Uganda Journal
Dec 19 - 25, 2004
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At exactly 9:10 p.m., East African Standard Time, on Tuesday, December 17, 1985, a beaming President Daniel arap Moi emerged from Harambee House in Nairobi flanked by Gen. Tito Okello Lutwa and Mr Yoweri Museveni, the leaders of the two delegations at the Uganda Peace Talks. The Kenyan leader announced that a deal had been reached between the two warring sides to join together in government and, for that, fighting across Uganda was to end by December 19, 1985 - 19 years ago today. The deal did not hold and a month later guerrilla chief Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) fighters marched on Kampala. Peter Nyanzi looks back:-
Ugandans around the world saw the deal as signalling the dawn of a new era of peace after nearly two decades of political turbulence, bloodshed and war. The five-year-old guerrilla campaign waged by Mr Museveni had since cut off of large swathes of the country, which were already under its control.
But many other groups were also fighting the government in various other parts of the country. Only about five months earlier – on July 25, 1985 – senior Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) officers Lutwa and Bazilio Olara Okello had toppled President Milton Obote in a military coup, leading to mass looting and turmoil across the country. Once in power the Military Council, the ruling organ of the General Okellos, sought peace through negotiation with the fighting groups, principally Museveni’s NRM/A. Originally, the talks were scheduled to open in Dar es Salaam on August 13, 1985 but the NRM delegation never showed – apparently because Bazilio Okello turned down its request to be provided transport from Nairobi. So the talks were moved to Nairobi under the chairmanship of President Moi. The issues The NRM people also said they would not recognise the Lutwa government, which they kept referring to as the military junta. In fact, the NRM wanted Lutwa to attend as commander of UNLA and not as head of state. When the talks resumed, however, the NRM accepted Lutwa as chairman of the Military Council and head of state. The rebel group further wanted the four political parties (UPC, UPM, DP and CP) that took part in the 1980 general elections to have a member each on the Military Council. On its part, the Military Council offered NRM only four seats, a proposal the rebels flatly rejected, prompting a postponement in the talks. When the negotiations resumed, the offer of seats was increased to six. The Museveni guerrillas also accepted the inclusion of other fighting groups, provided the representatives of those groups were acceptable to all parties involved. There was a proposal that three friendly countries – Kenya, Tanzania, and Britain – be approached to take charge of national security as the various fighting forces were disarmed and disbanded. It was also not happy with the idea of "complete disarmament if the country was to achieve genuine peace". Secondly, it argued that because Uganda needed an army, the NRA already had in the field "a well organised, disciplined, motivated and pro-people army", which could be used in the formation of the new Uganda army by integrating part or all of it with the good elements in the UNLA and other fighting groups. Meanwhile, back in Kampala, an alliance of the other fighting groups – Fedemu, UFM, UNRF, and Funa – issued a joint statement criticising the way NRM was "using the limited forum of the Nairobi peace talks to grab power and entrench itself over the people of Uganda". Instead, they wanted a national peace conference that would bring everyone on board. They said the talks should lead to a final round of peace talks involving all parties. The Military Council wanted the NRA to show the same commitment, as disarmament would enable Ugandans to "discuss the future of their country in a free atmosphere without the fear of coercion by any group". Eventually, it was agreed that UNLA, with 3,700 soldiers, and NRA with 3,580 soldiers form the nucleus of the new national army. On the question of the ceasefire, the NRM wanted a complete cessation of hostilities and the restriction of troop movements to areas under the control of the respective fighting groups. The Okellos wanted harassment of civilians, attacks on police posts, hijacking of vehicles, robbing of banks, blockading of roads to stop forthwith. Upon signing the agreement, all parties had to stop recruitment, mobilisation and deployment. Of course, the NRA was known to have hundreds of Rwandese fighters in its ranks. All new acquisitions of arms also had to stop immediately. Feathers ruffled The many fights around the negotiating table prompted the junta to demand that the teams concentrate on the "urgent issues of immediate concern" and leave all the other matters and their elaboration to the fully constituted council to decide upon. Indeed, in the first week of November, Museveni granted Kenyan journalist John Gachie an interview. It was one that didn't help things. Gachie asked Museveni to comment on media impressions that he was the main stumbling block to Uganda's peace by, for example, resisting disarmament. "What is disarmament?" the future Ugandan leader said. "It is an insult to our people. They are talking of bringing in foreign forces, Uganda is not a colony. It is not necessary nor advisable to have foreign troops or they want security from foreign soldiers, worried about their own safety? Why should a foreign power play a colonial role or mercenary role in Uganda?" He also described Tito Okello and Bazilio Okello as "opportunists" who had absolutely nothing to do with the coup. Meanwhile, Moi's patience had started to wear thin. He had already issued an ultimatum to the Ugandans "either to sign the agreement by Wednesday, December 4th or quit the talks and get out of Kenya". For each of those days, Moi had personally chaired the talks although the leaders of the delegations kept changing. Museveni, Samson Kisekka, Eriya Kategaya led the NRM group at various times. There were days when only one delegation would be in town and Moi would spend the whole day waiting in vain for the other side to appear. Then Museveni addressed a press conference in Nairobi where he was asked his delegation's reaction to Moi's ultimatum. But Moi never wavered. Agreement preamble This agreement is made pursuant to the Peace Talks held in Nairobi, Kenya during the period 26th August 1985 to 17th December 1985 under the Chairmanship of His Excellency Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kenya, between the Military Government of Uganda, which assumed power in Uganda following the ouster of the former government of that country on the 27th July 1985 (Hereinafter referred to as 'The Military Government'), and the National Resistance Movement. We, the Military Government and the National Resistance Movement, the parties to this agreement; RECALLING the desire of the people of the sovereign state of Uganda at independence on the 9th of October 1962 to exercise fully the right to self-determination of one nation within the United Nations Organisation; MINDFUL of the determination proclaimed by the people of the world in the charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of all men and women of all nations and to promote social progress and freedom, which determination was restated and subscribed to by the sovereign state of Uganda in the charter of the Organisation of African Unity but more particularly in the bill of rights contained in the independence constitution of Uganda and the successive constitutions of Uganda; AWARE of the endless conflicts resulting from the denial of, or impediments in the way of, freedom and peace for the citizens of and people in Uganda by successive governments, which conflicts have destroyed peace and stability, eroded national institutions and democratic principles and threatened the sovereignty and integral status of our country so dearly cherished by us and all Ugandans everywhere; CONSCIOUS of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peace based on respect of individual persons and of the need for respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons in Uganda without distinction as to race, sex, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or language; RECOGNISING the passionate yearning for peace and freedom for all citizens of Uganda everywhere and other people living in Uganda, a yearning shared by all nations and people of good will towards Uganda and the decisive positive role that such citizens, nations and people can play in the political, social and economic development of Uganda in times of peace; CONVINCED that any continuation of armed conflict, dictatorial rule, denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms prevent development in Uganda as well as positive international co-operation with friendly and brotherly nations and other bodies and militates against the ideals of peace; CONVINCED that Uganda has an inalienable right to peace and complete political and economic freedom and in that regard must exercise the right of self-determination as a sovereign state and integral national territory whose boundaries were more particularly delineated and described in schedule 1 to the constitution of the Republic of Uganda of 1967; WELCOMING the commitment to and participation in the search for peace in Uganda by our brotherly neighbours the Republic of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania and recognising that instability in any one of the nations is a threat to the peace and stability of the whole East African region; BELIEVING that the process of restoration of peace, stability and democratic rule and government is now irresistible and irreversible as exemplified by the spirit of mutual co-operation, trust and frankness between the parties at the peace talks: and in so believing desiring a formula to terminate the problems that have for so long bedevilled and manacled Uganda, such as dictatorial rule and all practices of denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms, discrimination and massacres associated with such rule; (1) of bringing to a most speedy end dictatorship in all its forms and manifestations, armed conflict and denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Participants
National Resistance Movement Delegation
The Agreement The agreement was signed after sweeping concessions to Museveni’s NRM.
Agreement fails to hold The NRM also was aware that the Okellos had staged a coup because they were sure that the NRA was likely to take power given the divisions and low morale in the UNLA. They suspected Obote would flee leaving them behind to suffer the consequences. As Museveni later wrote in Sowing the Mustard Seed, the Okellos had established contact with the NRA about deposing Obote but abandoned the contacts after the coup and "teamed up with all sorts of opportunists to try and isolate the NRA". So Museveni was not particularly taken by the Okellos. Ideologically, he saw their regime as the type that could not solve the fundamental problems of Uganda. But the international pressure was too much, so he talked. The late John Kazzora, then a special advisor to Museveni, said: "Most members of the NRA were sceptical about the peace talks. However, we signed the agreement because we did not want the international community to see us as militarists and war mongers." There are other reasons why the agreement failed. First, the NRM/A members wanted to be assured of their future after those many long years in the bushes of Luweero, or in exile. And they saw their successful campaign as the perfect chance for southerners to destroy the northern stranglehold on national power. They therefore saw Nairobi as an attempt to arrest this process. They were not about to let that happen. But there was also pressure from people in the areas under NRM control who never wanted their villages to be opened up to the infamous UNLA again. Lutwa's inability to discipline his marauding soldiers allowed Museveni to accuse him of violating the agreement and use it as a perfect excuse to go on the final offensive. Writes Museveni in Sowing the Mustard Seed: "The UNLA's massacres of civilians continued even after we had signed the peace accord and we knew that we had no option but to continue with the war against them." Consequently, Kampala fell on January 26, 1986, and Museveni assumed the presidency three days later. |
© 2004 The Monitor Publications
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