TUESDAY REFLECTIONS
With Kintu Nyago
Lessons from the Amin coup d�etat
Monitor, Jan 27, 2004
Last week�s New Vision photo, depicting youthful soldiers from the UPDF�s 509 Brigade in Pader district, after having hunted down the LRA�s notorious Tolbert Nyeko in torn fatigues, but in high morale, was extremely touching.
It�s these men, whose sacrifice at the frontline against the most brutal form of terrorism and under extremely trying circumstances, have enabled most Ugandans to lead a normal life.
It�s these usually unmentioned members of the UPDF that deserve the Person of the Year Award!
Additionally, this photo states most graphically the case for the need to fight corruption in the army and all public offices in Uganda.
January 25 is a significant day in Uganda�s political development. It�s the day when both Maj. Gen. Idi Amin and the NRM, through the force of arms, came to power.
My focus here is with Amin�s blood-stained coup d�etat, which overthrew the besieged regime of his mentor, Milton Obote way back in 1971.
Though Uganda has had five forceful changes of government, three of which were coups, Amin�s coup, establishing his �Government of Action� and �Second Republic�, has been the most controversial and debated.
And its timing is still vividly remembered by most Ugandans alive then and across the political spectrum.
My concern is whether this tragedy could have been avoided and what lessons we draw from it.
Although former president Obote usually blames imperialism as the primary cause of this coup due to his then radical foreign policy, in all certainty this is only part of the story.
The manner in which he conducted the affairs of state was the main cause of his first demise. This largely explains why more radical African leaders were never toppled by their former colonial masters, as for instance Abdul Nasser, Muamar Gadhafi, Sekou Toure or closer to home his Mulungushi colleagues, Mwalimu Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda.
The 1971 coup had its origins in the manner in which the then ruling political elite opted to undermine the existing constitutional order for narrow short-term political expediency, while concurrently failing to institutionalise the proper management and control of the army.
Obote�s decision to appease the mutinying Uganda Army at Jinja Barracks in 1965 for purely tactical gain, by accepting all their demands, set the foundation for the 1971 coup. Incidentally, Amin, then a major, manoeuvred and played the instrumental role of arbiter between the political elite and the mutinying troops.
This endeared him to both parties.
However, earlier in 1962, on the eve of independence, the incoming Prime Minister opted to ignore advice from the departing colonial governor to summarily sack Junior Officer Amin due to the killings and excessive brutality he had inflicted on Karimojong and Turkana rustlers.
Dr Obote, in his wisdom, opted to retain and promote this blood-thirsty officer.
The calculation had been to buy the loyalty of the men in uniform, also bearing in mind that most had been recruited from northern Uganda, were he and Defence Minister, Felix Onama, originated.
The military, in turn, was used to crush his legitimate political challengers within the ruling UPC-KY coalition led by President Edward Mutesa and Grace Ibingira, the UPC Secretary General.
After cowing his political party, Obote went on, with Amin�s support, to abrogate the 1962 Independence Constitution, replacing it with the most controversial 1966 �Pigeon Hole� one!
Additionally, the armed forces, including the paramilitary Special Force and the General Service Unit, were used to enforce the draconian State of Emergency and �Detention without Trial� regulations in Buganda.
The emergency was dutifully renewed from 1966 after the storming of the Lubiri until the 1971 coup, laying fertile ground for political discontent critical in ensuring the success of any coup.
The wily Amin clearly manipulated these circumstances in his favour when the chips were down.
The men in uniform soon realised that they were the actual power behind the throne. However, the 1971 coup may possibly never have occurred hadn�t Obote allowed Amin, his army commander, to centralise excessive authority within the military in his office.
This enabled Amin to personally recruit into the army his personal supporters and place them into strategic positions.
This was, for instance, the case with the armoured units that stormed Kampala, and took over government or with the communications and signals officers who kept him informed about plans for his imminent arrest.
The character of Amin�s regime was illustrated by the first lie he offered the Ugandan public, that this had been a �bloodless coup�.
The truth was that the manipulative Amin had ordered the massacre of hundreds of Langi and Acholi officers including most members of the Special Force and GSU!
Rethink your business approach for the new year with the helpful tips here. -------------------------------------------- This service is hosted on the Infocom network http://www.infocom.co.ug
