Air Force Pilots Say They're Flying Blind Against Islamic State

Within the U.S. Air Force, there’s mounting frustration that the air
campaign against ISIS in Syria and Iraq
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/09/u-s-planes-are-blowing-the
-hell-out-of-isis-at-kobani-but.html>  is moving far more slowly than
expected. Instead of a fast-moving operation with hundreds of sorties flown
in a single day—the kind favored by many in the air service—American
warplanes are hitting small numbers of targets after a painstaking and
cumbersome process.

The single biggest problem, current and former Air Force officers say, is
the so-called kill-chain of properly identifying and making sure the right
target is being attacked. At the moment, that process is very complicated
and painfully slow.

“The kill-chain is very convoluted,” one combat-experienced Air Force A-10
Warthog pilot told The Daily Beast. “Nobody really has the control in the
tactical environment.”

A major reason why: the lack of U.S. ground forces to direct American air
power against ISIS positions. Air power, when it is applied in an area where
the enemy is blended in with the civilian population, works best when there
are troops on the ground who are able to call in strikes. From the sky, it
can be hard to tell friend from foe. And by themselves, the GPS coordinates
used to guide bombs aren’t nearly precise enough; landscape and weather can
throw the coordinates off by as much as 500 feet. The planes need additional
information from the guys on the ground. The only other option is to use
laser-guided bombs, but even then the target has to be correctly indentified
beforehand.

But putting the specialized troops the Pentagon calls “Joint Terminal Air
Controllers,” or JTACs, into combat comes with a cost. “The problem with
putting JTACs on the ground is that once you get American boots on the
ground—and one of those guys gets captured and beheaded on national TV or
media,” the A-10 pilot said.

The Pentagon has compensated for this, in part, by easing back in Syria on
the restrictive rules used in Afghanistan to minimize civilian casualties.
But in many other aspects, current and former Air Force personnel say, U.S.
Central Command is fighting the war against ISIS in largely the same way it
operates against the Taliban in Afghanistan. “The strategic problem posed by
[ISIS] is different than that in Afghanistan,” one former senior Air Force
official said. “So the similarity of the minimal application of airpower,
along with excessive micromanagement by the CENTCOM bureaucracy, is a
symptom of not recognizing that this is a different strategic problem.”

After all, ISIS isn’t simply a collection of terrorists. The group holds
territory, and manages an inventory of heavy military and civilian
equipment. There’s a reason they call themselves the Islamic State. So
instead of worrying about individual air strikes, this former official said,
the CENTCOM needs to run a wider more free-ranging air war where more
targets are hit much more quickly. “Very few in the military today have
experience in planning and executing a comprehensive air campaign—their
experience is only in the control of individual strikes against individual
targets,” the official added. “There needs to be constant 24/7 overwatch,
and immediate attack of any [ISIS] artillery, people, vehicles, or
facilities that they are occupying.”

But that is a view shared mainly by those within the Air Force—which has,
for decades, argued that it has the ability to win wars though strategic
bombing.

Even in the case of the campaign against ISIS, there are many officers from
the Army, Navy and even the Air Force who told The Daily Beast that they
agree with the restraint shown by CENTCOM leadership—noting it is pointless
to bomb the wrong target and antagonize the local population.

Further, the challenge for CENTCOM is further compounded by the lack of
workable intelligence in Syria. It’s hard to untangle the convoluted
alliances and entanglements between friend or foe. Often, so-called moderate
rebel forces cooperate with the hardcore Islamic fighters in their fight
against the Syrian government or even ISIS. (That’s why, late last month, a
moderate camp wasalmost hit by an allied airstrike
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/30/exclusive-america-s-allies
-almost-bombed-in-syrian-airstrikes.html> ; the bombs were meant for the al
Qaeda outpost next door.) Additionally, there is little to no cooperation or
coordination with moderate rebel forces and the U.S. military.


“The kill-chain is very convoluted. Nobody really has the control in the
tactical environment.”Because of those factors, there are often too few
suitable targets to attack, sources told The Daily Beast. A partial solution
to that—even though it is not quite as effective as having troops on the
ground—is to use an airborne controller. That usually means a low, slow
flying warplane like the Air Force’s A-10 Warthog, which can stay in a
target area for a long time and tell other aircraft where to drop their
weapons. “It doesn’t have to be an A-10, it can be an Apache [attack
helicopter], but they are slow and vulnerable—so that’s one drawback for a
helicopter vice fixed-wing,” the A-10 pilot said.

He conceded that the Air Force does have some F-15E Strike Eagle supersonic
fighter-bomber crews who are trained to do that mission too. The U.S. Navy
and Marine Corps also use the supersonic F/A-18 Hornet strike fighter to
guide other jets to their targets.

Right now, there are no Warthogs deployed to the fight against ISIS, however
the Indiana Air National Guard will send a dozen of the jets to the area
this month. The Army, however, has deployed some AH-64 Apache gunships into
Iraq to strike at ISIS from close in.

“We’re using AH-64s because they’re the best platform to get in and visually
identify the targets and either take them out or designate for someone else
to take them out,” said one former Army aviator with extensive Apache
experience. “ISIS does have armor, so Hellfires [anti-tank missiles] will be
very effective against them, and we all know how devastating a weapon the
30mm [cannon] is against troops.”

But the Apaches are short range and need maintenance troops to deploy with
them into a location within Iraq itself. “The only disadvantage is contrary
to President Obama, we definitely have ‘boots on the ground,’” the former
Army officer said. “They’re unsupportable otherwise.”

There’s another reason the campaign against ISIS is proceeding slowly: the
unwieldy coalition of foreign countries put together by the U.S. to fight in
this new war. There are differing ways of doing things and different
countries have different objectives, which makes for a long process, the
A-10 pilot said.

There have also been instances during this air war when combat aircraft are
not available in time to strike a target that pops up. For example, the A-10
pilot said, if a Predator drone finds a target, it can take warplanes like a
B-1 bomber or an F-15E Strike Eagle fighter—up to two hours sometimes—to
arrive at the target area. Often times, the target is simply gone by then.
“You bring in assets like the A-10 or Apaches, and you bring them in close,
that’s a whole lot easier to handle,” the A-10 pilot said. “That’s one way
to speed it up.”

                 Thé Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Ssabassajja and Dr. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda is in
anarchy"
                    Kuungana Mulindwa Mawasiliano Kikundi
"Pamoja na Yoweri Museveni, Ssabassajja na Dk. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda ni
katika machafuko"

 

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