US Aborted Raid on Qaeda Chiefs in Pakistan in '05
By Mark Mazzetti
The New York Times
Sunday 08 July 2007
Washington - A secret military operation in early 2005 to capture senior
members of Al Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas was aborted at the last minute
after top Bush administration officials decided it was too risky and could
jeopardize relations with Pakistan, according to intelligence and military
officials.
The target was a meeting of Qaeda leaders that intelligence officials
thought included Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden's top deputy and the man
believed to run the terrorist group's operations.
But the mission was called off after Donald H. Rumsfeld, then the defense
secretary, rejected an 11th-hour appeal by Porter J. Goss, then the director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, officials said. Members of a Navy Seals unit
in parachute gear had already boarded C-130 cargo planes in Afghanistan when
the mission was canceled, said a former senior intelligence official involved
in the planning.
Mr. Rumsfeld decided that the operation, which had ballooned from a small
number of military personnel and C.I.A. operatives to several hundred, was
cumbersome and put too many American lives at risk, the current and former
officials said. He was also concerned that it could cause a rift with Pakistan,
an often reluctant ally that has barred the American military from operating in
its tribal areas, the officials said.
The decision to halt the planned "snatch and grab" operation frustrated
some top intelligence officials and members of the military's secret Special
Operations units, who say the United States missed a significant opportunity to
try to capture senior members of Al Qaeda.
Their frustration has only grown over the past two years, they said, as Al
Qaeda has improved its abilities to plan global attacks and build new training
compounds in Pakistan's tribal areas, which have become virtual havens for the
terrorist network.
In recent months, the White House has become increasingly irritated with
Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for his inaction on the growing
threat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
About a dozen current and former military and intelligence officials were
interviewed for this article, all of whom requested anonymity because the
planned 2005 mission remained classified.
Spokesmen for the Pentagon, the C.I.A. and the White House declined to
comment. It is unclear whether President Bush was informed about the planned
operation. The officials acknowledge that they are not certain that Mr. Zawahri
attended the 2005 meeting in North Waziristan, a mountainous province just
miles from the Afghan border. But they said that the United States had
communications intercepts that tipped them off to the meeting, and that
intelligence officials had unusually high confidence that Mr. Zawahri was
there.
Months later, in early May 2005, the C.I.A. launched a missile from a
remotely piloted Predator drone, killing Haitham al-Yemeni, a senior Qaeda
figure whom the C.I.A. had tracked since the meeting.
It has long been known that C.I.A. operatives conduct counterterrorism
missions in Pakistan's tribal areas. Details of the aborted 2005 operation
provide a glimpse into the Bush administration's internal negotiations over
whether to take unilateral military action in Pakistan, where General
Musharraf's fragile government is under pressure from dissidents who object to
any cooperation with the United States.
Pentagon officials familiar with covert operations said that planners had
to consider the political and human risks of undertaking a military campaign in
a sovereign country, even in an area like Pakistan's tribal lands, where the
government has only tenuous control. Even with its shortcomings, Pakistan has
been a vital American ally since the Sept. 11 attacks, and the militaries of
the two countries have close ties.
The Pentagon officials said tension was inherent in any decision to approve
such a mission: a smaller military footprint allows a better chance of a
mission going undetected, but it also exposes the units to greater risk of
being killed or captured.
Officials said one reason Mr. Rumsfeld called off the 2005 operation was
that the number of troops involved in the mission had grown to several hundred,
including Army Rangers, members of the Navy Seals and C.I.A. operatives, and he
determined that the United States could no longer carry out the mission without
General Musharraf's permission. It is unlikely that the Pakistani president
would have approved an operation of that size, officials said.
Some outside experts said American counterterrorism operations had been
hamstrung because of concerns about General Musharraf's shaky government.
"The reluctance to take risk or jeopardize our political relationship with
Musharraf may well account for the fact that five and half years after 9/11 we
are still trying to run bin Laden and Zawahri to ground," said Bruce Hoffman, a
terrorism expert at Georgetown University.
Those political considerations have created resentment among some members
of the military's Special Operations forces.
"The Special Operations guys are tearing their hair out at the highest
levels," said a former Bush administration official with close ties to those
troops. While they have not received good intelligence on the whereabouts of
top Qaeda members recently, he said, they say they believe they have sometimes
had useful information on lower-level figures.
"There is a degree of frustration that is off the charts, because they are
looking at targets on a daily basis and can't move against them," he said.
In early 2005, after learning about the Qaeda meeting, the military
developed a plan for a small Navy Seals unit to parachute into Pakistan to
carry out a quick operation, former officials said.
But as the operation moved up the military chain of command, officials
said, various planners bulked up the force's size to provide security for the
Special Operations forces.
"The whole thing turned into the invasion of Pakistan," said the former
senior intelligence official involved in the planning. Still, he said he
thought the mission was worth the risk. "We were frustrated because we wanted
to take a shot," he said.
Several former officials interviewed said the operation was not the only
occasion since the Sept. 11 attacks that plans were developed to use a large
American military force in Pakistan. It is unclear whether any of those
missions have been executed.
Some of the military and intelligence officials familiar with the 2005
events say it showed a rift between operators in the field and a military
bureaucracy that has still not effectively adapted to hunt for global
terrorists, moving too cautiously to use Special Operations troops against
terrorist targets.
That criticism has echoes of the risk aversion that the officials said
pervaded efforts against Al Qaeda during the Clinton administration, when
missions to use American troops to capture or kill Mr. bin Laden in Afghanistan
were never executed because they were considered too perilous, risked killing
civilians or were based on inadequate intelligence. Rather than sending in
ground troops, the Clinton White House instead chose to fire cruise missiles in
what became failed attempts to kill Mr. bin Laden and his deputies - a tactic
Mr. Bush criticized shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks.
Since then, the C.I.A. has launched missiles from Predator aircraft in the
tribal areas several times, with varying degrees of success. Intelligence
officials say they believe that in January 2006, an airstrike narrowly missed
killing Mr. Zawahri, who hours earlier had attended a dinner in Damadola, a
Pakistani village.
General Musharraf cast his lot with the Bush administration in the hunt for
Al Qaeda after the 2001 attacks, and he has periodically ordered Pakistan's
military to conduct counterterrorism missions in the tribal areas, provoking
fierce resistance there. But in recent months he has pulled back, prompting Mr.
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to issue stern warnings in private that he
risked losing American aid if he did not step up efforts against Al Qaeda,
senior administration officials have said.
Officials said that mid-2005 was a period when they were gathering good
intelligence about Al Qaeda's leaders in Pakistan's tribal areas. By the next
year, however, the White House had become frustrated by the lack of progress in
the hunt for Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Zawahri.
In early 2006, President Bush ordered a "surge" of dozens of C.I.A. agents
to Pakistan, hoping that an influx of intelligence operatives would lead to
better information, officials said. But that has brought the United States no
closer to locating Al Qaeda's top two leaders. The latest message from them
came this week, in a new tape in which Mr. Zawahri urged Iraqis and Muslims
around the world to show more support for Islamist insurgents in Iraq.
In his recently published memoir, George J. Tenet, the former C.I.A.
director, said the intelligence about Mr. bin Laden's whereabouts during the
Clinton years was similarly sparse. The information was usually only at the
"50-60% confidence level," he wrote, not sufficient to justify American
military action.
"As much as we all wanted Bin Ladin dead, the use of force by a superpower
requires information, discipline, and time," Mr. Tenet wrote. "We rarely had
the information in sufficient quantities or the time to evaluate and act on
it."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Editor's Comment: CNN's Wolf Blitzer asserted the FBI documents released to
Judicial Watch were generating conspiracy theories; an FBI spokesman appearing
on the show agreed. Our editors have reviewed the documents carefully and feel
that they are newsworthy. It's also worth noting that while the FBI now
maintains that there is "nothing new and nothing significant in these
documents," the FBI fought a protracted legal battle with Judicial Watch to
keep them from bringing the documents to public view. TO/ma
The Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy"
Groupe de communication Mulindwas
"avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie"
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