Grace Stuart Ibingira 1980 African Upheavals Since Independence (emphasis added, unless otherwise stated)
Ch. 7 Uganda: The Immediate Causes of the Revolution
a. The Exposure of Clandestine Involvement in a Foreign Conflict
b. Accusations of Profiteering from the Conflict
c. The Likely removal of Idi Amin and Its Consequences
d. The UPC Stand on Ochieng�s Motion
e. The Constitution and Its Restraints
f. The Seizure of Absolute Power (P. 149)
Subsection: The Gold Inquiry
g. The Unrestrained Executive and Its Effect on National Unity � subsections:
(i) Power Over Security Matters;
(ii) Power Over Legislation;
(iii) Control of Local Government;
(iv) Self-Perpetuation in Office;
(v) Abolition of Kingship;
(vi) Powers Denied;
(vii) Other Aspects of Over-Centralized Authority
h. The 1971 Coup D�etat � subsections:
(i) Immediate Reasons;
(ii) Basic Causes;
(iii) The Absence of Elections;
{An aside: Among the many writings of on Amin�s 1971 coup d�etat; John Agami�s 1977 book, The Roots of Political Crisis in Uganda and an article in the Washington Post of February 24, 1978 are particularly notable in being well informed. Agami, a Lugbara, was in the Uganda army and witnessed events first-hand.
Pro-Obote Acholi need to read this book, carefully, to see how they were manipulated & hoodwinked and effectively �tarred� by Obote. In his bid for absolute power, Obote also �tarred� the Baganda. In some ways, Acholi is still suffering from Obote�s cynical maneuver � as witnessed by �Kony� and the fact that a great many Acholi have only known life as inhabitants of Museveni�s �Protected Villages� as IDPs (�Internally Displaced Persons�), a fate they share with the Baganda of Obote�s infamous �Luwero Triangle�.
Recall too that, under Uganda�s much maligned federal constitution there were no Uganda refugees, IDPs, internal wars were virtually nonexistent and territorial disputes � e.g. �lost counties� -- were settled peacefully enough; unlike the situation under the unitary model.
Finally, those na�ve and gullible UPC fanatics (e.g. the current UPC leaders like Rwanyarare), who were duped into believing that Obote and Amin attacked the Kabaka in the infamous May 1966 battle of Mmengo because the Late Muteesa II was planning to overthrow the government of Uganda by force of arms supposedly imported through Gailey Roberts, could easily disabuse themselves of this falsehood by reading an article that appeared on 30 November, 1978. That article shows that it was none other than Bob Astles the British pariah, who suggested to both Obote -- who �had long resolved to remain in power at all costs� (Ibingira, 1980) -- and his chum Idi Amin, that they (Obote & Amin) hide some arms in the Lubiri after the attack in order to make their shenanigans believable. Talk about nonexistent WMD! Lets now see what Ibingira, a former Secretary General of UPC, Minister of Justice of the UPC, etc government had to say about the Obote�s actual seizure of absolute power. }
THE SEIZURE OF POWER
�The same day that Obote arrested ministers, he announced to the country that he had suspended the constitution, assumed all executive powers in the state, and would be advised by a number of people to be named later.
�This was patently illegal of course, because the constitution provided no powers for suspension but only amendment, and this was vested in the Parliament. The executive powers of the state were vested in the Cabinet, appointed by the prime minister and advising the president. On February 26 1966, Idi Amin, who was only three weeks previously had been voted suspended by Parliament, was now given the effective command of the Uganda army.
�Things moved swiftly. On March 3, Obote assumed the functions of the presidency and dismissed both the president (Muteesa II, the Kabaka of Buganda, and the vice-president (Nadiope, who was also vice-president of the UPC), although such powers of removal were vested in the Parliament.
�The charges against the five detained ministers were too vague. First it was because they had conducted themselves in a manner that was threatening the security of the state, without detailing precisely how. Then it was later alleged that they were in collusion with the opposition to overthrow the government.
�The truth is that there was a perfectly legitimate political struggle going on between its (the UPC) leaders to influence the policies of the party, not to abrogate the constitution. When Obote felt he was losing, he had to employ his ultimate weapon � Amin and his army, with all the terror it meant.
�The prime minister made a great play of Muteesa�s having attempted to ask troops to aid him in overthrowing the government. This was allegedly the principal reason why Obote seized power. Did Muteesa really want to overthrow the government? If he asked for foreign troops, what were his reasons?
�For more than a year before the 1966 crisis I (Ibingira) had been telling him (Muteesa), as a good personal friend, that I was worried by Obote making preparations to seize absolute power, impose a one-party system, and preempt any prospect of a fair election, even though I could not tell him when he would strike.
�Muteesa was fully aware of how disadvantageous the continuation of the KY was as it provided an ideal target to whip up ant-Bugandan emotions as a prelude to possible physical attack. It was for this reason that he (Muteesa) decided to advise KY political leaders to disband it and open Buganda to political parties.
�At first it seemed incredible that a prime minister should plot to �overthrow himself,� since he was already in power. And yet, it was this seeming improbability that provided Obote with a perfect cover for his preparations until he came out in his true colors. Then it was too late to stop him. The Kabaka no longer aspired for Buganda�s secession and was resolved to meet whatever problems the future held, within a Ugandan framework. This was no mean achievement for the UPC/KY alliance. I know too, that he (the Kabaka) completely supported the constitution.
�It was under the independence that Buganda had been fairly integrated in the country and the kabakaship had been assured. If he had wished to exercise executive power he might done what Sir Seretse Khama did in Botswana: abandon the traditional role and launch a political party. With Buganda�s almost unanimous support, no other nationalist would have beaten him. This was not his ambition and the post of a ceremonial presidency, offering him prestige and relatively less toil, was preferable to him. If he wished to fight at all, therefore, he would fight to protect the status quo ensured by the constitution, not to upset it by promoting a revolution.
�Immediately after the Ochieng motion was passed in Parliament, swift and alarming developments followed, compounded by persistent rumors of an impending coup. Troop movements were ordered from different battalions to report to Deputy Commander Idi Amin for unspecified instructions without the commander of the army�s knowledge. Regularly scheduled military exercises were interpreted as moves in preparation of a coup against Obote, who stayed in the North on the pretext that his schedule had been planned long in advance.
�This in fact was similar to what he was to do much later when he went to Singapore, leaving preparation behind to eliminate his opponents in his absence. In this case, the idea was that the Ochieng motion having passed, his group in the army should launch a revolution in the capital, eliminate physically or by detention, repudiate the constitution and invite him to the capital to assume full executive powers.
�Few people in the country know how much they owed to the courage of the opposition members of parliament from the North who moved to neutralize this calamity (my emphasis).
�In January 1966, an Acholi parliamentarian had already warned Obote about this (my emphasis):
There are certain individuals who were of opinion that they could exploit the ethnic groups of our men in the armed forces. I would like to inform, especially those who do not come from the area where I come from, that it would be futile for anybody who calls himself Nilotic to think that he could play the emotions of the Acholi to fight on his side, because he is fully aware of the plight of certain politicians having failed, � have exhorted and resorted to playing on ethnic origin of the men of our armed forces � do not count on certain Nilotics to come and support you and maintain you in office indefinitely or for thirty years as some conceited Front Bench Members seem to think
�Despite Obote�s effort, the Acholi were certainly not unanimously for him (my emphasis). Most particularly the DP parliamentarians from Acholi and West Nile, like A Latim, H. Obonyo, and M. Okelo (all later murdered by Idi Amin), who could use ethnicity as a tool to penetrate Obote�s monopoly of the army, had to work intensively, drive secretly to several battalions, and plead with the troops not to move on the reckless behest of government politicians (my emphasis). It worked. But the country and especially the capital knew was being attempted by Obote. The Cabinet under the chairmanship of Cuthbert Obwangor met at least twice and sent urgent requests to Obote to return to the capital, but in vain.
�It was such circumstances, therefore, that prompted Muteesa II to get involved. He had no executive authority to conduct government business. But the very constitution that tied his hands was in imminent danger of being abrogated by those charged by upholding it. It was obviously an impossible situation to be in: on the one hand being required to be constitutional when constitutionality is in the process of being repudiated, and on the other hand taking steps to ensure the survival of the constitution when he had no legal powers to do so. He (Muteesa II) chose the latter course � to act �and it was the more honorable course, even if it did miscarry, partly because the action was too limited and too hesitant but especially because the commander of the army, Brigadier Opolot, who had privately campaigned for the Ochieng motion to remove Idi Amin, his rival, and had assured c
onstitutionalists he block any overt move to abrogate the constitution, became fainthearted and faltered in the face of a more bold and desperate Amin, once the revolution was under way.
�I had some meetings with Muteesa II at this time; he was entitled to consult his ministers. The position he (Muteesa II) took was that should there be an actual upheaval or rebellion in the army when any faction moved to seize power, it should be stopped so as to uphold the constitution, and if necessary a precautionary request should be sent to the British asking them to provide military assistance to overcome disorder. As a former colonial power with which Uganda had parted without hard feelings and as a fellow member of the Commonwealth, Britain was a reasonable choice at this time.
�It was not the first time that British military assistance was requested to put down a rebellion in Uganda. As stated earlier, in January 1964 British troops had been called in by Obote to quell a mutiny in the first battalion. The only difference this time was that Muteesa II, the ceremonial president, and not Obote, the executive head of government, was to make the request. Technically, therefore, Obote was right that Muteesa had no legal power to make the request (my emphasis).
�But the request as put was contingent on there being an overt, internal military threat to abrogate the constitution that could not be contained by local means. It is significant that the prime minister conveniently left this point out and injected a new false claim that the request was for foreign troops to overthrow the government. Muteesa plainly and openly stated that he had made the request in good faith as a responsible head of state (my emphasis). But the supreme moment for which Obote had long planned was at hand and the politicized army under Idi Amin was on top.
�On April 15 1966 in a parliamentary session while was surrounded by troops, Obote formally announced, � the constitution we had from 9 October, 1962 is hereby abrogated.�10 He then imposed his own brand of constitution granting himself for all practical purposes the unrestrained, centralized power. Without any Member of Parliament having seen the new constitution, they were forced to adopt it (my emphasis).
�As he told Parliament, �It is hereby resolved that the � constitution now laid before us be adopted, and it is hereby adopted this 15th day of April 1966 as the constitution of Uganda.� He added, �Fairly soon you will find copies [of the constitution that parliamentarians had never seen but had approved] in your pigeon holes.�
�At long last he could give some reasons. �The new constitution,� he said, �proposed to treat Uganda as one united country � one country, one parliament, one people,� while the abrogated constitution had the message that �Uganda must be divided so much that there is no government that will ever be able to govern.�
�Was this really true? It was at the heart of the Ugandan crisis and in crises of many emerging African states. Was excessive centralization of power the answer for effectively integrating multiethnic groups in the new state or was it counterproductive? We shall return to this issue later in this chapter.
�In the most ill-conceived move of its life, the Bugandan Lukiiko, with its old �resolution mentality� passed a motion on 19 May 1966 asking Obote�s central government to quit the capital, in effect, seceding. Morally, they had a case. The Independence Constitution by which all Ugandans had come together had been unlawfully abrogated and, logically this meant releasing all groups from the obligations it had imposed.
�Consequently, if the central government was the first to abrogate it, it had no moral or legal right to uphold its new one. But the country had left legality and morality behind. What mattered now was that anyone with the military might could impose his will. The Lukiiko resolution, therefore, was a godsend to Obote for a longed-for opportunity to crush Buganda.
�It has been claimed by Obote that when the first army contingent went to the Kabaka�s palace it had instructions to search for illegally hidden arms, using minimum force. This is false on two counts.
�First, the order to the troops could not have been to use minimum force. After they slaughtered civilians by the hundreds around the palace in an unequal battle, not a single soldier was ever reprimanded for excessive use of force; indeed many were rewarded with promotions (my emphasis).
�Second, there were no illegally hidden arms in the palace (my emphasis). The Kabaka was permitted by the laws enacted by Obote�s government to have a bodyguard of 120, who armed with submachine guns and six automatic rifles, all certified by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (my emphasis).
�The declaration that the objective of the army�s palace invasion was to search for arms was a fabricated excuse for launching a premeditated attack on the Kabaka by Obote. The world to be informed by the New York Times of 30 November 1978 (more than ten years later) that it had been the British-born agent, Bob Astles, the confidant of both Amin and Obote at the time, who had suggested to both of them that in order to make the invasion of the palace plausible, they had to hide some arms in it during the attack and then claim their capture after taking the palace. This is what was done.
�Undoubtedly, there was considerable tension around Buganda as a consequence of Obote�s unlawful assumption of absolute power and his revocation of the constitution under which Buganda and others felt their future secure. We were used to handling such crises, and the police had always been sufficient to handle the situation.
The introduction of the army was not because the police had failed to handle the situation but rather to take advantage of the situation, to destroy Buganda, and to seize absolute power. It is hard to arrive at the correct number of those who died, but they were counted by the thousands throughout the kingdom. The precedent was now firmly set to use massive official violence against political opponents, real or imagined, and it was rebound against Obote with tragic and terrifying force after the 1971 coup d�etat that deposed him.
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