Ndugu Mitayo,
I strongly disagree. Like an opportunistic disease, Zionists are taking
advantage of a pre-existing condition. In any case, to put it simply, it
is crazy and totally bankrupt to think as you do that a murderous state
has the right to butcher its own citizens in the tens of thousands on
the spurious allegation that they harbour Zionist proxies. Without
prejudice to the fact that Sudan is indeed a target of Western hegemony
(which Third World country isn't) this line of reasoning should land you
a place in a lunatic asylum.
This is the bigger picture, my brother. We black people, the true owners
of Abibiman, the continent that the West has tutored us to call Africa,
have suffered cataclysmic invasions by two pairs of supremacist
ideologies; one Muslim and Turko-Arab and the other European and Christian.
The tragic folly of many African progressives (you are a fine example)
born out of and fed on the breast milk of our struggles against European
colonialism has been to forget that even before medieval Europeans
jumped into the fray, the Turko-Arab-Muslim world had invaded us from
the north and completed the destruction of the Black civilizations of
Kemet (ancient Egypt) and Nubia that the Greeks had started. It was only
the relative technological backwardness of Turko-Arab-Muslim colonialism
and impenetreable geography that made it possible for frontier
nationalities (including the Ma'di to which I proudly belong) to resist
Arab- and Turkish-led slavery and imperialism.
Those of us who belong to nationalities in the borderlands, whose direct
experience of colonialism includes the Turko-Arab-Muslim variety, can
tell you that it is cruel joke to ask us to choose one over the other.
Both must be fought and defeated. But because many African progressives
have only focused on European- and Judeo-Christian-led slavery and
imperialism, we have an intolerable situation in which Arab supremacists
are having a field day in Sudan and Mauretania, especially.
Sudan's misfortune, as that of other African/Arab borderland countries
(until recently including Chad), is to be saddled with a state that has
been "captured" by an elite from a minority distinguished by its claim
of Arab descent. That Arab minority, in each of the affected borderland
countries has unleashed proto-apartheid regimes onto the nationalities
that still cling to their African identities, irrespective of religious
belief. The extremely predatory and manipulative state in these
countries has created a political and socio-economic order in which it
is not enough to be Muslim to fully belong and benefit. You must in the
best possible mix acquiesce and become an assimilated Arab and a Muslim.
You need to take a crash course in the political economy of the Sahelian
belt, which runs from Sudan to Mauretania.
Back to Darfur. The interesting thing about this part of contemporary
Sudan is that although nearly 100 percent of the indigenous peoples
converted to Islam, they retained their African identities and formed
strong empires or states (sultanates) that successly resisted conquest
and assimilation by invading Arab groups. It was actually the British
who eventually managed to incorporate the people of Darfur into the
modern state that the Arab ruling cliques in Khartoum inherited. Despite
their amazing success in employing anti-imperialist rhetoric and
alliances, those cliques (principally organized around the Mirghani,
Mahdi, and Akwana Muslimin/Muslim Brotherhood politico-religious
families/clans) are step-children of European colonialism. They owe
their political and economic power almost entirely to British colonial
policy in Sudan.
Now, what's that to do with Darfur? Darfur has given the ruling cliques
in Khartoum two unique resources: gum Arabic and what Mirambo would have
called mapimpiti or logs to throw into the fires of civil war. The one
has helped to strengthen them economically, the other to provide the
backbone of the pseudo-jihadist armies that the Arab supremacist state
has used to repress politically, economically, and culturally
marginalized nationalities.
In many senses, the war in Darfur is a direct outcome of the two wars
that southern Sudanese guerrillas fought against the Arab-supremacist
state. During the first civil war (1955-1972), the Khartoum regimes
recruited a big percentage of the members of the state army from western
(Darfur) and central (the Nuba mountains) Sudan. Because the desired
populations were predominantly Muslim, the state used Islam as a
recruiting ideology. So, during the first war Darfurians and the Nuba
fought and died to prop up the Arab-supremacist state, but collectively
gaine dabsolutely nothing. Western and central Sudan remained
economically backward. Actually, the Nuba became wiser after the
experience. Whereas in the 1960s, only the Christian and "animist Nuba
under Abuna Philip Ghaboush rebelled against Khartoum's discriminatory
policies, during the 1980s and 1990s, they overwhelmingly (Muslim,
Christian, and "animist") under the charismatic leadership of Yusuf
Kuwa, made common cause with the southern Sudanese.
Meanwhile, Darfurians were again hoodwinked and pressed into joining the
Arab-supremacist military juntas in fighting another fratricidal war
against fellow marginalized non-Arabized indigenous Sudanese in the
south. But something funny different happened during the 1983-2004 civil
war. The SPLA fought a non-secessionist war, claiming as its aim, the
liberation of the entire country. Remarkably through its
"socialist"/pro-Soviet and "capitalist/Christian" and pro-US phases, the
SPLA maintained its core objective to liberate the whole of Sudan.
So, Col John Garang's guerrilla movement, which overall had a more
educated and ideologically more sophisticated cadreship than the rebels
under Gen Joseph Lagu (during Anyanya I), was more inclusive. So,
disenchanted members of the elite from the north, east, and west joined
the SPLA. Among them was Dr Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, an Arab and a
scion of the founder of the Democratic Unionist Party, which is part of
the ruling cliques. Even Sadiq el Mahdi, another Arab leader and
grandson of the Mahdi who led a successful rebellion against the
British-Egyptian condominium, for almost a decade allied his Umma Party
with the SPLA.
Once again, the Darfurians, who made the bulk of Khartoum's army fought
and died for Arab supremacy. Since man cannot feed on ideology, at least
not for too long, the people of Darfur, after realizing that they were
not gaining anything economically and political from the "jihads" that
Khartoum made them fight for almost 40 years started asking questions.
Environmental degradation and attendant conflicts over pastureland
provided the spark that ignited the rebellion in Darfur.
As always, extraneous geopolitical interests impose themselves on
essentially local conflicts. And Darfur's case is no different. But it
would be wrong-headed and simplistic to conclude that the fighting in
western Sudan is instigated by Zionists.
I have said elsewhere that what's happening in Sudan is the slow but
painful death of a crypto-apartheid, racist, and supremacist fiction:
that Sudan is an Arab country. According to the only census carried out
in Sudan outside of a period of war, only 30 percent of the population
of the country claims Arab descent. This odious reality of an oppresive
and supremacist minory clinging to power with the support of Arab
countries in north Africa and beyond is what fuels rebellion against the
Sudanese state.
The statist ideology under which Sudan is currently organized can claim
as much nationalist legitimacy as the Boers and Anglos in South Africa
did under apartheid. In like vein, for the evolue or assimilated Arabs
of Sudan to claim that the country is part of the Arab world is as
absurd as the whites in Rhodesia and South Africa claiming that their
countries were part of Europe.
Despite having been sacrificed long ago by African progressives like
yourself on the altar of unexamined Third World solidarity, the
non-Arabized people of Sudan are grabbing whatever help they can
(sometimes unfortunately from Zionists) to fight a racist and
supremacist state. And guess what? They are winning. Very soon Sudan
will emerge from the nightmare created by the minority ruling cliques in
Khartoum with the support of the entire Arab world.
All of us Black people whose first allegiance is to Africa should be
ashamed that we have allowed this intolerable situation to go on with
our connivance for the last 50 years.
Vukoni
Mitayo Potosi wrote:
*I have always maintained that what is taking place in Darfur has been
manufactured and financed by Zionists. It is they who are arming the
so called rebels there. Their weapons are sent through Eriterea.*
*They confine the Palestinians in a cage that is Gaza, **and then tell
you that they love the black man so much !!*
*Let me again paraphrase the wisest words Museveni has ever told us:
"If we are stupid (to naively swallow the Zionist Darfur hoax) then we
deserve to be enslaved"*
**
*Read on......*
Go to Original
<http://www.blackcommentator.com/197/197_a_tale_of_two_genocides_africa_action.html>
*The Tale of Two Genocides:
The Failed US Response to Rwanda and Darfur*
By Africa Action
The Black Commentator
Wednesday 11 August 2006
Africa Action is the oldest Africa advocacy organization in the
U.S. Its mission is to change U.S. Africa relations to promote
political, economic and social justice in Africa. Africa Action
provides accessible information and analysis, and mobilizes popular
support for campaigns to achieve this mission.
On September 9, the two-year anniversary of the Bush
Administration's recognition that genocide is occurring in Darfur,
Africa Action joined with hundreds of activists for a rally and act of
civil disobedience in front of the White House. During the rally,
participants made their mark of witness with red handprints to
represent the victims of the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. This
gathering emphasized the urgent need for concerted efforts by the U.S.
to remove the obstacles to the deployment of a United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping force to protect the people of Darfur.
*Introduction*
In 1994, an estimated 800,000 people died in Rwanda, as the U.S.
and the international community failed to mount an intervention to
stop genocide. Senior U.S. officials later expressed regret, and
acknowledged that this crime against humanity should have invoked a
more urgent and active response. It is reported that President Bush
reviewed a memo on the Rwandan genocide early in his presidency and
wrote "Not on my Watch" in the margin of that document.[1]
Less than a decade after the Rwandan genocide, the U.S. was faced
with another unfolding genocide in Africa, this time in Darfur,
western Sudan. In early 2003, the government of Sudan and its proxy
militias unleashed a scorched earth campaign, targeting civilians from
three African communities in Darfur and causing untold death and
destruction.
More than three years later, the Darfur genocide is continuing on
the Bush Administration's watch. The U.S. has again failed to take the
action necessary to stop the violence and protect civilians from
genocide. The dynamics are different on the ground and
internationally, and the level of engagement among policymakers and
the public is different in this case, too. But the failure to stop
genocide once again is clear, and the outcome remains the same - the
loss of hundreds of thousands of African lives as the world looks on.
This report by Africa Action identifies patterns in the U.S.
response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and to the current genocide
in Darfur, Sudan. It explores the similarities and differences in the
reaction of U.S. policymakers and the American public, and it examines
the important lessons the U.S. has yet to learn. Finally, Africa
Action lays out in this report the actions needed now from the U.S. to
stop the genocide in Darfur. It underscores the possibility and
necessity of a more urgent and effective U.S. response to this
genocide, and the obligation of the entire international community to
assert its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur.
This Africa Action report is released on September 9, 2006 to mark
the two-year anniversary of the Bush Administration's acknowledgement
that what is happening in Darfur constitutes genocide. The passage of
this anniversary and the continuation of the genocide in Darfur
indicate the inadequacy of U.S. policies in response to this crisis.
*The United States and Genocide in Rwanda*
In one hundred days of genocide, beginning in April 1994, Rwanda
experienced a death toll with a speed and magnitude unparalleled in
modern history. In a carefully planned and nearly successful attempt
to eliminate the Tutsi minority, the Hutu-controlled government
incited masses of the Hutu population to take up arms against those
deemed enemies of the state. As a result, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi
and moderate Hutu were killed.[2]
Today, the world recognizes the shamefully inadequate
international response to the genocide in Rwanda. The United Nations
(UN) observes a Day of Remembrance for this genocide's victims, and
numerous world leaders have repeated the mantra of "never again."
However, as the violence unfolded on the ground twelve years ago, the
international community stood silently by, and key leaders such as the
United States maneuvered to avoid direct engagement and to limit any
robust response to stop the killing.
*What the US Knew*
During President Bill Clinton's trip to Africa in 1998, he stopped
in Kigali, Rwanda, to deliver an apology for not having done "as much
as we could" to stop the genocide in 1994. He announced to an audience
at the Kigali airport, "[A]ll over the world there were people like me
sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully
appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed
by this unimaginable terror."[3]
In fact, there exists a great deal of evidence to suggest that
detailed information on the scope of the genocide was indeed available
to the U.S. - both before and during the massacres in Rwanda. Reports
suggesting a high likelihood of massive ethnic violence had been
available even during the early 1990s. In January 1994, U.S.
intelligence analysts had predicted that in case of renewed conflict
in Rwanda, "the worst-case scenario would involve one half million
people dying."[4] In the final analysis, even these dire forecasts
proved to be conservative.
On April 6, 1994, the same day that Rwandan President
Habyarimana's plane was shot down and the crisis began to unfold,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell
drafted an urgent memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. In
it, she warned that the assassination could prompt an outbreak of
killings, and she urged the U.S. to appeal for calm.[5]
Within days, Joyce Leader, Deputy Chief of Mission stationed in
Rwanda, realized that a pattern of clear and systematic killing of
Tutsi had emerged.[6] Lists of the names of Tutsi and some Hutu
targets had been compiled and distributed, and blocks were being set
up along the roads to check people's identification papers and
separate those who would be eliminated.
Recognizing the extreme danger on the ground, the U.S. made the
decision to evacuate all American citizens from Rwanda. By April 10,
1994, the U.S Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson and 250 American
citizens had been evacuated from the country.[7] Memos prepared for
U.S. officials in subsequent days warned of a massive and impending
"bloodbath".[8] Though fully briefed on the unfolding crisis, the
Clinton Administration took no action to halt the growing violence,
and instead began to lobby for the withdrawal of the UN force in
Rwanda.[9]
As it continued to monitor the situation, the State Department
convened daily interagency meetings, also featuring representatives
from the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and the wider
intelligence community.[10] In the following weeks, U.S. intelligence
and defense reports repeated similar messages, warning of a worsening
crisis and growing death toll in Rwanda. On April 26, 1994, an
intelligence memo named individuals responsible for organizing the
violence and warned of their intent to exterminate the Tutsi
population. On May 9, 1994, a Defense Intelligence Agency report
discounted the notion that these massacres were spontaneous and
instead pointed the finger at the Rwandan government, which was
clearly targeting lists of people for destruction.[11]
During the weeks in which the genocide unfolded, staff within the
administration and in the intelligence community were steadily
confronted with irrefutable evidence. The U.S. made an informed
decision in choosing not to act to stop the genocide in Rwanda.
*What the US Did*
In a February 2004 interview, Madeleine Albright commented on her
role at the time as the U.S. ambassador to the UN. She stated, "I have
reviewed the record a lot, and I don't think actually that we could
have done more. I just wish that it had not been something that the
international community was not capable of dealing with. So it's a
huge regret."[12]
It is clear, however, that the U.S. could indeed have done more.
In the face of U.S. intelligence clearly demonstrating the rapidly
escalating violence, the question was not one of U.S. inability to
respond, but one of a lack of political will. A great effort was made
to ensure that the U.S. would avoid any direct involvement, and
particularly any military commitment, in Rwanda. This priority not
only led to deliberate inaction on the part of the Clinton
Administration, but also to proactive blocking of international
efforts to save lives.
Under the pretext that the reputation of peacekeeping was
suffering due to recent public failures, the U.S. lobbied to have the
UN force in Rwanda, UNAMIR, either removed or drastically reduced.
Administration officials apparently feared that increased UN
peacekeeping would eventually require some U.S. troop commitment. They
actively supported a UN withdrawal from Rwanda even as the genocide
was underway.[13] As a result of U.S. lobbying at the UN Security
Council, the decision was made to slash the force size in Rwanda and
leave only 270 peacekeepers behind.[14] This action left the people of
Rwanda without any international protection from the genocide.
The Clinton Administration promised to support an arms embargo,
and to work towards the renewal of the peace process, but this
rhetoric produced no change on the ground. U.S. officials acknowledged
that an arms embargo would essentially be useless in the face of a
genocide carried out mainly with machetes and other farm
implements.[15] There also seemed little chance of a return to the
negotiating table in the midst of such bloodshed in Rwanda.
The lack of real U.S. engagement on Rwanda was clear.
Demonstrating the dearth of high-level attention, President Clinton
did not devote a single meeting of his senior foreign policy advisors
to devising U.S. options for action on the crisis.[16] Some low- and
mid-level officials, recognizing the lack of top-level support for
larger engagement, sought more moderate tactics to lessen the death
toll. One suggestion was to jam the hateful radio transmissions, which
were inciting the general population to take up arms. This proposal
was rejected as a costly endeavor that would have too little effect.[17]
As the weeks of violence dragged on, U.S. officials consciously
and consistently evaded the use of the term "genocide," for fear of
invoking a responsibility to act.[18] Spokespeople for the
administration were challenged repeatedly on this question. They were,
in fact, instructed as to the precise language approved for use by the
U.S. State Department. At the same time, a message from a U.S.
political advisor to the State Department in late April stated that
the events in Rwanda clearly met the definition of genocide laid out
in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide. This message warned that acknowledging this publicly
might force the UN Security Council to act. U.S. decisions and
statements were carefully orchestrated to evade any such
responsibility to act, even as many U.S. officials privately
recognized the extent of the crisis and the need for international
action in response.
On June 7, 1994, President Clinton stated that humanitarian aid
was all that the U.S. could provide to Rwanda, in light of other
American military commitments in Europe and Asia. Later that month,
the President defended the U.S. response on Rwanda to Members of
Congress who requested troop deployment. The President cited U.S.
payment for medical supplies and its pressure for a cease-fire as
evidence of a strong U.S. response to the crisis.[19]
In July 1994, President Clinton finally announced the provision of
humanitarian relief for Rwanda, and requested emergency funding from
Congress for this effort.[20] By this time, the genocide had
essentially been completed, and some 800,000 Rwandan lives had been
lost.What Influenced the U.S. Response
When the genocide occurred in Rwanda in 1994, the U.S.
administration was still recovering from the incident the previous
year in Somalia, when eighteen American soldiers had been killed
during a U.S.-sponsored humanitarian intervention. Many officials
believed that the American population was unwilling to stomach any
more U.S. casualties abroad, and that there were insufficient U.S.
interests in Rwanda to warrant another military commitment in Africa.
Meanwhile, there seemed to be no domestic movement invested in
this issue and pressuring the U.S. leadership to stop the genocide in
Rwanda. Representatives of a leading human rights organization
lobbying for greater U.S. commitment on the crisis were told by
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake: "If you want to make this
move, you will have to change public opinion. You must make more
noise."[21] There seemed to be no concerted "noise" forthcoming.
After the genocide was over, Senator Paul Simon famously said, "If
every member of the House and Senate had received 100 letters from
people back home saying we have to do something about Rwanda, when the
crisis was first developing, then I think the response would have been
different."[22] In the absence of such public activism, the U.S. did
not feel compelled to act.
As far as U.S. officials in the Clinton Administration were
concerned, there was no political cost to inaction against the Rwandan
genocide, as opposed to a potentially steep political cost to U.S.
embroilment in yet another violent African quagmire. This appears to
have been the final determination of U.S. policy toward Rwanda, even
as the human cost of inaction became devastatingly clear.
*The United States and Genocide in Darfur*
The ongoing genocide in Darfur marks the first genocide of the
21st century, and the first the world has faced in Africa since Rwanda
in 1994. It began in early 2003, when the government of Sudan and its
proxy militias (known as the Janjaweed) launched a campaign of
genocide against three African communities - the Fur, the Zaghawa and
the Massaleit - in Darfur, because rebel groups from that region had
risen up to challenge Khartoum's authoritarian rule and their own
marginalization.
Three and a half years later, the genocide in Darfur continues
today. Some 500,000 lives have been lost,[23] with millions more
Darfuris left homeless and facing a growing man-made humanitarian
crisis, which forms part of this genocide. Although there has been
some U.S. engagement on this crisis, largely prompted by a groundswell
of activism nationwide, the Bush Administration has failed to take the
action necessary to stop the violence and protect the people of Darfur.
*What the US Said*
Two years ago today (September 9, 2004), the Bush Administration
acknowledged that what is happening in Darfur constitutes genocide.
This announcement was the result of political pressure from Congress
and citizen pressure from across the U.S. The legal finding was itself
based on overwhelming evidence from a study of the region completed by
the State Department the previous month.[24]
In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
September 9, 2004 then-Secretary of State Colin Powell first used the
word "genocide" to describe the crisis in Darfur, and he identified
the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed as the perpetrators. A White
House statement later that day confirmed this determination.[25]
Despite this acknowledgment of genocide, however, the
administration immediately ruled out any urgent response to what was
happening in Darfur. In his same testimony on September 9, Secretary
Powell declared, "no new action is dictated by this determination."[26]
Two weeks later, President Bush addressed the UN General Assembly,
reiterating the U.S. position that genocide was occurring in Darfur,
but urging no new international action to address it.[27] Though
President Bush claimed to be "appalled by the violence" in Darfur, and
though he asserted that only outside action could stop the
violence,[28] no such action was initiated by the U.S. in response to
the genocide. Other than a brief response to a question on Darfur
posed to the President during the election debates in October,[29] the
White House would remain silent on the crisis for months thereafter.
In early 2005, as the crisis in Darfur deepened, senior officials
at the State Department, including Deputy Secretary of State Robert
Zoellick, began to evade media questions on Darfur and backed away
from using the term "genocide." A spokesperson at the White House
defended the apparent lack of engagement by the U.S. on Darfur,
stating that the President had "more pressing priorities" than this
crime against humanity.[30]
In June 2005, President Bush responded to growing pressure from
advocates and from the media by breaking his months-long silence on
Darfur. He reiterated the U.S. position that genocide was occurring
but suggested no new plan to stop the violence.[31]
As the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate in late
2005 and into 2006, the President and senior administration officials
spoke out more frequently on Darfur, seeking to ward off criticism and
respond to growing activism on this crisis. But their words were not
matched with action.
The death toll in Darfur continued to mount, even as top-level
officials repeatedly claimed that the U.S. was doing everything
possible to stop the genocide. In a television interview in February
2006, Vice President Dick Cheney said on Darfur: "I am satisfied we
are doing everything we can do."[32] In May 2006, in testimony before
the House International Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, declared Darfur to be "a
top priority for...elected officials", and emphasized "the
Administration is working diligently toward a resolution."[33] But
these statements rang hollow in the absence of U.S. action to stop the
violence.
A White House fact sheet on Darfur in May 2006 said that the
President maintained that what was happening in Darfur genocide
because "no other word captures the extent of this tragedy."[34] But
this fact sheet was created twenty months after the U.S.' recognition
of genocide in Darfur, and the violence was worsening without action
to stop it.
*What the US Did*
The U.S. response to the genocide in Darfur has involved
engagement in some aspects of the crisis, in an attempt to mitigate
the humanitarian crisis and promote a long-term solution. But on the
most immediate priority of stopping the violence and providing
protection to the people of Darfur, the U.S. has failed to articulate
or pursue a successful plan of action.
The U.S. has provided significant financial support for
humanitarian efforts in Darfur, where the largest humanitarian
operation in the world struggles to cope with growing numbers of
people in need. As aid agencies have increasingly voiced concerns
about the dangerous conditions on the ground, and have been forced to
take measures to curtail their operations at certain moments, the U.S.
has helped to fund their operations but has failed to tackle the
growing violence and insecurity they face. In the first three years of
the genocide, the U.S. provided $1 billion in humanitarian aid for
Darfur, helping to sustain millions of people left dependent on
international assistance.[35] The U.S. did not, however, take steps to
directly address the worsening security situation or to protect
civilians and humanitarian operations on the ground.
The U.S. also made a diplomatic investment in the Abuja peace
talks, sponsored by the African Union (AU). The administration
repeatedly expressed its commitment to a "political solution" to the
ongoing crisis in Darfur. Senior U.S. officials, particularly Deputy
Secretary of State Zoellick, traveled a number of times to Khartoum
and to Abuja, Nigeria. However, occasional trips and periodic remarks
about U.S. engagement failed to substitute for assertive international
leadership to stop the genocide. In fact, the signing of the Darfur
Peace Agreement in May 2006, which was heavily promoted by the U.S.,
actually led to a spike in violence in subsequent months. As AU
officials condemned the striking increase in violence and civilian
casualties in the summer of 2006,[36] the U.S. and international
response failed to address the deteriorating situation on the ground.
The "hands off" U.S. strategy on Darfur was initially framed by
the administration as deference to the African Union, which had shown
some leadership on the crisis and had deployed a small mission to the
region. In fact, the AU was essentially abandoned by the international
community to deal with the growing crisis. While it was clear that the
African Union's mission in Darfur lacked the troop size, the mandate
and the logistical capacity to stop the genocide and protect the
people, the U.S.' limited financial and logistical support for the AU
was described by the Bush Administration as a central element of its
response to the crisis. The U.S. offered transport planes to bring AU
troops to Darfur, it worked with NATO members to provide planning and
logistical assistance and intelligence support to the AU, and it
committed some funding to extend the life of the AU operation. But it
was already abundantly clear that a larger international intervention
was required, if this genocide was to be stopped.
At the international level, the U.S. introduced or supported
numerous UN Security Council resolutions on Darfur, condemning the
violence, urging an end to atrocities, and even imposing some limited
sanctions on those perpetrating war crimes and crimes against
humanity. But the U.S. did not begin to push for a large and robust
international peacekeeping force until 2006, and even then, it did not
invest sufficiently in galvanizing international support around this
goal. Although the Bush Administration described itself as a leader on
Darfur, and although it had affirmed the September 2005 UN commitment
of a "Responsibility to Protect" civilians against crimes against
humanity such as genocide,[37] the U.S. failed to take the necessary
action to stem the bloodshed in Darfur.
Within the UN, U.S. Ambassador John Bolton claimed in 2006 to have
built up a strong track record on the crisis in Darfur,[38] though his
actions revealed otherwise. In October 2005, Bolton joined with
representatives from China, Russia and Algeria in blocking the UN
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Mendez, from
briefing the Security Council on human rights violations in Darfur. In
February 2006, when the U.S. held the rotating presidency of the
Security Council, Bolton issued a rhetorical "Presidential Statement"
rather than seeking to galvanize Security Council support for action
in the form of a resolution authorizing a peacekeeping mission for
Darfur. In June 2006, when a Security Council delegation traveled to
Sudan to highlight their concern about the crisis and their commitment
to achieving agreement on a UN peacekeeping force, Bolton did not
participate and instead sent the lowest-level representative of any of
the 15-member Security Council delegation.[39]
In the summer of 2006, as the situation in Darfur deteriorated
still further, there finally emerged an international consensus around
the need for a UN peacekeeping force to stop the violence and restore
security. This notion received public support from the U.S., the UN
Secretary-General, most members of the UN Security Council, the AU,
the leadership of the Arab League, and dozens of organizations and
millions of public citizens. The UN Secretary-General presented
recommendations to the Security Council on the necessary size,
mandate, scope and logistical capacity of a future UN peacekeeping
mission for Darfur, with the remaining obstacle being Khartoum's
opposition to such a mission.[40]
At the writing of this report, a new resolution passed at the
Security Council promised new momentum on Darfur, but as yet the
deployment of a UN force remains stalled. As the government of Sudan
continues to reject the prospect of a UN peacekeeping mission, the
need for U.S. leadership and action is paramount. The ongoing failure
of the U.S. to take effective steps to break the international
deadlock, overcome Khartoum's opposition, and achieve a UN
peacekeeping mission for Darfur continues to reveal a lack of serious
engagement in resolving this crisis.
*What Influenced the US Response*
The crisis in Darfur has generated unprecedented citizen activism
across the U.S. A diversity of groups and people of conscience from
all faiths and backgrounds have become engaged in advocacy and
activism on Darfur, raising awareness of the genocide and promoting a
more urgent U.S. response. These citizen voices, and the media
attention which they have commanded, have influenced the
administration's response, evoking pledges of commitment and some new
engagement. Numerous rallies and events held around the country, and
millions of communications sent to policymakers by constituents, have
raised the profile of this issue and demanded U.S. action. This
activism was part of what led the White House to call this "genocide"
in 2004, and it has continued to drive the U.S. engagement on this issue.
Other factors also seemed to argue for greater U.S. action on
Darfur. Comments made by the President and other senior officials
indicated a rhetorical commitment to avoiding the mistakes made during
the Rwandan genocide, and asserted the "Responsibility to Protect"
civilians. In addition, the UN Security Council proved to be amenable
to passing numerous resolutions on Darfur, and the long timeline of
this crisis allowed ample opportunities to overcome obstacles and
promote new action.
But other, more powerful factors and competing priorities
apparently negated these potential motivators for U.S. action.
At the time when the Darfur genocide began, the U.S. was involved
in promoting a peace settlement in Sudan in the long-running civil war
between the government in the North and the people of the South. The
official relationship between the U.S. and Sudan appeared to be on the
path towards a thaw, after an isolationist approach to Khartoum by
Washington in the 1990s as a result of Sudan's hosting of Al Qaeda.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Khartoum invited an
intelligence-sharing relationship with the U.S. in the context of the
so-called "War on Terrorism."[41]
The conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between
North and South in Sudan was considered a diplomatic victory for the
U.S., but also coincided with the beginning of the
government-sponsored genocide in Darfur. The U.S. support for the CPA,
its intelligence-sharing relationship with Khartoum, and the mutual
desire to move towards the normalization of economic and political
relations between the countries were policy priorities that were
considered to have undermined a more robust U.S. response on Darfur.
Ironically, at the same time, these interests and ties between
Washington and Khartoum provided the Bush Administration with clear
leverage and opportunities to push Sudan to stop the genocide and
allow UN peacekeepers into Darfur. As the international community
stalled in overcoming Khartoum's objections to a UN force, the U.S.
could have done much more to challenge the Sudanese government and
find a way forward on Darfur.
It is also clear that the U.S. could have invested sooner and more
deeply in international diplomacy on Darfur, to help mobilize new
action on this crisis. But the Bush Administration wished to retain
its international leverage and its political capital for other
concerns, in the Middle East and in the larger so-called "War on
Terrorism." In the White House's consideration of geo-strategic
calculations and foreign policy priorities, the people of Darfur lost
out and they have paid the ultimate price.
*Lessons Yet to Learn*
In Rwanda in 1994, the Clinton Administration refused to name the
unfolding genocide. The U.S. also failed to act to stop it. It blocked
international intervention in Rwanda, claiming that there was no
domestic constituency nor compelling foreign policy interest to
support U.S. action on this crisis. The U.S. failures on Rwanda,
summarized in this report, have been well documented elsewhere.
In Darfur, the Bush Administration remains the only government to
have publicly acknowledged that what is happening constitutes
genocide. But this declaration has not galvanized official U.S. action
sufficient to stop the violence on the ground. The U.S. has made some
diplomatic investment in the peace process in Darfur, and some
financial investment in humanitarian efforts, but it has failed to
implement a successful strategy to protect the people of Darfur from
the ongoing genocide. The unprecedented activism across the country
has forced rhetorical commitments from the administration, but these
have not been followed by concrete actions to improve the security
situation in western Sudan.
Despite some key differences in the domestic and international
dynamics today, compared to twelve years ago during the Rwandan
genocide, the U.S. response on Darfur reveals that important lessons
remain unlearned.
As successive U.S. administrations have been faced with genocide
in Africa, each has claimed to be doing everything possible in
response. This has been untrue and this assertion is, therefore,
disingenuous. The U.S. is the most powerful country in the world, with
an unmatched capacity to respond to crises and to mobilize the broader
international community's response. If the U.S. were to do everything
it could to stop genocide, it is certain that it would succeed in
doing so. Instead, in Rwanda and now in Darfur, the U.S. claims it is
fully invested in addressing this crisis, but it is not expending the
necessary diplomatic or political resources to achieve an
international peacekeeping force, which is the most immediate priority.
In Rwanda, the Clinton Administration offered humanitarian
assistance but refused to support the necessary intervention in the
form of an international peacekeeping force. In Darfur, once again,
the Bush Administration has been quite generous in the provision of
support to the humanitarian effort, and it has also afforded
logistical support to the African Union. But the U.S. has not invested
sufficiently in achieving the deployment of the necessary peacekeeping
force, to respond to the most urgent priority of protecting the people
of Darfur. The crime of genocide, which seeks to destroy a group of
people in whole or in part, demands more than a humanitarian response.
The international community must be prepared to deploy a peacekeeping
force to stop the violence, and must quickly do so in response to such
a crisis. This was not a U.S. priority in Rwanda in 1994, and it is
clearly not a U.S. priority in Darfur today.
In a broader sense, the failed response to Rwanda and now to
Darfur indicates a shameful negligence on the part of the U.S. when it
comes to saving African lives. In the realm of U.S. foreign policy
priorities, Africa is most often absent or marginalized, and the human
cost of this myopia is most clear in the death toll of these two
genocides. In Rwanda in 1994, the Clinton Administration was more
focused on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and was still reeling
from the disastrous U.S. intervention in Somalia the previous year. In
Darfur at present, the U.S. is focused more urgently on the crisis in
the Middle East, on the war in Iraq and on the so-called "War on
Terrorism", which are estimated to be more pressing policy priorities
than genocide in Africa.
There is a clear pattern of a lack of political will on the part
of U.S. officials to take action to save African lives. It is hard to
imagine another part of the world where genocide would be left to
continue, and where the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives would
be tolerated. The persistent racism in U.S. foreign policy is clear
from the lack of urgency with which the U.S. responds to genocide on
the African continent.
While in Rwanda, Clinton Administration officials claimed that the
genocide happened quickly, that they were ill informed, and that there
was insufficient public activism, these excuses cannot be used to
explain the U.S. failure to stop the genocide in Darfur. But there is
the same lack of political will in both instances. The rhetoric and
the profile of the Darfur crisis do not mask the underlying U.S.
failure, once again, to save the lives of countless innocent civilians.
*Recommendations*
Unlike during the Rwandan genocide, which took place in only three
months, the U.S. and the international community have now watched the
Darfur genocide play out over several years, with ample time to absorb
what was happening, and to identify the possibilities and priorities
for action.
Although, at the writing of this report, estimates indicate that
some 500,000 lives have already been lost in Darfur, Africa Action
asserts opportunities and obligations for new action that can still
save countless lives.
With protection being the clear and immediate priority, the first
step must be the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to the
region. The African Union's leadership on Darfur has been important,
but there exists a larger international responsibility to act in
support of the AU to stop the genocide and protect civilians in
western Sudan. The AU cannot do this alone, nor should it have to. An
international peacekeeping force must be deployed that is adequate in
size and mandate to stop the violence in Darfur and provide security
to civilians and humanitarian operations in the immediate term, and
that can pave the way for a true peace process and ultimately
facilitate the return of millions of displaced people to their lands.
The establishment of such a peacekeeping mission is entirely
consistent with the "Responsibility to Protect" principle, according
to which all UN member states agreed in September 2005 that there is
an international obligation to protect populations against genocide
and other crimes against humanity. The agreement of UN member states
that they "are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and
decisive manner" to help protect populations from genocide and other
such crimes against humanity must now drive their response to the
crisis in Darfur.[42]
Achieving the deployment of the required UN peacekeeping operation
for Darfur, with the necessary size, scope and mandate, involves a
special role for the U.S. At the international level, it requires new
and urgent action from the U.S. to overcome all remaining obstacles to
such a force, and to secure all necessary support from the members of
the UN Security Council to move this forward quickly. The U.S. must
use its leverage with all stakeholders, including the Sudanese
government, to pave the way for the rapid deployment of the requisite
UN force. The U.S. must itself be prepared to commit substantial new
resources and logistical assistance to the future UN peacekeeping
operation in Darfur. The U.S. must also continue to provide generous
support to humanitarian assistance programs in Darfur and throughout
the region to meet the urgent needs of the people on the ground.
While a UN peacekeeping force is not the final answer for Darfur,
it is essential to stabilize the situation and protect the vulnerable
in the immediate term, and it represents a first step on the path to
peace. In responding to genocide, civilian protection is both a
priority and an obligation, and this should always trigger urgent
international action.
*Conclusion*
A decade after failing to stop genocide in Rwanda, and two years
ago today, the Bush Administration publicly recognized that genocide
was taking place in Darfur, Sudan. This declaration suggested a
different and more engaged response than what had been seen in Rwanda.
Yet this has not been borne out. The genocide continues in Darfur, and
the U.S. has failed to stop the violence or protect civilians on the
ground.
The achievement of a large and robust international peacekeeping
force for Darfur remains elusive without strong leadership and new
action. The U.S. claims to be doing all it can on this crisis, but the
death toll is mounting and it is clear that much more can and must be
done. The most important immediate priority is providing protection to
the people of Darfur, and an international peacekeeping force can
achieve this. What is missing is the political will on the part of the
Bush Administration to overcome remaining obstacles and make this a
reality.
The U.S. and the international community have been judged harshly
for their failures on Rwanda, and world leaders have apologized for
their inaction on that genocide twelve years ago. But history will
judge current policies on Darfur just as severely. The failure of the
Bush Administration to take the necessary steps to stop genocide in
Darfur, and the subsequent cost in human lives, belies U.S. claims
that it is mounting a committed response to this crisis and denies the
reality that much more could and should have been done before now.
As the genocide continues in Darfur, it becomes an increasing
political liability for the Bush Administration. It is an indictment
of the current White House, but it is also a comment on Africa's place
in U.S. foreign policy.
Unless we learn the lessons of Rwanda and apply them now in
Darfur, we confirm a pattern of negligence that destines the U.S. to
repeat these horrific failures in the future.
*Endnotes*
[1] Philip Gourevitch, "Just Watching," The New Yorker, 5 June 2006
[2] PBS, Frontline, "The Triumph of Evil: 100 Days of Slaughter"
[3] Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," The Atlantic
Monthly, September 2001
[4] Organization of African Unity, "Rwanda: The Preventable
Genocide," OAU report by International Panel of Eminent Personalities,
July 2000
[5] William Ferroggiaro, ed. "The US and the Genocide in Rwanda
1994: Evidence of Inaction," The National Security Archive at the
George Washington University, 20 August 2001. Document #2: "Memorandum
from Prudence Bushnell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of African Affairs, through Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 'Death of
Rwandan and Burundian Presidents in Plane Crash Outside Kigali', April
6, 1994. Limited Official Use."
[6] PBS, Frontline, "Ghosts of Rwanda: Interviews: Joyce Leader"
[7] Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."
[8] Ferroggiaro, ed. "The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994:
Evidence of Inaction," Document #3: "Memorandum from Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa, through Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Talking Points On Rwanda/Burundi",
April 11, 1994. Confidential."
[9] Ferroggiaro, ed. "The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994:
Information, Intelligence and the U.S. Response," The National
Security Archive at the George Washington University, 24 March 2004.
Footnote #11: "US Department of State, cable number 94 State 099440,
to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, "Talking Points for
UNAMIR Withdrawal", April 15, 1994."
[10] Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."
[11] Samantha Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of
Genocide (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2002) 355.
[12] PBS, Frontline, "Ghosts of Rwanda: Interviews: Madeleine
Albright"
[13] Ferroggiaro, ed. "The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994:
Information, Intelligence and the U.S. Response," Footnote #11: "US
Department of State, cable number 94 State 099440, to US Mission to
the United Nations, New York, "Talking Points for UNAMIR Withdrawal",
April 15, 1994."
[14] Gerald Caplan, "Why we must never forget the Rwandan
Genocide," Pambazuka News: Weekly Forum for Social Justice in Africa,
1 April 2004
[15] Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of
Genocide, 371.
[16] Power, "Bystanders to Genocide."
[17] PBS, Frontline, "Ghosts of Rwanda: Timeline"
[18] Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of
Genocide, 361.
[19] Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of
Genocide, 377.
[20] Chris McGreal, Ian Katz, and Ian Black, "Rwandan Apocalypse,"
The Guardian, 23 July 1994.
[21] Human Rights Watch, "Remembering Rwanda: Africa in Conflict,
Yesterday and Today" (Campaign)
[22] Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Secret Genocide Archive," The New
York Times, 23 February 2005
[23] Eric Reeves, "Quantifying Genocide in Darfur (Part 1),"
SudanReeves.org, 28 April 2006.
[24] "Documenting Atrocities in Darfur," (State Publication 11182,
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research) September 2004
[25] "President's Statement on Violence in Darfur, Sudan,"
(Statement by the President, Office of the Press Secretary), 9
September 2004
[26] Colin Powell, "The Crisis in Darfur, Testimony Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 9 September 2004
[27] "Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations
General Assembly," 21 September 2004
[28] "President's Statement on Violence in Darfur, Sudan," 9
September 2004.
[29] Commission on Presidential Debates, "2004 Debate Transcript,
The First Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate," 30 September 2004
[30] Guy Dinmore, "White House is quiet as Darfur killings
continue," Financial Times, 14 March 2005.
[31] "President and South African President Mbeki Discuss
Bilateral Relations" (Oval Office, Office of the Press Secretary), 1
June 2005
[32] PBS, The Newshour with Jim Lehrer, "Newsmaker: Vice President
Dick Cheney," 7 February 2006
[33] Jendayi Frazer, "Prospects for Peace in Darfur, Testimony
Before the House International Relations Committee," 18 May 2006
[34] "Fact Sheet: Darfur Agreement: A Step toward Peace" (Office
of the Press Secretary), 8 May 2006
[35] Charles W. Corey, "United States Has Spent $1 Billion Feeding
the Hungry in Darfur," USINFO, 12 May 2006
[36] African Union, "Press Statement on the Escalation of Violence
in Darfur," 11 July 2006
[37] "The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty"
[38] "John Bolton's Work at the UN: The Situation in Sudan,"
Office of the Public Liaison, Fact-sheet forwarded by the White House.
[39] StopBolton.org, "Three Strikes, You're Out: Bolton Fails
Darfur; Take Action Now to Oust Bolton" (Action Alert), August 2006
[40] "Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur" (S/2006/591),
United Nations Security Council, 28 July 2006
[41] Ken Silverstein, "Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's
War on Terrorism," The Los Angeles Times, 29 April, 2005.
[42] "The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty."
-----
/This report was written by Ann-Louise Colgan, with valuable
contributions from Diana Duarte. Additional research support was
provided by Petra Stankard and was produced by Africa Action, with
partial support from American Jewish World Service (AJWS). The views
and conclusions expressed in this report reflect those of Africa
Action, and not necessarily those of AJWS./
-------
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