By Patrick Matsiko wa Mucoori
Jan 27, 2005
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It may sound like war mongering to say that Uganda looks inevitably headed for another cycle of armed struggle. But looking at the sequence, circumstances and precursors of our post independence armed struggles and compare it with what is happening today, it would not be farfetched to infer that this country is slowly and certainly sliding into a new rebellion. Apart from the January 25, 1971 coup by the late Idi Amin, the bulk of the subsequent armed struggles germinated after national elections.
The 1981-86 National Resistance Army rebellion which catapulted President Yoweri Museveni to power on January 26, 1986, was a result of the disputed 1980 general elections in which Milton Obote acquired a second term as president. I will not draw any comparison from the 1987-88 rebellions by Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement and the resultant Lord's Resistance Army by Joseph Kony for some reason. Because the two rebellions comprised mainly people from the north who had lost power to southerners, one can safely say they were desperately hoping to regain the status quo. But there is an insurgency trend that has been building up in the last ten years, which suggests that every time Museveni seeks and achieves another presidential term, a new rebellion is born. When Museveni was re-elected in early 1996, the Allied Democratic Forces, which had not been heard of before, made their daring surprise attack in western Uganda in November 1996. They overran Mpondwe border post and held it for two days until they were driven out by the Uganda People's Defence Forces. It took the government about five years to put down the insurgency. Though the ADF was not directly connected to Dr Paul Ssemogerere, whom Museveni defeated in the 1996 polls, the cause of that rebellion cannot be divorced from the anger accumulated from Museveni's re-election. Those who took up arms against him were the opposition who saw his re-election as an attempt to perpetuate himself in power. They were also part of the opposition disappointed by the loss of an election they believed Museveni had made unfree and unfair to their disadvantage but to his benefit. So this gave them a reason to fight. After 1996 there were Movement people who no longer supported Museveni, but who could not take up arms against him because they genuinely believed he would retire in 2001. They patiently waited for the opportunity for them to try a shot at the presidency. But by 2001, Museveni was showing no signs of leaving power. Some of his former bush war colleagues like Col. Dr Kizza Besigye and others deserted the Movement wagon to stand against him. Besigye lost the elections and petitioned court but lost the legal battle too on a 2-3 majority ruling. However, all the five judges of the Supreme Court, including those who ruled in his favour, agreed there had been serious election rigging in various parts of the country. But they also ruled that the amount of rigging was not enough to suggest that if such had not happened the winner would have been Besigye. But the point had been made -- that the elections had been rigged. Perhaps the court could have made a similar ruling in 1980 elections if Museveni had filed an election petition. Museveni's Uganda Patriotic Movement (now National Resistance Movement), won only one seat in Parliament but he went to the bush claiming the elections had been rigged and he wanted to stop such from happening again. So the court could have ruled that though the elections had been rigged, there was no proof that if such cheating had not happened, Museveni would have become the winner. But all the same Museveni used the election rigging and the resultant anger and desperation not only to justify his armed rebellion that cost lives and property for five years, but also to mobilise recruits for his rebellion. Similarly when Besigye lost in 2001, he and his supporters said the elections were rigged. Reports started trickling in that Besigye was organising a rebellion. The government started restricting his movements. He escaped and soon after army officers, Lieutenant Colonels Samson Mande and Anthony Kyakabale deserted the UPDF and declared "a struggle" against Museveni's government. They cited, among others, election rigging. Another senior UPDF officer Col. Edison Muzoora, and other officers followed them later. Now the country is awash with reports that the said officers in partnership with Besigye are training a rebel group called the People's Redemption Army (PRA). The government strongly believes PRA exists under Besigye-Mande-Muzoora-Kyakabale command. I will not go into whether PRA exists as the government says, or whether PRA is a mere creation by Museveni's regime to discredit and hunt down his opponents, as the opposition contends. But there are sufficient signs that there is a simmering rebellion that could burst sooner than later. It does not matter whether it is PRA or not. The opposition may have reached such proportions that if an armed group launches its offensive, key opposition figures would be arrested for alleged connection to the insurgents. This could spark off chain arrests which may result in many opposition members fleeing the country or joining the rebels to bolster their ranks. Because most of the resources would be channeled to counter-insurgency operations and nobody would carry out any meaningful economic activity during an insurgency. Either way you look at it, third term will be counter-productive. So it is up to the President to measure the gains against the losses and make a judicious decision on the third term bid. He has not openly declared that he wants the third term but the agitation by his ministers and his close aides is sufficient for one to reasonably conclude that he is actually going for a re-election. The vice president and cabinet ministers cannot be going on their own to agitate for a third term unless they are abundantly aware of their boss' position on the matter. The agitators of third term should know the cost of third term. If it took the UPDF five years to defeat the ADF who lacked serious military command and strategy, how long would it take the army to defeat the PRA, for instance, under the command of four trained colonels, who probably have some internal sympathisers in the regular force? It is just a hypothetical question.
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� 2005 The Monitor Publications.
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