African liberation Movements and the 'end of history'
Henning Melber (2008-10-02)
When liberation movements take power, their governments are often marked by 
military mindsets, categorising people as winners and losers and operating 
along the lines of command and obedience. Such trends are evident in southern 
Africa. Democratic discourse in search of the common good would look quite 
different.

A knee-jerk reaction of 'Tiers-Mondisme' is to show solidarity with the 
struggle for freedom among the 'wretched of the earth'. Sometimes, struggles 
are glorified, as was the case back in the 1960s. Frantz Fanon's book 'Les 
damnés de la terre' (the wretched of the earth) was paradigmatic. His manifesto 
became a call to battle for the Algerian resistance movement against France, 
the colonial power.

Jean-Paul Sartre wrote the introduction. He was quite selective in his 
argumentation, tending in some spots to glorify violence as an act of 
emancipation. Indeed, he seemed to see violence as a purifying force that would 
turn the colonised into full citizens. Fanon himself however spoke out against 
excessive post-colonial authoritarianism. In penetrating analyses and withering 
criticism, he described what he had seen, mainly in West Africa, up to his 
death in 1961.

Fanon critisised the authoritarian attitudes of the African elite, which 
usurped young states in the course of decolonisation, and their abuses of power 
when securing privileges for themselves and turning entire states into 
instruments of control. His early warnings went largely unheeded, however. Not 
until the 1990s, when the shortcomings of revolutionary movements could no 
longer be ignored, did Fanon's analyses come back into the foreground.

VICTORY IN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE?

When liberation movements in the so-called third world took up arms, they 
enjoyed support from the socialist countries as well as solidarity movements in 
the West. Organisations such as the PAIGC, MPLA, and FRELIMO challenged 
Portugal's colonial power. Their resilience in Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, 
Angola, and Mozambique even had repercussions in the Lisbon metropole. They 
triggered the Carnation Revolution, bringing an end to Portuguese colonialism 
in Africa in the mid-1970s.

In Rhodesia - today's Zimbabwe - the ZANU and ZAPU liberation movements fought 
the white minority regime under Ian Smith, which had declared unilateral 
Independence (UDI) from the British Empire. Colonial rule came to an end in 
1980 when the Lancaster House Agreement was signed and ZANU subsequently won 
the elections.

In Namibia, the United Nations negotiated a transition period for independence, 
which was ultimately implemented in 1989-90. South Africa had occupied the 
country in violation of international law. SWAPO fought against this illegal 
occupation for a quarter of a century.

Four years later, the Namibian model of controlled change helped South Africans 
hold their first free elections, which were won by the ANC. The former 
liberation movement thus assumed political responsibility, and it did so in a 
legitimate fashion.

One must bear in mind that armed resistance was part of the solution both in 
South Africa and Namibia. It led to negotiations for transitional arrangements 
towards majority rule. The compromises required from all sides contributed to 
the transitional periods working out. At the same time, a decidedly patriotic 
form of writing history turned the independence struggle soon thereafter into a 
myth.

ZIMBABWEAN TRAUMA

It bears repetition that the unscrupulously violent character of Zimbabwe's 
ZANU regime already revealed itself in the early to mid-1980s, when a special 
unit killed an estimated 20,000 people, mainly in Matabeleland, where the 
opposition ZAPU had most of its supporters.

The soldiers of the fifth brigade trained by North Korea, took no prisoners. 
They killed, tortured, raped and humiliated anyone who seemed suspicious (and 
it was enough to be Ndebele); men, women, and even children. The only 
organisation to protest was the local catholic church, which raised its voice 
to protect the victims. The rest of the world, including those who had 
originally shown solidarity, had little to say; after all, it simply couldn't 
be true.

The violence did not stop until ZAPU agreed to sign a pact with the ruling 
party. ZANU basically took them over. None of this hurt the Mugabe government's 
bilateral and multilateral standing. To the contrary: up to the late 1990s, 
Zimbabwe was considered a success story, an example of successful transition. 
Indeed, in 1994 Queen Elizabeth II personally bestowed knighthood upon 
President Mugabe, who had assumed comprehensive executive powers in the 
meantime. Not until June of this year was his knighthood revoked.

WOUNDS OLD AND NEW

When a new opposition party, the MDC, took to the political stage in Zimbabwe 
and turned out to be a serious competitor at the end of the 1990s, the 
'Chimurenga' (struggle) became a permanent institution. Violence became the 
customary response to political protest. As political power shifted away from 
Mugabe after he lost a referendum in 2000, his regime became only more violent.

In 2005, Mugabe and his people launched Operation 'Murambatsvina' (Drive Out 
Trash) in raids on pockets of opposition in Harare and other major towns: more 
than 2 million people are estimated to have lost their already meagre 
livelihoods in the process. There is no need to delve into the recent 
escalation of violence, since the election troubles were reported in detail 
worldwide.

An estimated third of Zimbabwe's people has fled the country for political and 
economic reasons; from exile, they try to support family members who have 
stayed home. All of this is sad proof that life under a liberation movement is 
not automatically better than it was under colonialism. The human-rights 
violations of SWAPO have also been downplayed. In the 1980s, the organisation 
imprisoned thousands of its own members in dungeons in southern Angola, 
accusing them of spying on behalf of South Africa. These people lost their 
liberty in spite of never having been proven guilty; indeed, they were not even 
brought to trial. Many of them did not survive the torture. Those released are 
scorned even today.

It could have been different in South Africa. The ANC government's Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission talked about human rights violations committed by its 
own members. But the final report containing these findings was never published 
in its original form. So far, ANC omissions have not been discussed openly.

VICTIMS BECOME PERPETRATORS

There is nothing new about military movements that are supposedly justified in 
ethical and moral terms quickly losing their legitimacy. Since the French 
Revolution, liberators have often turned into oppressors, victims into 
perpetrators. It is not unusual for a new regime to quickly resemble an old 
one. That has happened time and again around the world.

The Indian psychologist and sociologist Ashis Nandy, one of the founders of 
critical post-colonial studies, has dealt with this issue in depth. The 
Intimate Enemy, his book of 1983, discusses how liberators tend to reproduce 
the past rather than offering genuine alternatives. In this light, the 
"anti-imperialist" Robert Mugabe turns out to be merely the final executor of 
the policies of the racist colonists Cecil Rhodes and Ian Smith. Armed combat 
merely created new repressive institutions of the state for the dominant group 
within anti-colonial resistance. Former PLO activist Yezid Sayigh argued 1997 
in Armed Struggle and the Search for State that this was also happening in the 
Palestinian liberation movement.

Such power structures often revolve around individual commanders who act to the 
benefit of their crony supporters. Resistance movements normally adopt rough 
survival strategies and techniques while fighting an oppressive regime. That 
culture, unfortunately, takes root and is permanently nurtured. In sum, it 
becomes questionable whether there is a true difference between the political 
systems they manage to throw out and what they establish in their place.

In May 1990 Albie Sachs had already spoken of this trend in respect to South 
Africa. In a lecture at the University of the Western Cape, this South African 
lawyer, who was crippled by a parcel bomb in Mozambique during his 24-year 
exile, expressed his doubts about ANC activists being ready for freedom. He 
worried about the habits they had cultivated. As Sachs put it, the culture and 
discipline of resistance may have served a survival strategy in the 
underground, but these skills were certainly not those of free citizens.

Maybe this is why Nelson Mandela became a global icon in his lifetime; the many 
years he spent in prison kept him away from the daily intrigues and power plays 
prevalent in an organised liberation movement. Mandela preserved a spirit of 
human compassion and tolerance that a life of struggle and exile might not have 
afforded him.

This may sound cynical but might be close to reality. Jacob Zuma, a product of 
the struggle, cultivates a 'Zulu warrior culture'. He emerged as a populist 
alternative to the more intellectual, somewhat aloof Thabo Mbeki, and will 
probably soon be South Africa's next president. Zuma has an international 
reputation for various allegations of corruption, charges of sexual abuse and 
martial rhetoric (his favourite song is 'Bring me my machine gun').

Disappointed by the limits of the liberation they have experienced, many people 
are looking for substitute saviours. Fortunately, the number of those for whom 
fundamental values of democracy, liberty and human rights matter more than 
submissive loyalty to an organisation is growing.

Raymond Suttner is an example. He used to operate underground in South Africa 
as a member of the ANC, and spent years in solitary confinement as a political 
prisoner. As a member of parliament and later as ambassador, he represented the 
ANC government before returning to the academic world from which he originated. 
In November 2005, he pointed out that ANC ideology and rhetoric do not 
distinguish between the liberation movement and the people. He thus argues that 
the liberation movement is a prototype of a state within the state, one that 
sees itself as the only legitimate source of power.

'END OF HISTORY'

As we now know, post-colonial life looks a lot like the colonial era did in 
respect to day-to-day life, the reason being that socialisation factors and 
attitudes from armed struggle have largely shaped the new political leaders' 
understanding of politics, and their idea of how to wield power.

In governmental office, liberation movements tend to mark an 'end of history'. 
Any political alternative that does not emerge from within them will not be 
acceptable. This attitude explains the strong sense of camaraderie between the 
Mugabe regime and the governments of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South 
Africa over many years. Typcially, any political alternative cropping up in 
these countries as a result of disillusionment with post-colonial life will be 
discredited as part of an imperialist conspiracy designed to sabotage national 
independence.

These governments never seem to even consider the possibility that their own 
shortcomings may be the reason why opposition forces are becoming stronger. 
Instead, they only think along the militaristic dichotomy of friend/foe, 
leaving no legitimate alternative to their own hegemony.

At the same time, the sad truth is that the opposition forces that do stand up 
against such governments tend to only add to the problem, rather than to 
provide a solution. All too often, they only want to share the spoils of the 
state apparatus and its bureaucracy among their cronies once they are strong 
enough to constitute a true power option. Again, the relevant categories of 
thought are only winners and losers.

Democracy however is about something completely different: compromise, and even 
the search for consensus, in pursuit of the public good. To achieve that, one 
does not need military mindsets, but rather a broad political debate.

* Henning Melber is Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in 
Uppsala, Sweden. This text was published first in Development and Cooperation, 
October 2008.

* Please send comments to [EMAIL PROTECTED] or comment online at 
http://www.pambazuka.org/


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