
ÂÂÂÂ Contrary to Bush administration assertions, the activities of Al-Qaeda and its allies have not decreased since 2001, quite the contrary. The attacks committed in Mombassa (Kenya), Casablanca (Morocco), Djerba (Tunisia), Jakarta (Indonesia), Karachi (Pakistan), Riyadh (17 dead November 9) and, of course, in Baghdad attest to it. To these must be added the many thwarted attacks, such as those aimed at sinking ships in the straits of Gibraltar, at using ricin poison in England and France, at sending a missile on an airplane from Londonâs Heathrow airport, at smashing a plane into the United Statesâ consulate in Karachi, at exploding bombs in front of several embassies in Bangkok (Thailand) or at destroying the American embassy in Lebanon.
ÂÂÂÂ "Al-Qaeda has always had a two-speed operation,â a source close to the CIA confides to Le Monde. âOn the one hand, it offers technical and financial assistance to radical Islamic groups to attack Westerners, and more recently, Jews and Israel, and especially the governments of Muslim countries considered to be âtraitorsâ. At the same time, it slowly prepares spectacular attacks, now essentially against the United States, spaced out by several years.â
ÂÂÂÂ Al-Qaeda, which has become an organization made up of decentralized cells, exerts its influence from the Philippines to Uzbekistan, passing by way of Yemen, East Africa, and Georgia. âThe biggest mistake is to liken it to an army or a classic mafia-style terrorist network on the model of Abu Nidal,â asserts Mr. Benjamin (Center for International Strategic Studies) âIf you neutralize half an armyâs manpower, itâs defeated; if you kill the leaders of Abu Nidal, thereâs no more organization. Thatâs not the case with Al-Qaeda, which is still able to act in the absence of half its members.â
ÂÂÂÂ The Americans no longer doubt that Bin Laden is alive. They also acknowledge that they cannot find him. Since February 2002, George Bush has stopped mentioning his name in public. At the very least being âon the runâ has reduced his ability to run his network. Paradoxically, the loss of his Afghan sanctuary has made tracking his men even more difficult. Surprised by the sudden collapse of the Taliban and without sufficient troops at the time, the Pentagon missed a unique opportunity to inflict much more damage on the group.
ÂÂÂÂ Since then, the fronts have multiplied. Thus, the organization and its allies are very active in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, with the declared objectives of overturning the regimes in power in these two countries, which, at least appear to go along with the United States.
ÂÂÂÂ This support remains ambiguous. The Saudis, for example, only began to act against Al-Qaeda after 35 deaths from the May 12, 2003 attacks in Riyadh. Many experts also agree that the Saudi and Pakistani Secret Services shelter numerous jihad sympathizers. âWithin a time frame of four or five years,â according to Mr. Benjaminâs analysis, âno one knows whether General Pervez Musharraf âthe Pakistani President- or the Saudi monarchy wonât be totally destabilized. The only certainty is that we wonât have gained anything by a change.â
ÂÂÂÂ According to Mrs. Pletka, of the American Enterprise Institute, Iranâs attitude is equally suspect: âThe CIA and the Saudis are definite. Several hundred members of the network are present in that country. The NSA âthe American service in charge of phone tapping- has proof of telephone communications a little before the Riyadh attacks in May which were unquestionably coordinated from Iran.â October 28, le Washington Post asserted for its part that Saad Bin Laden, one of Osamaâs sons, but also Saif Al-Adel, responsible for Al-Qaedaâs military operations, and Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, its Treasurer, are protected and controlled by a special unit of Iranian security.
ÂÂÂÂ The threat, undeniable abroad, has moreover not totally disappeared from the United States. Proof came with the information obtained after the March arrest in Pakistan of Khalid Cheikh Mohammed, the presumed number 3 of Al-Qaeda. The data stored in his computer and mobile phone, as well as his responses to interrogation, allowed the discovery of members of his organization on American soil. It seems that the organization has modified its strategy. While the September 11 hijackers were drawn from Arab country nationals in the United States on tourist or student visas, the reinforcement of security measures has led the network to use Americans. The story of truck driver Lyman Faris, arrested in April, is exemplary. This 34 year-old man, born in Kashmir, but an American citizen since 1999, went through the Afghan training camps. He had effected numerous casings of locales with the goal of destroying the Brooklyn Bridge or derailing a train between New York and Washington.
ÂÂÂÂ "Will we be able to capture, kill, and dissuade more terrorists every day than the Madrassahs (Koranic schools) and religious radicals recruit, train, and send against us?â Mr. Rumsfeld asks himself in his memorandum. âIt will take years to reverse hatred of America in the Muslim world. The battle for minds has been won hands down by the terrorists,â judges the academic, John Esposito.
ÂÂÂÂ Is America ready today for a long conflict, the successes of which, unlike the failures, generally pass by unnoticed? âThereâs an obvious contradiction, â asserts Mr. Benjamin, âbetween our immediate objective- to destroy the terrorist network before they act- and the necessity to vanquish them in the long term of converting Muslim countries to our values of democracy, freedom, tolerance, and openness. As I see it, this contradiction has become unbearable with the war in Iraq. At best, it will make us lose many years.â
ÂÂÂÂ Osama Bin Laden launched a holy war in 1998 against âJews and Crusadersâ. If his ambition was to give credence to the idea that Islam and the West are condemned to clash and to make his prophecy self-fulfilling, his plan is working. The war in Iraq has contributed a great deal to that. For almost all the specialists, the occupation of that country is a blessing for the jihadists. âIt translates into a growing mass of recruits,â underlines Mr. Esposito.
ÂÂÂÂ In the United States, the operation against Iraq has diverted considerable financial and human resources away from the war against terror. In the Muslim world, it is perceived as proof of Bin Ladenâs theses that the United Statesâ goal is to conquer Muslim countries. According to a global opinion survey published in June 2003 by the Institute for International Studiesâ Pew Global Attitude Project Survey, the majority of people surveyed in seven Arab countries out of eight feel threatened by an American âinvasionâ.
ÂÂÂÂ "It took almost a half century to conquer the U.S.S.R.; weâre engaged in a battle of the same magnitude,â acknowledges Danielle Pletka, before adding : â Fortunately there is a strong political consensus in this country from George Bush to the Democrat the furthest to the left, Howard Dean, on the necessity of waging this battle.â But certainly no consensus exists on the means to employ. âBush administration strategy feeds what looks like a âclash of civilizations.â This isnât the way to win the war against terrorism,â writes General Wesley Clark, former NATO commander and candidate for the Democratic nomination in the presidential election of 2004, in his last book, a work with the revealing title: Winning Modern Wars.
Translation: Truthout French language correspondent Leslie Thatcher.
