Grace Stuart Ibingira 1980 African Upheavals Since Independence (emphasis added, unless otherwise stated)
Ch. 7 Uganda: The Immediate Causes of the Revolution
a. The Exposure of Clandestine Involvement in a Foreign Conflict
b. Accusations of Profiteering from the Conflict
c. The Likely removal of Idi Amin and Its Consequences
d. The UPC Stand on Ochieng�s Motion
e. The Constitution and Its Restraints (p. 147)
f. The Seizure of Absolute Power � subsection: The Gold Inquiry
g. The Unrestrained Executive and Its Effect on National Unity � subsections:
(i) Power Over Security Matters;
(ii) Power Over Legislation;
(iii) Control of Local Government;
(iv) Self-Perpetuation in Office;
(v) Abolition of Kingship;
(vi) Powers Denied;
(vii) Other Aspects of Over-Centralized Authority
h. The 1971 Coup D�etat � subsections:
(i) Immediate Reasons;
(ii) Basic Causes;
(iii) The Absence of Elections;
{An aside: Among the many writings of on Amin�s 1971 coup d�etat; John Agami�s 1977 book, The Roots of Political Crisis in Uganda and an article in the Washington Post of February 24, 1978 are particularly notable in being well informed. Agami, a Lugbara, was in the Uganda army and witnessed events first-hand.
Pro-Obote Acholi need to read this book, carefully, to see how they were manipulated & hoodwinked and effectively �tarred� by Obote. In his bid for absolute power, Obote also �tarred� the Baganda. In some ways, Acholi is still suffering from Obote�s cynical maneuver � as witnessed by �Kony� and the fact that a great many Acholi have only known life as inhabitants of Museveni�s �Protected Villages� as IDPs (�Internally Displaced Persons�), a fate they share with the Baganda of Obote�s infamous �Luwero Triangle�.
Finally, those na�ve and gullible UPC fanatics who were duped into believing that Obote and Amin attacked the Kabaka in the infamous May 1966 battle of Mmengo because the Late Muteesa II was planning to overthrow the government of Uganda by force of arms supposedly imported through Gailey Roberts, could easily disabuse themselves of this falsehood by reading an article that appeared on 30 November, 1978. That article shows that it was none other than Bob Astles the British pariah, who suggested to both Obote -- who �had long resolved to remain in power at all costs� (Ibingira, 1980) -- and his chum Idi Amin, that they (O
bote & Amin) hide some arms in the Lubiri during the attack in order to make their shenanigans believable. Talk about nonexistent WMD! Lets now see what Ibingira, a former Secretary General of UPC, Minister of Justice of the UPC government had to say about the root causes, and pretexts, of the fiction called 1966 Crisis. It behooves those who are nursing the notion of amending the current Constitution to read this section to see what history has to say on bending to the ill-advised wishes of the incumbent for self-perpetuation in office (a.k.a. kisanja) � which is bound to be disastrous for the country in the long run � on the laughable pretext that it is the will of the �peasants�.}
�As we indicated before, the Independence Constitution, while providing for a strong government and legislature, imposed important restraints on each of them. Above all, the fundamental rights of the people could not be abrogated without a national consensus through a two-thirds majority in a national legislature and in the kingdoms.
�Even though the �semi federal� regions of Ankole, Bunyoro, Busoga and Toro were dominated by and controlled by the UPC, their governments were not prepared to surrender all rights and powers affecting the common people to the central government without any restraint (my emphasis). Buganda obviously would not.
�Parliament itself would not, despite the fact that it was now overwhelmingly UPC. A substantial section of its UPC membership, apprehensive of Obote�s insatiable grasp for more powers, were unprepared to support him in removing all restraint from the Constitution imposed against assuming more powers (my emphasis). Similarly, within the UPC hierarchy outside Parliament, there was a formidable opinion against vesting excessive powers in the executive because of the increasing misuse (my emphasis) of the powers already possessed.
�With this solid backing for the retention of constitutional restraints, and given the unwavering determination of Obote to assume all power, a crisis was ultimately unavoidable (my emphasis). As he put it, �What happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable object?�
�What was so vital was not merely that the constitution preserved kingdoms when he (Obote) favored republicanism; the issue of kingship was blown out of proportion as an added excuse to repudiate the constitution (my emphasis). The truth is that after independence power had effectively passed into the hands of the people and their kings were solely symbols of their traditions. As I said, even the Kabaka�s power (who was the most powerful ruler) could be defied by the KY leadership.
�If the issue in 1966 was simply to remove kings and no more � which is strongly denied � most Ugandans would have gladly considered it. But in fact the abolition of kingship was to be, in my mind, a secondary matter. The crux of what Obote wanted was the power to take away the rights of any individual, any group or organization, political, cultural or otherwise, without any restraints, without any challenge, either in Parliament, in the electorate, or in the law courts (my emphasis).
�The separation of powers among the executive, the legislative (sic) and the judiciary, which the constitution assured, had to give way a virtually unrestrained executive. This could only come through a revolution, as the people of the country were not going to grant it by free choice. Precisely the immense powers, as we shall see, were assumed by him (Obote) once he abrogated the constitution.
�It is most important, in judging objectively as to whether or not the Independence Constitution was viable, to remember that at no time was a basic measure of government policy of the central government obstructed or denied implementation by any region � including Buganda � because of a constitutional impediment (my emphasis).
�A good example was the transfer of the �lost counties� from Buganda to Bunyoro. Muteesa, as President of Uganda, had to sign every law before it became effective. Anticipating that he might decline � for obvious political reasons � to sign the legislation authorizing the referendum and subsequent transfer of the territory because of his position as kabaka of Buganda and save face among his people, the first constitutional amendment, which I moved in Parliament in 1963 as minister of justice, provided that if for any reason the president was unable to sign a bill into law, the prime minister would do so and the law would take effect as if it had been duly signed by the president. That is what happened and there was no crisis. It was the only time that this provision was invoked (my emphasis).
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