3. Rwanda's economic ruin.
During the 1970s and the first years of the 1980s Rwanda enjoyed relative economic stability and food selfsufficiency. Rwanda had one of the best road systems in the region, and post and telephone services as well as electricity supply were expanding. The health and education systems were improving, and the government had ambitious plans for further development. But, as in the rest of Africa, these plans were all aborted under the pressure from the international financial institutions. In April of 1984 the government of President Habyarimana introduced a program of 'rigour and austerity' which suspended many projects. Effected also by falling coffee prices and high import costs, especially for petrol, Rwanda began to slide into economic crisis. In June of 1989 the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) collapsed under pressure to liberalise the world markets in favor of the big multinational coffee traders. With 75% of Rwanda's export earnings coming traditionally from coffee, the price collapse reduced Rwandas foreign earnings by 50%. In 1988 and 1989 the country was effected by serious drought causing a famine in the south. Thousands of refugees who streamed into Rwanda, fleeing from neighbouring Burundi made the situation for the government even more difficult.
During the 1970s and the first years of the 1980s Rwanda enjoyed relative economic stability and food selfsufficiency. Rwanda had one of the best road systems in the region, and post and telephone services as well as electricity supply were expanding. The health and education systems were improving, and the government had ambitious plans for further development. But, as in the rest of Africa, these plans were all aborted under the pressure from the international financial institutions. In April of 1984 the government of President Habyarimana introduced a program of 'rigour and austerity' which suspended many projects. Effected also by falling coffee prices and high import costs, especially for petrol, Rwanda began to slide into economic crisis. In June of 1989 the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) collapsed under pressure to liberalise the world markets in favor of the big multinational coffee traders. With 75% of Rwanda's export earnings coming traditionally from coffee, the price collapse reduced Rwandas foreign earnings by 50%. In 1988 and 1989 the country was effected by serious drought causing a famine in the south. Thousands of refugees who streamed into Rwanda, fleeing from neighbouring Burundi made the situation for the government even more difficult.
Under those circumstances, the international financial institutions IMF and World Bank mercilessly pushed the Rwandan government into implementing a structural adjustment program. The elements of this policy were the same notorious measures which had already failed elsewhere in Africa, but in the case of Rwanda, it pushed the country into economic disintegration at the very moment when it was attacked by the invasion from Uganda. The first devaluation of the Rwandan Franc was carried out in November 1990. This led immediately to large increases of the price of fuel and essential consumer goods. In June of 1992, in the middle of the war, the IMF insisted on the next devaluation increasing prices even further. The other measures of the SAP were trade liberalisation, lifting of subsidies to agriculture, privatisation of state enterprises and the retrenchment of civil servants. But as the government was the biggest employer with 7,000 employees
in
central government and more than 40,000 in local administration these measures proved to be a desaster, especially also because the government had to cope with hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled the war from the north.
By 1990, the government had to divert about 10 million dollars of the meager budget recources a year to the payment of foreign debt. Rwanda was caught in the same debt trap as almost all other African countries beginning in 1980. Rwanda started out with less than 200 million dollars foreign debt in 1980. Despite the fact that the Habyarimana government payed millions of dollars back every year, the total debt more than trippled to about 700 million dollars by 1990.[18]
The strangulation of African countries by the foreign debt is one of the worst crimes against humanity Western governments and their financial institutions have committed, because it has more than anything else contributed to creating poverty, desease and human death. In 1980 Subsaharan Africa had about 80 bn dollars foreign debt. By the end of the 1990s this had increased to more than 250 bn dollars, even though the African countries in the meantime had payed more than 200 bn dollars back.
For Rwanda, the effects of the foreign debt strangulation and the structural adjustment measures meant the destruction of the social fabric of society, which went parallel to the destruction caused by the war, and was almost complete by the beginning of 1994.
4. Rwanda's fall into violence and revenge.
The economic crisis made it more and more difficult for the Rwandan government to envisage the large scale reintegration of returning refugees of the Tutsi community abroad. Nevertheless, in 1990 President Habyarimana was ordering different government departments to prepare plans for the return of those refugees. He himself went to refugee camps in Uganda to discuss this. And a bilateral commission between Rwanda and Uganda was set up to develop plans for the return of the refugees. The commission met in Kigali in July of 1990 with the participation of the UNHCR and representatives of the OAU. An action plan for different options for the refugees was agreed upon and delegates from the refugee camps were supposed to visit Rwanda at the end of September 1990. The next meeting of the commission was scheduled for Jannuary 1991. But, instead, war started in October of 1990. Habyarimana had also agreed to constitutional changes towards democratisation following the La Baule summit of Francophone African States in June of 1990. The leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and their allies in Kampala have never answered the question, why, despite those changes in President Habyarimana's government attitude, they attacked Rwanda militarily, if their only concern was to return to their home country and to help build democracy. Maybe they were just driven by narrow interests. But for the political strategists in Washington and London, who encouraged and supported their war, this cannot be cited as an excuse.
The economic crisis made it more and more difficult for the Rwandan government to envisage the large scale reintegration of returning refugees of the Tutsi community abroad. Nevertheless, in 1990 President Habyarimana was ordering different government departments to prepare plans for the return of those refugees. He himself went to refugee camps in Uganda to discuss this. And a bilateral commission between Rwanda and Uganda was set up to develop plans for the return of the refugees. The commission met in Kigali in July of 1990 with the participation of the UNHCR and representatives of the OAU. An action plan for different options for the refugees was agreed upon and delegates from the refugee camps were supposed to visit Rwanda at the end of September 1990. The next meeting of the commission was scheduled for Jannuary 1991. But, instead, war started in October of 1990. Habyarimana had also agreed to constitutional changes towards democratisation following the La Baule summit of Francophone African States in June of 1990. The leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and their allies in Kampala have never answered the question, why, despite those changes in President Habyarimana's government attitude, they attacked Rwanda militarily, if their only concern was to return to their home country and to help build democracy. Maybe they were just driven by narrow interests. But for the political strategists in Washington and London, who encouraged and supported their war, this cannot be cited as an excuse.
Lynda Chalker could have put pressure on the Ugandan President to stick to negotiations with President Habyarimana about the settlement of the refugee question and not go to war. As the Ugandan government depended for its survival entirely on money from the Western donors, in particular from Britain and the United States, the US government could have used their influence among the Rwandan refugees to prevent them from preparing for war. Instead, both governments did the opposite and encouraged the war drive. Therefore these Western governments bear responsibility for the disaster which followed in Rwanda and culminated in the carnage in 1994. In this way the internal eruption of violence in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994 was also directly caused by the US and British governments adoption of their special form of unilateralism. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the Bush, sen. administration brought back war as a justified means of solving
international conflicts. It was applied on a grand scale with Desert Storm against Irak in 1991. In the African context the war in Rwanda and later in Congo followed the same logic.
In Rwanda the war began spreading panic and the invaders were not at all wellcomed as liberators. In 1991 there were more than 100,000 displaced persons who had fled from the war in the north southwards. At the beginning of 1992 this had increased to 300,000. And the new RPF offensive in February of 1993 caused a stream of almost 1 million refugees inside the country. Under these circumstances and the disintegrating economy, it can be explained that the old traumata of Rwanda's and Burundi's history, of the tensions between the two major population groups Hutu and Tutsi, came back full force. The Rwanda Revolution of 1959 with the ensuing violence, and the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Hutu in Burundi in 1972 were a reminiscence of the fragile relationship between them in the past. When then the democratically elected Hutu President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, was assassinated by the Tutsi military in Bujumbura in October of 1993,
just
three month after the Rwanda parties had signed the Arusha peace agreement, the ground for compromise in Rwanda was further destroyed. The spiral of violence escalated. Finally, the shooting down of the Presidential plane on April 6, 1994, killing President Habyarimana of Rwanda, President Ntaryamira of Burundi, the chief of the Rwandan army General Nsabimana, the commander of the Presidential Guard, Major Bagaragaza and a number of other officials had the effect equivalent to throwing a hand-grenade into an ammunitons depot. This now ment that in the course of 6 months three Hutu Presidents were assassinated. The existing tensions burst out into an orgy of violence and mass killings. For months already the country was under the effect of widespread suspicion whether one was with the government of Habyarimana or the invading forces of the RPF.
To this day, no investigation of the circumstances of the deadly attack on President Habyarimana's plane took place. Neither the RPF government in Kigali, nor the United Nations, or the Western governments undertook one. Only one thing is clear, this could not have been done in Africa without the active involvement of Western intelligence services. And whoever ordered it knew about the consequences. It would lead to the total breakdown of any basis for implementing a compromise agreement between the RPF and the Habyarimana government which it did.
5. The failed Arusha peace negotiations and
Western refusal to intervene in case of greatest need.
The US and British governments' attitude towards negotiations between the two war parties in Rwanda show the same questionable approach as their support for the war in 1990. The premise of these negotiations, which started under US and French guidance in July of 1992, was to justify and legitize the RPF's invasion after the fact. They had engaged in warfare against an internationally recognized souvereign government, and yet they were accorded the same status as this government. The question about which the negotiations took place from the beginning, was not really the sharing of power, but the gaining of power of the RPF. That this ended in the questionable formula of 60% for the government forces and 40% for the RPF forces and the sharing of 50% of all command posts of the f uture army was obviously no contribution to building trust among the adversaries.[19]
Western refusal to intervene in case of greatest need.
The US and British governments' attitude towards negotiations between the two war parties in Rwanda show the same questionable approach as their support for the war in 1990. The premise of these negotiations, which started under US and French guidance in July of 1992, was to justify and legitize the RPF's invasion after the fact. They had engaged in warfare against an internationally recognized souvereign government, and yet they were accorded the same status as this government. The question about which the negotiations took place from the beginning, was not really the sharing of power, but the gaining of power of the RPF. That this ended in the questionable formula of 60% for the government forces and 40% for the RPF forces and the sharing of 50% of all command posts of the f uture army was obviously no contribution to building trust among the adversaries.[19]
While negotiations between the government and the RPF went on in Arusha beginning in July of 1992, the war went on. In February of 1993 the RPF launched a massive offensive, which brought their troops within 50 kilometres of Kigali. Under pressure from Western governments the Arusha agreement was signed in August of 1993. But it soon became obvious that those Western governments had no interest in guaranteeing the implementation through the United Nations. Delegations of the Rwandan government and the RPF warned the Security Council in September of 1993 of the collapse of the agreement if a significant UN force would not be deployed rapidly to Rwanda. When the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) was finally established on Oct. 5, 1993, it had neither sufficient manpower nor logistics nor a strong enough mandate to be a guarantor for the peace process. UNAMIR was in no position to react against the rising violence in the
country.
The United Nations have admitted to their failure in Rwanda in 1993 and 1994.[20] The real scandal though is the behaviour of the governments in the UN Security Council which were first of all responsible for UNAMIR's weakness. Secondly, especially the American and British governments refused any effective military action of the UN to the consequences of the fatal killing of President Habyarimana. Against the urgent request from the UN commanders in Kigali, the UN Security Council decided to reduce rather than to increase the manpower for UNAMIR. Thus, the explosion of violence against civilians and the mass killings which followed the death of the President took their toll without limits. The US, British, French and Belgian governments were fully aware of the carnage going on. Why did they not act? On April 21, the UN Security Council decided to wihtdraw UNAMIR, but one week later the same Security Council decided to increase UNPROFOR for
the
Balkan by more than 6000 troops. Were the Western governments calculating to have the RPF take power first, and only than intervene, like US troops did in July of 1994 to help the stranded Rwandese refugees in Goma, Zaire?
6. War as a means of population control.
The action and non-action of Western governments, in particular of the US and British governments, in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994 of actively supporting a war and refusing to intervene when it was needed to save civilians, were, as we have shown, driven by geopolitical considerations. As later events in Rwanda itself and in the Congo make clear, this policy continues to this day. It reveales the utter hypocracy of Western governments, when they speak of their concern for human rights and good governance in Africa. In reality their policy is driven by nothing but strategic considerations to having access to vital raw materials. That Western powers in persuance of this strategic aim take into account the loss of life of millions points to an even more devilish side of the world-view adhered to by parts of the Western political elite. This is called the dogma of popula tion controle. As ugly as wars may be, but, they reduce populations quite effectively. If African populations can be reduced, the longterm strategic danger that African nations would use up their precious raw materials for themselves can be eliminated. This is the ugly truth behind the paradigm shift Western Africa policy underwent during the last 30 years. Thus, Western powers foment wars and destabilisations of governments in Africa. Than, they only have to find the rebels, mercenaries or warlords to make the deals for taking the raw materials out of the continent, leaving the local population to their fate in misery.
The action and non-action of Western governments, in particular of the US and British governments, in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994 of actively supporting a war and refusing to intervene when it was needed to save civilians, were, as we have shown, driven by geopolitical considerations. As later events in Rwanda itself and in the Congo make clear, this policy continues to this day. It reveales the utter hypocracy of Western governments, when they speak of their concern for human rights and good governance in Africa. In reality their policy is driven by nothing but strategic considerations to having access to vital raw materials. That Western powers in persuance of this strategic aim take into account the loss of life of millions points to an even more devilish side of the world-view adhered to by parts of the Western political elite. This is called the dogma of popula tion controle. As ugly as wars may be, but, they reduce populations quite effectively. If African populations can be reduced, the longterm strategic danger that African nations would use up their precious raw materials for themselves can be eliminated. This is the ugly truth behind the paradigm shift Western Africa policy underwent during the last 30 years. Thus, Western powers foment wars and destabilisations of governments in Africa. Than, they only have to find the rebels, mercenaries or warlords to make the deals for taking the raw materials out of the continent, leaving the local population to their fate in misery.
During the days of Africa's liberation struggle in the 1950s and 60s the rapid economic development of Africa to levels of standards of living comparable to Western Europe or the United States was the generally accepted policy orientation. Underdevelopment was considered the problem, not overpopulation. This changed with the introduction of the irrationalist Malthusian dogmas of the Club of Rome in 1971 and the first World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974. From then on, socalled overpopulation was regarded as the problem for Africa, not underdevelopment. Starting with the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 200 "Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for U.S. Security and Overseas Interests", authored by than National Security Council Secretary Henry Kissinger for the United States Government in December of 1974, Neo-Malthusianism was widely introduced into the policy formulations of all Western governments and internat
ional
organisations like the United Nations.[21] Other policy outlines of governments and thinktanks followed the same line, for example Jimmy Carter's Global 2000 plan. Malthusianism also became the dominant ideology in Western universities and the media, and increasingly changed public opinion., so much so that the horrific human catastrophe, the worst since World War II, which has been unleashed since 1990 in Central Africa finds no adaequate recognition, neither with Western governments nor with the general public.
7. Conclusion and the case of Andre Ntagerura.
Andre Ntagerura was a very senior member of the last government of President Habyarimana. He also belonged to the central committee of the MRND. Before being the Minister of Transportation and Communications in the first government in April of 1992 which included opposition parties, he held other portfolios before, like Social Affairs and Public Works. The MRND included him as Minister of Planning in the list of Ministers they were proposing for the broad based government agreed upon in the 1993 Arusha peace negotiations, to which the RPF did not raise any objections at the time. Minister Ntagerura had the reputation of a very competent technocrat in his field more so than a politician. He was a well respected and competent negotiator in regional organisations such as the Kagera Basin Organisation (KBO) of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania where he was work ing on linking Rwanda by rail through the Central Corridor to the Tanzanian railsystem to reach the port of Dar Es Salaam. He was also promoting a Northern Corridor via Uganda and Kenia to the port of Mombassa. He was committed to developing the transport- infrastructure of Rwanda and its neighbors, because he regarded this as key for overcoming the misery of the people living in the region. In this context, he reportedly was a respected Rwandan representative with international organisations such as the World Bank. In May of 1994 Ntagerura led the Rwandan government delegation to Arusha to try and negotiate a ceasefire agreement with the RPF.
Andre Ntagerura was a very senior member of the last government of President Habyarimana. He also belonged to the central committee of the MRND. Before being the Minister of Transportation and Communications in the first government in April of 1992 which included opposition parties, he held other portfolios before, like Social Affairs and Public Works. The MRND included him as Minister of Planning in the list of Ministers they were proposing for the broad based government agreed upon in the 1993 Arusha peace negotiations, to which the RPF did not raise any objections at the time. Minister Ntagerura had the reputation of a very competent technocrat in his field more so than a politician. He was a well respected and competent negotiator in regional organisations such as the Kagera Basin Organisation (KBO) of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania where he was work ing on linking Rwanda by rail through the Central Corridor to the Tanzanian railsystem to reach the port of Dar Es Salaam. He was also promoting a Northern Corridor via Uganda and Kenia to the port of Mombassa. He was committed to developing the transport- infrastructure of Rwanda and its neighbors, because he regarded this as key for overcoming the misery of the people living in the region. In this context, he reportedly was a respected Rwandan representative with international organisations such as the World Bank. In May of 1994 Ntagerura led the Rwandan government delegation to Arusha to try and negotiate a ceasefire agreement with the RPF.
The Habyarimana government was the legitimate government of Rwanda in 1990. Like any other government it clearly had the right to buy weapons and defend the country, when it was attacked. Mainly with French assistance the government increased the army from 5,000 to about 50,000 men in 1993. Given the guerilla tactics, the invading forces were using, it is understandable for the military and political leadership of the country to also organize militias. Between the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1994 the government faced a total onslaught amidst the collaps of the economy and the desperate effects of more than 1 million refugees uprooted by the advancing enemy troops. That groups of extremists played an ethnic card within the broader context of the governments efforts to survive cannot be held principally against every member of the government or the old ruling party. The stock-taking of the 1990-1994 events in Rwanda would not be complete
without
mentioning, that atrocities and mass-killings were committed on both sides of the political divide. But the internal human catastrophy in Rwanda would not have happened without the military, political, and intelligence services intervention from the outside. Unless the truth about this aspect of the Rwanda tragedy is uncovered, justice can not be done.
Political analysis has to uncover the processes which lead to desasters such as the catastrophe in Rwanda during the last decade of the 20th century. The contribution of political analysis to justice and reconciliation exists in drawing lessons from it. After the people of Rwanda and Burundi have lived through the horrors of fratricidal wars again and again during the second half of the 20th century, they will only be able to find longlasting peace and reconciliation among themselves if the attitude and policy of the Western powers towards this sorrow stricken part of Africa changes. The policy of promoting economic misery and conflicts must be replaced by finally creating peace through real development.
Notes
[1] Financial Times, London, November 14, 1998.
[1] Financial Times, London, November 14, 1998.
[2] The Observer, London, August 18, 1996
[3] BBC News, London, February 5, 2002.
[4] The Monitor, Kampala, March 31, 2002
[5] "Covert Action in Africa: A Smoking Gun in Washington, D.C." news brief from U.S. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, April 16, 2001.
[5a] News brief Cynthia Mc Kinney: Statement by Keith Snow and Wayne Madson
[5b] Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record of Wayne Madson before the Subcommittee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2001.
[6] "Rwandese Refugees in Uganda, Ogenga Otunnu," in The Path of Genocide, The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, New Brunswick, N.J.: Surke Transaction Publishers, 1999.
[7] Impuruzu newsletter, June 1988.
[8] "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPF) Ogenga Otunnu," in The Path of Genocide, The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, New Brunswick, N.J.: Surke Transaction Publishers, 1999.
[9] The Monitor, Kampala, May 30, 1999.
[10] The Monitor, Kampala, June 1, 1999.
[11] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 21, 1995.
[12] New African Yearbook 2001, London: IC Publication.
[13] Yoweri T. Museveni, "Fanon's Theory on Violence: Its Verification in Liberated Mozambique."
[14] Yoweri Museveni, "What Hope for Africa?" address to 1995 annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland.
[15] Richard Dowden, "Uganda Slips Through West's Democracy Net."
[16] Sam Kiley, "New Leaders Take Africa's Destiny Into Their Own Hands," in The Times of London, May 20, 1997.
[17] Peter Scholl Latour, Afrikanische Totenklage, Bertelsmann Verlag, 2002.
[18] Debt tables from World Bank data.
[19] Bruce Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process," in The Path of Genocide, The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, New Brunswick, N.J.: Surke Transaction Publishers, 1999.
[20] Statement by the UN Secretary General, Dec. 16, 1999.
[21] NSSM 200, Dec. 10, 1974, Executive Summary.
Selected Bibliography
New African Yearbook 2001, London: IC Publications.
New African Yearbook 2001, London: IC Publications.
The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, New Brunswick, N.J.: Surke Transaction Publishers, 1999.
L.R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, London: Zed Books, 2000.
Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, 1997.
Helmut Strizek, Ruanda und Burundi von der Unabhaengigkeit zum Staatszerfall, Cologne: Weltforum Verlag, 1996.
Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms, 1997, 2001.
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