MARINE CORPS PSYOP?
I. PURPOSE: To underscore the necessity for the Marine Corps and the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to be able to plan for and conduct psychological
operations (PSYOP).
II. PROBLEM:
We can expect the enemy to make extensive use of PSYOP in contemporary and future conflicts. The Marine Corps must understand and be prepared to employ PSYOP throughout the levels of war and across the spectrum of conflict. Presently, MAGTF's are incapable of planning for or conducting PSYOP.
...
IV. CONCLUSION: Our maritime expeditionary forces that are essential for credible
deterrence and warfighting across the spectrum of conflict must be prepared to plan for and conduct PSYOP.
V. RECOMMENDATION: A PSYOP Master Plan should be developed
to reemphasize and revitalize PSYOP capabilities within the Marine Corps; it should address: doctrine, training and education, planning, and force structure.
MARINE CORPS PSYOP? OUTLINE THESIS STATEMENT.
Our maritime expeditionary forces that are essential for credible deterrence and war fighting across the spectrum of conflict must be prepared to plan for and conduct psychological operations (PSYOP).
I. Service Roles and Missions ...
"To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To
subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Sun Tzu, 4th century B.C....
...
The National Security Act of 1947 required that the Marine Corps provide rapidly
deployable amphibious forces for contingency missions in support of national strategy. The requirement to deploy and employ Marine forces as part of the fleet resulted in establishment of Fleet Marine Forces (FMF's). Marine Corps policy is that these FMF's will be employed as integrated air-ground teams -- Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) comprised of combat, combat support units, and combat service support units. The Marine Corps describes these MAGTF's as integrated, balanced air-ground combined arms forces organized for combat with their own combat service support elements. It advertises the MAGTF's as multi-purpose forces that can operate across the spectrum of conflict and perform all aspects of military operations. The Marine Corps believes that MAGTF's will become the nation's "force of choice" in the most likely future conflicts. This may not be the case as the Marine Corps has failed to embrace the concept of psychological warfare. MAGTF's are incapable of planning for or conducting psychological operations. Psychological operations, or PSYOP, are a form of political and military activity that is defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication l as: Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotion, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originators objectives.The attitudes and behaviors of foreign groups can influence situations in ways advantageous or harmful to the attainment of one's objectives. The use of PSYOP is but one way by which foreign individual and group attitudes and behaviors can be influenced. PSYOP are conducted during peacetime, crisis, hostilities short of declared war, and declared war. PSYOP can be executed in a national, joint, combined, or single-Service context, by unified or specified commands, by subordinate unified commands or joint tasks forces. PSYOP can be carried out as an integral part of an overall military action or independently of other military operations. PSYOP are a vital part of modern military and political power. When fully coordinated with tactical, operational, and strategic military planning and effectively integrated in the military decision-making process, PSYOP enhance combat power.The ultimate objective of PSYOP is to convince enemy, friendly,and neutral nations and forces to take actions favorable to the United States.
1 Effective PSYOP modify the behavior of the target audience in accordance with the
commander's objectives. Military and political leaders have used PSYOP in various forms throughout history. Alexander the Great perfected a method of psychological harassment which was the hidden cause of many of his victories. Alexander developed psychological procedures and his actions were similar to modern day psychological operations. He developed and put into practice the following principles: (l) Maintain good relationships with pacifistic elements within neighboring peoples in order to take advantage of favorable opinions and sentiments.(2) Use secret agents to infiltrate and spread rumors and news.(3) In moments of crisis, bury the enemy -- with public opinion-- under an avalanche of information, true or false, that can produce concern, demoralization and chaos.
Genghis Khan, "the true father of psychological warfare" is credited with leading huge
hordes of savage horsemen across Russia and into Europe. The size of his armies was exaggerated by agents planted in advance of the army and by rumors and other forms of propaganda. To supplement his PSYOP activities, Ghengis Khan also used rapid troop maneuver to confirm the illusion of invincible numbers. Because the Mongols created an image of total, barbaric domination, target groups never believed they were the victims of astute psychological warfare. Once the image had spread, the Mongols had created a permanent weakness in the enemy psychology and thus gained a military advantage wherever the Mongol reputation was known.2
Today, PSYOP have become more critical as ideological and revolutionary struggles
increase. When properly conducted, PSYOP can be an effective force multiplier throughout the spectrum of conflict (low, mid, and high intensity). PSYOP can reduce enemy combat effectiveness by inducing enemy forces to disengage, desert, or act less aggressively; degrade enemy morale; enhance deception operations; facilitate the occupation of enemy towns; help control enemy and friendly civilians in the combat area; counter enemy propaganda; assist in rear area protection; and confuse and harass the enemy.
During peacetime, PSYOP are generally not needed for support of routine naval
operations. Strategically, however, PSYOP may be appropriate to increase the willingness of foreign nations to provide facilities that support U.S. Navy operations, to reduce foreign government willingness to support operations of potentially hostile powers, and to retaliate for foreign actions that adversely affect or interfere with naval operations. During crisis and the execution of associated short-term military operations, PSYOP should be conducted to gain support from foreign nations for U.S. positions, to influence the military and civilian personnel of the nations against which operations may be undertaken in order to gain objectives without the need for combat, and to support the achievement of the objectives of military operations in minimum time with minimum casualties. During war, combat operations may be conducted in, or on, the periphery of a single country, be limited to a single theater, or be conducted worldwide. Regardless of the extent of the area of conflict, ideological warfare in the form of PSYOP should be conducted on a worldwide basis. Three basic reasons for this are to gain support for U.S. actions, to isolate enemy nations from outside support, and to establish a psychological climate to achieve postwar goals.
Against enemy nations, PSYOP campaigns are conducted to weaken the effectiveness of the enemy's military forces by reducing the will to fight among the enemy populace and leadership groups, and to degrade the ability of commanders and political leaders to act decisively. Service responsibilities for PSYOP are addressed both in JCS Pub 2, the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) and JCS Pub 27, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. The UNAAF sets forth principles and doctrines governing joint activities and the performance of the armed forces of the United States. With regard to PSYOP, the UNAAF states that each Military Department and Service will: (l) Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate PSYOP planning skills.(2) Provide capabilities organic to Service forces to execute PSYOP actions and, as appropriate, dedicated PSYOP forces and equipment. (3) Provide PSYOP forces or detachments to CINC's for service in foreign countries.(4) Provide departmental intelligence to support planning and conduct of PSYOP. (5) Provide departmental intelligence and counterintelligence assets, trained, equipped and organized to support planning and conducting wartime PSYOP.(6) Train and educate departmental personnel to counter and neutralize effects of hostile foreign PSYOP.
JCS Pub 27 addresses the use of psychological operations and identifies the following as specific responsibilities of the Marine Corps:
(l) Develop PSYOP policy guidance, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for
the primary functions assigned the Marine Corps, coordinating as appropriate with the other Services, to support:(a) The PSYOP campaigns of the unified commands, through the designated subordinate component commander of joint force commander. (b) Land and associated air operations to seize advanced naval bases or other objectives essential to the successful prosecution of a naval campaign.(c) Assault phase and subsequent land combat of amphibious operations. (d) Defense of Marine Corps bases, installations, and forces in foreign countries.(e) Intelligence and counterintelligence collection by MarineCorps forces.
(2) Plan and conduct tactical PSYOP in support of the component commander. Allegedly, the groundwork for the development of a basic PSYOP capability within the MAGTF is addressed within its "blueprints for the future": the MAGTF Master Plan, the Operational Concept for the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), and the Operational Concept for Marine Corps Employment in Low Intensity Conflict.3
However, these concepts only highlight the Marine Corps' and the MAGTF's inability to plan for or conduct PSYOP. Published as a Marine Corps Order in October 1975, the Marine Corps doctrine for PSYOP is over fourteen years old. It states "commanders at all levels are responsible for planning and conducting psychological operations affecting their missions"; however, it provides no guidance or direction for the conduct of PSYOP by the MAGTF. In truth, the Marine Corps has no viable doctrine for the conduct of PSYOP. The MAGTF Master Plan (MMP) foresees that PSYOP will become an organic capability of future MAGTF's. Accordingly, MAGTF's will be able to execute PSYOP across the spectrum of conflict. It states that:MAGTF's will conduct active psychological operations ranging from planned civic actions to the employment of specially organized, trained and equipped psychological warfare units. The MAGTF commander and his staff will plan and employ organic assets in support of psychological operations objectives. They will also be able to integrate other Service units such as specialized U.S.Army loudspeaker and audio-visual direct support teams as required. However, the MMP also recognizes that, presently, the Marine Corps has no doctrine for PSYOP, lacks PSYOP billets for all MAGTF's, has no PSYOP training for Marines, and has no collateral PSYOP support equipment...
However, current MAGTFcommand element task organizations do not provide for a PSYOP billet nor do proposed changes to MAGTFcommand element task organizations substantially remedy this deficiency. No one is performing the PSYOP officer staff functions: advising the commander on PSYOP; preparing PSYOP plans and estimates; coordinating PS-OP activities; analyzing target audiences and evaluating the effects of PSYOP; and supervising the conduct of PSYOP campaigns. Operational Handbook 6-1, Ground Combat Operations is the Marine Corps' basic manual for combat. While it contains no revolutionary departures, it provides the principles of combat operations based principally on the experience of Marines in battle and although it identifies PSYOP as one of those general tasks to be considered in battle, it does not provide for PSYOP techniques, procedures, professional education nor individual and unit training.The Art of War, a treatise written by the Chinese military thinker Sun Tzu in the fourth century B.C., advocates the idea that an army of superior numbers can be "made not to fight."
Even General A. M. Gray recognized the "human dimension" in war and that "moral
forces exert a greater influence on the nature and outcome of war than do physical."4
Psychological operations have been used as an integral part of military operations throughout history. As the Marine Corps plans for the evolution of the current MAGTF, it can ill afford to pay lip service to the role of psychological warfare and the conduct of PSYOP. The Marine Corps must recognize the vital role PSYOP have on the battlefield and must prepare the MAGTF's for the conduct of psychological operations. The Marine Corps must prepare MAGTF commanders to identify and employ organic assets in support of PSYOP objectives. MAGTF commanders must be concerned with the role of the MAGTF, whether active or passive, in the attainment of psychological objectives and the impact of PSYOP on his mission and concept of operations. At the tactical level, he must understand the capabilities and limitations of joint PSYOP units in support of the MAGTF or joint task force.5
Additionally, every Marine should have a basic understanding of the purpose and capabilities of PSYOP. There emphasis and revitalization of PSYOP within the Marine Corps will not take place overnight, but take place it must. The Marine Corps should develop its own PSYOP Master Plan addressing: doctrine, planning, education and training, and force structure. Only in this manner will the Marine Corps fulfill its responsibilities for PSYOP.Doctrine sets forth the purposes and fundamental operating principles for employment of forces. Our Service doctrine concerning PSYOP must be aligned with joint doctrine, but more importantly it must provide guidance and direction for the MAGTF's employment and use of PSYOP. The conduct of psychological operations is not the exclusive domain of specialized units.6
The Marine Corps must develop PSYOP planners to meet the needs of the MAGTF and to provide our proportionate share of planners on joint staffs. Trained PSYOP planners will then be able to properly advise MAGTF commanders regarding PSYOP and exploitation of military exercises, deployment of forces, contact with foreign nationals through port visits and civic action, and specific types of combat operations. Education and training is essential to the revitalization of PSYOP within the Marine Corps. We must produce commanders and planners who understand PSYOP and can evaluate situations for the employment of PSYOP. The Marine Corps needs to produce planners who can prepare PSYOP plans and supervise their execution. Additionally awareness education and training must be provided to all Marines as it addresses the purposes, uses, and capabilities of friendly PSYOP activities and, also, the hostile PSYOP threat. Finally, it's not necessary that the Marine Corps develop new force structure to provide PSY0P personnel and planners in the Marine Corps. Rather, the emphasis should be to identify PSYOP billets within our current and proposed MAGTF command element task organizations. Additional military occupational specialties already exist within the Marine Corps to support assignments and the continued professional development of PSYOP officers and men. Our maritime expeditionary forces that are essential for credible deterrence and war fighting across the spectrum of conflict must be prepared to plan for and conduct PSYOP. Psychological operations are an important dimension of military power. Whether we accept it or not, everything we do or fail to do has a psychological impact on our enemies, our allies, neutrals, and even ourselves. We can expect the enemy to make extensive use of PSYOP in future conflicts, therefore the Marine Corps must understand and be prepared to employ PSYOP throughout the levels of war and across the spectrum of conflict.
END
NOTES
1 Headquarters,Department of the Army, Psychological Operations FM 33-1, Washington, DC, July 1987, p.vi.
2 Ibid., p. 2-14.
3 Susan J. Flores, "PSYOP and the Marine Corps",Marine Corps Gazette,
September 1989, pp. 40-42.
4 U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, FMFM 1, Marine CorpsCombat Development
Command, Quantico, Virginia, March 1989, pp. 12-13.
5 Flores, pp. 40-42.
6 Alfred H. Paddock, Military PsychologicalOperations:Current Directions, undated, p. 11.
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