Sowing the Mustard Seed in Harsh Terrain
|
| ||||||||||
The Nation (Nairobi)
ANALYSIS
June 17, 2005
Posted to the web June 17, 2005
Peter Kimani
Nairobi
In the final of the two-part series on the conflict in northern Uganda, Daily Nation's senior writer PETER KIMANI explains why Uganda's political future may hinge on events in the north
Uganda President Museveni
|
|
Yoweri Museveni was a young student at Dar es Salaam University in Tanzania in 1980, where he joined hands with other students, mainly from western Uganda, to form the Front for National Salvation, Fronasa.
The political crisis that followed the 1980 poll, and the fragmentation of the the national army, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) after the fall of Idi Amin in 1979, provided Fronasa a tremendous boost, as it drew from disgruntled Acholi elements in the army, who felt sufficiently aggrieved to wage a war against Milton Obote - who discriminated against them.
Fronasa was further boosted by Rwandan elements in Uganda, to become the Popular Resistance Army, and later the National Resistance Army/Movement.
At this point, the stage was set for a bruising war that revived "colonial" grudges and complicated Uganda's contemporary politics.
The civil war that lasted from 1981 to 1985, unfolded in the Baganda district of Luwero, in what is now dubbed as the Luwero Triangle.
Thousands were killed in the resultant violence, and the region plundered. Twenty years on, Luwero Triangle remains a strong symbol of Acholis' perceived evil, rehashed by politicians to whip up "anti-northern" sentiments.
In this analogy, every Acholi is declared as an accomplice to the slaughter of innocent Baganda who perished in the Triangle, a theme that Museveni highlights in his autobiography, Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda.
"Whenever they looted," Museveni instructs, giving the example of theft of corrugated roofing sheets, "they would take them to their homes, and their parents would not ask where they obtained them- in this way, the whole community in Acholi and Lango became involved in the plundering of Uganda for themselves-"
Former Ugandan president Milton Obote
By demonising a whole region, the Museveni regime effectively galvanised huge portions of the country to remain indifferent to the plight of fellow citizens.
But the causes of Luwero Triangle remained opaque, and as Museveni's words pointed during the Nairobi peace talks in 1985, his motivation to take up arms was more than claims of poll fraud.
"The problem in Uganda is that leadership has mainly been from the north. The southerners who are mainly Bantu have played a peripheral role all these years since independence in 1962," Museveni would tell Drum Magazine in Nairobi, where peace talks were hosted to foster a truce between warring factions in August 1985. The post-1985 events further consolidated this position and analysts say they bear a direct link on why the conflict just won't end.
"The civil war," contends Prof Dani Wadada Nabudere, "was the result of a failure by all the political leaders since Uganda's independence to rise above ethnic and religious divisions and organise the country along democratic lines. Instead, the Ugandan political elite continued the politics of 'divide and rule.'"
Former rebel leader Alice Lakwena
The emergence of "prophetic" movements like Alice Lakwena's "spiritual" rebellion reflected the uncertainty that shrouded the national army and politics, writes Willet Weeks in Pushing the Envelope: Moving Beyond 'Protected Villages' in Northern Uganda.
Lakwena could not explain the initial grievance that saw her take arms when the Nation contacted her this week at Dadaab refugee camp in northern Kenya, where she has been exiled since 1994, but maintained her desire to return home.
Lords Resistance Army
Joseph Kony's emergence with the Lord's Resistance Army, also reading from a "holy" script, carried on with the struggle, although there were significant transformations.
"Each of these phases must be examined separately in order to understand their import and impact," instructs Prof Nabudere. The LRA insurgency in the north added a new dimension in 1994, when Khartoum and other rich Arab countries aided them, apparently to help fight the Sudan People's Liberation Army operating from Uganda, enjoying Kampala's political and military support.
Both Khartoum and Kampala signed a protocol in 2002 committing to stop aiding each other's rebels, and joined hands in the hugely controversial Operation Iron Fist.
Determined to close in on Islamic fundamentalists that had found a haven in the Sudan, the US government funded the operation from March 2002, and which critics say turned out to be an unmitigated disaster.
Kony's rebels split into smaller units and fled back into eastern Uganda, and stepped up their attacks on villages, pushing thousands more into camps.
"Since Operation Iron Fist started," the Uganda Human Rights Commission says in its 2002 annual report, "the people of Kitgum, Pader and Gulu have suffered more terror than they experienced in the whole of 2001".
Apart from the dislocation, heavy casualties were also reported, with 1,000 killed or missing.
Experts say Uganda's future is somewhat hinged in the north, where Museveni is facing the litmus test Ð not just in the negotiation of the peace process, but also in restoring the confidence that the hard-won national gains are not reversed.
There is a widespread view that Museveni is using the conflict to outlaw political parties (Uganda is a non-party 'movement'), thereby denying his political opponents a powerbase.
"Those who say that are either ignorant of the realities on the ground, or are deliberately insulting President Museveni," says Dr Ruhakana Rugunda, Uganda's Minister of State for Internal Affairs.
Critics also say Museveni's explanation for outlawing political parties is meant to discourage ethnicisation of politics, is contradicted by his policy of creating ethnic militias to counter LRA insurgency in the North.
Currently, there are at least 7,000 Arrow Boys in Teso sub-region, 8,000 Rhinos or Amuka in Lang'o and unknown numbers of Local Defence Units in Acholi sub-region.
"With a displaced population of 1.4 million, 700,000 of whom are male, and of which around 300,000 would be over the age of 18, that means possibly 10 per cent of the adult male displaced population is now under arms," explained analyst Chris Dolan in a recent presentation in London.
Dolan says Museveni has not pursued dialogue seriously, preferring instead to militarise his country.
This view is echoed by Betty Bigombe, a former minister of State who has taken it upon herself to resolve the conflict with admirable zeal. "The government uses a two-pronged approach - war as you talk. This is not easy," she says.
"In our view, the two (fighting and talking) are complimentary," contests Rugunda, adding that the government has a responsibility to protect its citizens.
Bigombe says violations of past agreements has led to "deep distrust" between the government and the rebels, making peace ever so elusive.
But she remains optimistic: "Both parties (government and the rebels) repeatedly express interest and commitment to the process," she says, but hastens to add that a truce cannot be achieved overnight. "It's a process that will take time."
"The government is ready to go to great lengths to get peace in northern Uganda," assures Rugunda.
Ironically, suggestions to engage LRA in negotiations have not always been received warmly by Kampala.
Last month, the European Union head in Uganda Sigurd Illing was accused by the senior presidential advisor on Media and Public Relations, John Nagenda, of "fuelling rebellion," in the north.
Illing clarified he had recommended dialogue, not war, as Museveni is keen on doing.
If the conflict in northern Uganda has somewhat soured relations with donors, the future of southern Sudan is equally problematic.
Although both Kampala and Khartoum profess to have severed links with each other's rebels, intra-Sudan politics militate against that resolution.
The presence of Equatorial Defence Forces (EDF) and South Sudan Defence Forces, who control huge territories in southern Sudan, and have links with LRA, could offer them a safety net.
"The LRA will always find soft landing in the EDF territories since EDF is hostile to SPLM/A and hates Uganda for supporting them," says Prof Nabudere.
The International Crisis Group concedes that failure to address the LRA question in the comprehensive peace agreement signed in Kenya between SPLM and Khartoum, was a big omission.
Existing militias
But SPLM's director general of national peace and reconciliation, James Kok Ruea, says there is no chance for existing militias to operate in southern Sudan after July 9, when SPLA shall formulate the national army and secure the region.
"The agreement is very clear about the security issue," he says, "All militias in Sudan will either be integrated into the national army in the north or south."
None of the two groups have indicated where their loyalties lie, but Ruea is firm about LRA's future.
"There is no way LRA are going to operate in southern Sudan," he says. "They are going to look for another base."
They already have set new bases in eastern Uganda, where they have been holed up since 2002, after escaping the UPDF's bombing expedition in the botched Operation Iron Fist.
This shifts the focus on Uganda, where an assortment of religious leaders under the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative are trying to broker peace.
And then there is the Bigombe initiative, which looks ever so promising, more so with the opening of communication lines between Kony and Bigombe.
"Since late March, I have been speaking to him (Kony) directly on the phone," explains Bigombe.
|
Dennis Mughisha, a 25-year-old student, thinks the United Nations should intervene, while Moses Tabaan places his hope on religious leaders.
Christine Ayaa, 30-year-old and mother of two, and whose relatives have been killed by the rebels, limps outside the hut that she shares with seven of her orphaned nephews and nieces, tears standing in her eyes.
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com
_______________________________________________ Ugandanet mailing list [email protected] http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/ugandanet % UGANDANET is generously hosted by INFOCOM http://www.infocom.co.ug/
