Don’t Blame Islam; Al-Qaeda and ISIS are products of US and Saudi
imperialism.



by David MiznerMujahideen fighters during the Afghan War. 

After the attack on Charlie Hedbo, certain liberals joined conservatives in
declaring that the killer was Islamic extremism. Any suggestion of Western
culpability would be inaccurate, if not immoral.

“The murders today in Paris are not a result of France’s failure to
assimilate two generations of Muslim immigrants from its former colonies,”
<http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/blame-for-charlie-hebdo-murders>
wrote George Packer.

They’re not about French military action against the Islamic State in the
Middle East, or the American invasion of Iraq before that. They’re not part
of some general wave of nihilistic violence in the economically depressed,
socially atomized, morally hollow West — the Paris version of Newtown or
Oslo. Least of all should they be “understood” as reactions to disrespect
for religion on the part of irresponsible cartoonists . . . They are only
the latest blows delivered by an ideology that has sought to achieve power
through terror for decades.

The sentiment recalls the prevailing view after September 11, 2001, when
Susan Sontag was blasted for pointing out that “this was not a ‘cowardly’
attack on ‘civilization’ or ‘liberty’ or ‘humanity’ or ‘the free world’ but
an attack on the world’s self-proclaimed super-power, undertaken as a
consequence of specific American alliances and actions.”

Yet this time around, more commentators in mainstream outlets broke from the
they-hate-freedom, blame-Islam chorus. Whether because the attack didn’t
happen in the United States or because the teenage “war on terror” shades
the debate, or because a few more thoughtful writers now have prominent
platforms, truth crept in.

Also in the New Yorker, Teju Cole
<http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/unmournable-bodies>
wrote, “Violence from ‘our’ side continues unabated. By this time next
month, in all likelihood, many more ‘young men of military age’ and many
others, neither young nor male, will have been killed by US drone strikes in
Pakistan and elsewhere. If past strikes are anything to go by, many of these
people will be innocent of wrongdoing.”

That counts as progress. As does CNN’s decision to run a
<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/19/opinion/charlie-hebdo-noam-chomsky/>
piece by Noam Chomsky that calls President Obama’s drone killings “the most
extreme terrorist campaign of modern times.” And as does
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/15/paris-warning-no-insul
ation-wars-arab-muslim-world> Seamus Milne’s piece in the Guardian pointing
out that violence like the Paris attack is an extension of Western wars.

Yet these pieces are still relatively kind to the United States and its
allies. They downplay the role of the West in producing the violence that
its “thought leaders” blame on Islam. The truth is not merely that Team
USA’s violence is far greater than that of its enemies, or that the former
triggers the latter, but that Western governments and their client states
have actively empowered right-wing jihadist groups.

Western imperialists depict “Islamic terrorism” as a mysterious, indigenous
virus in the way that neocons and their liberal allies
<https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/09/the-poverty-of-culture/> blame “black
culture” for problems caused by racism and longstanding oppression. There’s
nothing ineffable in Islam that produces “terrorism.”

There is, however, a longstanding US effort to use specific facets of Muslim
theology as weapons. This is part of a larger context that includes the
European colonialism that preceded it and the American coups and wars that
have sown chaos and sectarianism and undermined the self-determination of
people in the region.

Milne offers a familiar take: the West inflicts enormous violence on people
in the Middle East, and — as Ward Churchill once put it — “
<http://cryptome.org/ward-churchill.htm> some people push back.” This is
true. Many of those who’ve carried out attacks in Western capitals in the
name of Islam — from
<http://nypost.com/2013/05/16/tsarnaev-blamed-us-wars-in-iraq-afghanistan-in
-martyr-note-on-boats-wall-report/> Dzhokhar Tsarnaev to
<http://www.salon.com/2010/06/22/terrorism_22/> Faisal Shahzad, the would-be
Times Square bomber — cite the West’s violence as their motive. Their
explanations jibe not only with common sense but with the research of
University of Chicago political scientist
<http://political-science.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/pape.shtml> Robert
Pape, who found that by far the most significant cause of suicide bombing
across the world is foreign occupation.

Furthermore, only a tiny fraction of Muslims have joined right-wing jihadist
groups. Attempting to bolster his claim that Islam is inherently violent,
Bill Maher cites (selective) stats showing many Muslims hold retrograde
views on women and gays, but this is a non-sequitur. Holding such views
almost never translates into al-Qaeda–ISIS membership.

In his  <http://kurzman.unc.edu/the-missing-martyrs/> book The Missing
Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists, Charles Kurzman reports
that “well over 99 percent” have rejected the call. Despite the West’s
routine killing of civilians, the
<http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-soc
iety-overview/> vast majority of Muslims oppose retaliatory attacks on
civilians, and even most of those who approve of the tactic are loath to
sign on with a movement that kills mostly Muslims.

Beyond a fringe, Muslims don’t regard al-Qaeda-ISIS as a legitimate form of
resistance to imperialism.On the contrary, many see al-Qaeda-ISIS as the
spawn of US–Saudi imperialism.

Because it is.

Here we must resort to that bane of liberals: history. The United States
established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in 1933 but didn’t get
seriously involved in the Middle East until World War II, when it began to
take over regional hegemony from Great Britain. The US relationship with
Saudi Arabia deepened as Washington sought to secure its hold on the region.
Throughout the Cold War, American officials tried to use right-wing
militants against the two primary threats to its hegemony in the Middle
East: the Soviet Union and Arab nationalism.

Robert Dreyfuss lays out this history in his overlooked
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devil%27s_Game> 2006 book, Devil’s Game: How
the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam. The great flaw of the
book is that Dreyfuss, like neocons, lumps together all kinds of Muslim
political practice — from Hamas to Iran’s revolutionaries to al-Qaeda —
under the useless term of “Islamism.” (The American–Israeli permissiveness
vis-à-vis the rise of Hamas is important but tells us next to nothing about
al-Qaeda).

Nonetheless, Dreyfuss makes a persuasive case, one drawn largely from the
public record. Indeed, it’s almost certain that the US role in sparking the
right-wing jihadist fire is even greater than the one he documents because
many of the dealings were covert.

In the 1950s there was a problem for the United States called
<https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/01/united-states-saudi-arabia-isis/Gamel%25
20Abdal%2520Nasser> Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose resolute independence was
unacceptable. The new leader of Egypt was such a threat that Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles took Eisenhower’s statement that “the Nasser
problem could be eliminated” to be
<https://books.google.com/books?id=-IbQvd13uToC&pg=PA93&lpg=PA93&dq=the+Nass
er+problem+could+be+eliminated&source=bl&ots=cIs5EdBngJ&sig=MByTfSZtMRbFmXXf
W0bntqL7rSw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=2a7CVJHDF4vIsASLrYGoAQ&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAg> an
assassination order.

To try to weaken Nasser, the US wooed the Muslim Brotherhood despite — or
rather, because of — its record of terrorism and violence against the state.
Americans also saw anti-communist potential in its religiosity. “Either we
shall walk the path of Islam or we shall walk the path of Communism,” wrote
Sayyid Qutb, the group’s chief theoretician.

McCarthy-era Washington was receptive.

In 1953, a covert
<http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/feb/05/washingtons-secret-history
-muslim-brotherhood/> US government program brought leading thinkers and
activists from the Middle East to Princeton. Among them was the
Brotherhood’s Said Ramadan, son-in-law of the group’s founder. He visited
the White House that same year and would become the CIA’s man.

In 1954, a Brotherhood attempt to assassinate Nasser backfired. He survived
and launched a crackdown, arresting thousands. In 1956, Nasser’s popularity
surged thanks to his nationalization of the Suez Canal, which led Britain
and France to occupy the canal and Israel to invade the Sinai. All three
were forced to withdraw, and Nasser became a regional hero.

Nasser was a main target of Eisenhower’s 1957 speech to Congress declaring
that he would fund Arab governments in an attempt to diminish Soviet
influence. The “ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eisenhower_Doctrine>
Eisenhower Doctrine” made Saudi Arabia the region’s biggest beneficiary of
American money. (Roosevelt had declared defense of the kingdom a vital
national interest and secured Saudi agreement to host a US military base
until 2003.)

Nasser became even more popular in the 1960s on the strength of his
developmentalist program. At the same time, he continued to repress the
Brotherhood. Nasser’s government imprisoned, tortured, and eventually hanged
Qutb, a martyr-to-be whose writings calling for violent revolution would
inspire Islamic militants.

A common  <https://twitter.com/tomgara/status/555946014277115904>
misperception is that Arab governments successfully handled terrorism with
repression. In fact, they ended up displacing and deepening it. The
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/09/16/the-man-behind-bin-laden>
following thesis, laid out by Lawrence Wright, is overstated but contains a
measure of truth:

One line of thinking proposes that America’s tragedy on September 11th was
born in the prisons of Egypt. Human rights advocates argue that torture
created an appetite for revenge, first in Sayyid Qutb and later in his
acolytes, including Ayman al-Zawahiri.

In the 1960s, Arab nationalism — which entailed development and
redistribution, anti-imperialism, and a certain commitment to anti-Zionism —
gained traction not just in Egypt but across the region, from Algeria to
Palestine to Iraq. In response, the United States turned to its despotic
friend.

“The US forged a working relationship in the Saudi Arabia, intent on using
its foreign policy arm, Wahhabi fundamentalism,” Dreyfuss writes. “The
United States joined with King Saud and Prince Faisal (later King Faisal) in
pursuit of an Islamic bloc from North Africa to Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
To that end, Saudi Arabia formed a host of global institutions, including
the Wahhabi Muslim World League, and built thousands of mosques and
madrassas.

Flash forward to the 1980s, when the US teamed up with Saudi Arabia to fund
the Afghan mujahedeen. In the American mythos, the Soviet invasion led to US
involvement; in fact, the US had been backing the Afghan Muslim Brotherhood
and other right-wing proxies for years. Carter’s National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski would
<http://www.counterpunch.org/1998/01/15/how-jimmy-carter-and-i-started-the-m
ujahideen/> later acknowledge that it was their intent to trigger a Soviet
invasion.

At least as early as 1972, the CIA began funding Afghan fighters. They
included future Mujahideen leaders Rabbani Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
who would become close to both Osama bin Laden and Pakistani Intelligence
(ISI). Sayyah is believed to have invited bin Laden to take refuge in
Afghanistan in 1996. In the 1980s, the bulk of US and Saudi aid went to the
Mujahideen faction headed by Hekmatyar, a brutal leader whose “specialty,”
Dreyfuss reports, was skinning prisoners alive.

US support for such factions intensified after Sardar Daoud seized power
from his fellow royalty in 1973. Breaking with tradition, he declared
himself not Shah but president of a secular democratic republic. But his
non-alignment — he kept his distance from both Washington and Moscow —
concerned the United States, which teamed up with ISI to sponsor an
unsuccessful coup in 1974. As in Egypt, the United States joined with
right-wing militants to target a secular, independent government.

While Daoud’s independent, moderately progressive government was a problem
for the United States, the communist, Soviet-friendly government that took
control in 1978 was anathema. The CIA met with and funded anti-government
forces. Afghanistan became even more important to the United States when it
lost its nearby ally, the Shah, in January 1979. In July, President Carter
formalized authorized aid to the Mujahideen with a program called Operation
Cyclone.

In the fall, Prime Minster Hafizullah Amin became the leader of Afghanistan
after he ordered the killing of the president, Nur Muhammad Taraki. The
Soviet Union believed the CIA had arranged the coup. In December, Soviet
troops moved in, killed Amin, and installed a new leader.

The next sordid chapter — in which the US and Saudi Arabia funneled money
through ISI to the Mujahideen and recruited Arab militants to join them — is
well known, although details are disputed. Saudi Arabia deposited hundreds
of millions of dollars into a Swiss bank account controlled by the United
States.

The new Saudi king, at the time the governor of Riyadh, was a
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/22/the-next-king-of-the-saudi
s-salman-the-family-sheriff.html> top fundraiser, “providing $25 million a
month to the mujahideen.” British Intelligence, with guidance from the CIA
in Pakistan, headed the training of fighters inside Afghanistan while the US
military trained Arab fighters in Egypt and, according to some reports, in
the United States.

Secrecy makes it impossible to know how much, if any, contact there was
between the CIA and bin Laden in Pakistan, not least because each would have
an interest in concealing it. We know that bin Laden formed an alliance with
longtime CIA beneficiary Hekmatyar, and that ISI — the “
<http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3340101/t/bin-laden-comes-home-roost/> CIA’s
primary conduit” for sending money and weapons to the Mujahideen — supported
bin Laden’s front organization and precursor to al-Qaeda, Maktab
al-Khidamar.

A few weeks after September 11, Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia
<http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/01/lkl.00.html> said that in the 1980s
bin Laden had thanked him for bringing “the Americans, our friends, to help
us against the atheists, he said the communists.”

In any case, the US helped birth al-Qaeda — a truth so undeniable
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dqn0bm4E9yw> even Hillary Clinton has
discussed it, lying only about the sequence of events:

The people we are fighting today we funded twenty years ago, and we did it
because we were locked in this struggle with the Soviet Union. They invaded
Afghanistan, and we did not want to see them control central Asia, and we
went to work. And it was President Reagan in partnership with the Congress
led by Democrats who said, You know what? Sounds like a pretty good idea.
Let’s deal with the ISI and the Pakistani military. Let’s go recruit these
Mujahadeen. That’s great let’s get some to come from Saudi Arabia and other
places importing their Wahhabi brand of Islam so that we can go beat the
Soviet Union.

During the war in Afghanistan, the West and Saudi Arabia helped create not
just al-Qaeda but related groups, like the Libyan Islamic Fighters Group
(LIGF). Formed in Eastern Libya by “Afghan Arabs,” LIGF tried to kill
Muammar Qaddafi three times in 1995–96. British Intelligence sponsored one
of the attempts, according to former agent David Shayler. Former French
intelligence agents confirmed the claim and said it was this secret that led
Britain to
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/nov/10/uk.davidshayler> thwart the
arrest of bin Laden after Qadhaffi had issued (and Interpol approved) a
warrant in 1998.

The United States had also been involved in various attempted coups against
Qaddafi — Reagan even tried to
<http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/22/magazine/target-qaddafi.html?pagewanted=1
> kill the Libyan leader himself in 1986. But after September 11, Qaddafi
became an ally in the “war on terror,” and the United States helped him
crack down on his enemies. The CIA handed over former LIGF members to
Qaddafi,
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/05/us-torture-and-rendition-gaddafi-s-libya
> sometimes torturing them first.

But by the time the uprising broke out in February 2011, the West had deemed
Qaddafi an enemy again, and the United States was backing an opposition
force that included former LGIF members fighting as the Libyan Islamic
Movement. To be a right-wing jihadist over many years is to be backed by the
CIA in one war, tortured by the CIA in the next, and backed again by the CIA
in the next. It wasn’t popular in the United States to mention the fact that
the opposition forces in Libya
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/840704
7/Libyan-rebel-commander-admits-his-fighters-have-al-Qaeda-links.html>
included extremists. The press preferred to focus on more
<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/magazine/89645/benghazi-libya-rebe
ls> appealing factions.

Nor was it popular to discuss a CIA role. Even now it’s still widely
believed that US involvement was confined to airstrikes. Yet six weeks after
the first protests, the New York Times
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/africa/31intel.html?_r=0> reported
that “C.I.A. operatives have been working in Libya for several weeks as part
of a shadow force of Westerners that the Obama administration hopes can help
bleed Colonel Qaddafi’s military.”

To cite CIA involvement is not necessarily to deny that there was also an
indigenous rebellion. The two things can coexist, and often do. What’s
undeniable is that amid the chaos and carnage of post-regime change Libya,
extremist groups are thriving. These include an ascendant affiliate of ISIS
in the eastern city of Derna — which has, relatedly, produced an
<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/01/113440/libyan-city-struggles-with-his
tory.html> inordinate number of foreign fighters in Iraq.

The rise of ISIS, like al-Qaeda’s, implicates US imperialism. It’s hardly
radical to note that ISIS is
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/04/how-an-america
n-prison-helped-ignite-the-islamic-state/> the child of the US war on Iraq,
a fundamental fact that tends to go missing from mainstream analysis. While
violent
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/27/iraq-government-attacking-fallujah-hospi
tal> oppression of Sunnis by the Iraqi government aided ISIS, former Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki is too easy of a scapegoat. As
<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/iraq-crisis-how-saudi-arabia-he
lped-isis-take-over-the-north-of-the-country-9602312.html> Patrick Cockburn
writes, it was the war in Syria that destabilized Iraq and, in turn, made
ISIS a regional power.

The role of the US inside Syria prior to the 2011 protests is unclear.
Thanks largely to Seymour
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/03/05/the-redirection> Hersh’s 2007
report, we know that President Bush urged Saudi Arabia to unleash sectarian
forces in an attempt to undermine Assad in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
This time the primary target was Iran, not the Soviet Union, but this was
the Afghanistan playbook — still in vogue despite that intervening incident
in lower Manhattan.

As part of this effort, US officials
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/world/africa/26iht-syria.3674073.html?pag
ewanted=all> cultivated ties to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The plan
included covert ops in Syria, but we don’t know what they entailed or how,
if at all, they influenced the events of 2011, or the precise chain of
events that led to the uprising becoming a war.

What happened to the Syrian revolution — if, indeed, that term even applies
— is disputed. We should be able to agree, however, that a progressive
uprising of indeterminate size gave way to a large reactionary one as the
Syrian government cracked down on leftists and foreign-backed extremists
rushed in.

Gilbert Achcar, a self-described “strong and continuous supporter of the
uprising,” says the opposition made
<http://newpol.org/content/were-facing-important-crossroad> a grave mistake
when it allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, “which was in thrall to Turkey,
Qatar, and the US.” In so doing, he says, they “got sucked into a
degenerative dialectics of religious extremism that led to the founding of
ISIS.”

The United States supported the uprising against the Syrian government even
as ISIS became a fixture. US policy was one of malign neglect at best. We
can be certain that American officials were well aware of ISIS’s rise. They
accepted it in Iraq (a country they wanted to quit and whose president they
no longer supported) and approved of it in Syria (a country they wanted to
damage and whose president they wanted to remove or at least weaken).

With ISIS now public enemy number one, it may be easy to forget that for
months — until ISIS became big enough to threaten American interests — US
weapons, both rhetorical and actual, were pointed only at the Syrian
government. US officials gave major speeches on Syria that
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/09/07/samantha-power
s-case-for-striking-syria/> didn’t even mention ISIS.

 
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/14/america-s-allies-are-fundi
ng-isis.html> Saudi-Qatari-Turkish support for extremists had at least tacit
backing from Washington. Documents recently published online
<http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/16/turkish-military-says-mit-sh
ipped-weapons-to-al-qaeda> confirm that Turkish Intelligence provided arms
to al-Qaeda in Syria prior to its split with ISIS. Joe Biden’s
<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/10/06/242222/biden-continues-to-apologize-f
irst.html> October 2014 scolding of US allies for supporting ISIS and
al-Qaeda only threw into relief the previous months of silence.

More than that, the United States itself strengthened ISIS. Both President
Obama and his critics on the Right now have an interest in pushing the myth
that he did little to support anti-government fighters. In fact, beginning
at least as early as 2012, the CIA
<http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/21/world/la-fg-cia-syria-20130622>
trained opposition forces and gave them weapons belonging both
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-begins-weapons-de
livery-to-syrian-rebels/2013/09/11/9fcf2ed8-1b0c-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_stor
y.html> to the United States and
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/world/middleeast/arms-airlift-to-syrian-r
ebels-expands-with-cia-aid.html?pagewanted=all> its allies. Many of these
weapons
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most
-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> ended up in the hands
of ISIS and al-Qaeda.

Here’s
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175884/tomgram%3A_patrick_cockburn,_how_to_
ensure_a_thriving_caliphate/> Cockburn on the Yarmouk Brigade, part of the
US-backed Free Syrian Army:

Numerous videos show that the Yarmouk Brigade has frequently fought in
collaboration with JAN, the official al-Qa’ida affiliate. Since it was
likely that, in the midst of battle, these two groups would share their
munitions, Washington was effectively allowing advanced weaponry to be
handed over to its deadliest enemy.

Those who blame US ineptness are in effect arguing that American officials
were unaware of public information showing it was a near certainty that arms
could flow to al-Qaeda and ISIS. Did they want to arm their alleged enemies?
Or did they just accept it? Is there a difference, finally?

And the Free Syrian Army, insofar as it actually existed as a coherent
entity, contained many right-wing elements. The mainstream press now
acknowledges that right-wing sectarians dominate the opposition, but this
has been the case for some time. Nir Rosen, who spent months researching the
war, goes further. “There are no actual moderate insurgents either
ideologically or in terms of their actions,” he writes. Indeed, many FSA
fighters have joined ISIS and al-Qaeda.

The United States claims it has now ditched what’s left of the FSA in favor
of its own proxy army. As the US teams up with Arab countries to train
fighters, its policy on Syria resembles its policy on Afghanistan in the
1980s.

American officials would argue that ISIS is the target of this force, but
regime change remains the chief goal of their partners, and in any case the
result is clear: continued warfare and continued shattering of Syria. The US
now seems to favor a de facto partition that would destroy the territorial
integrity of the Syrian state.

As for the makeup of the new proxy force, President Obama has repeatedly
pressed Congress to exempt his war on ISIS from the ban on financing
torturers and other war criminals. While it’s quaint that he feels the need
to acknowledge the  <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leahy_Law> Leahy Law, his
doing so indicates the kind of force the US and its allies will be sending
into Syria.

“Clean” fighters are hard to come by, they say. No doubt. But the truth is
that, like their Afghan Mujahideen-supporting predecessors in the 1980s,
American officials probably want to unleash the most ruthless killers. And
in several years, once the force our government built has merged with ISIS
and slaughtered American civilians, we’ll all rally around the flag, lament
the “sickness” in Islam, and cheer as the bombs fall.

 

EM

On the 49th Parallel          

                 Thé Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Ssabassajja and Dr. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda is in
anarchy"
                    Kuungana Mulindwa Mawasiliano Kikundi
"Pamoja na Yoweri Museveni, Ssabassajja na Dk. Kiiza Besigye, Uganda ni
katika machafuko" 

 

 

 

 

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