Hi,

I wanted to follow up on the short presentation I gave at yesterday's UKNOF 
meeting about our effort to facilitate collection of some operational data 
related to routing resiliency.

We are looking for some statistics from your NOC. I understand there might be 
concerns regarding the disclosure of such information, but we hope we can 
figure out how to handle sensitivities, on a case by case basis.

To give you a better idea of what we're talking about I attach the survey 
itself.

Please contact Andrei Robachevsky ([email protected]) or me if you are 
interested in taking part in this survey. Concrete suggestions regarding the 
questions or the survey in general are also very welcome.

Thanks,
Mat
*Routing Resiliency Survey*

*Intro*

When addressing routing security issues, as with any security-related activity, 
a network operator needs factual data and a good understanding of what's going 
on in the system to better inform the process of risk assessment and the 
selection of adequate tools and approaches. It is also important to measure the 
effect of such tools once they are deployed, and monitor the changing dynamics 
of the environment. Because the inter-domain routing system is global, such 
monitoring and measurements should be long-term and be done on a global scale.

In this context, one important data set is operational statistics of incidents 
related to routing security, as registered by a network operator. This survey 
is aimed at collecting these operational data.

*Non-disclosure*

We understand the sensitivity of some of these data, therefore, the Internet 
Society will follow a few rules when conducting this survey:
- network operators are not asked to provide data that is strictly company 
confidential;
- all requested data is in the form of statistical information and doesn't need 
to reveal specifics, like AS numbers, prefixes, etc.
- even if such information is submitted for the discretion of the Internet 
Society, it will be fully anonymized before sharing with anyone, and presented 
in collated form.

*Questions*

0. Please provide your AS number: [                ]

1. Please provide statistics on the number of registered incident (e.g. opened 
tickets) by your NOC over the past 6 months, related to route hijacking. In 
particular, addressing the following incidents:


1.1. One of your own prefixes is hijacked
        [    ] times in the past 6 months (please enter a number, 
approximations are fine)

1.2. A prefix of one of your customers is hijacked somewhere in the Internet
        [    ] times in the past 6 months (please enter a number, 
approximations are fine)

1.3. One of your (direct or indirect) customers hijacks a prefix of another of 
your customers

        [    ] times in the past 6 months (please enter a number, 
approximations are fine)


2. For each of these categories, please specify

 2.1. Typical duration of the incidents

        Your prefix is hijacked:

        Your customerÕs prefix is hijacked somewhere in the Internet:

        Customer hijacks prefix of another customer:

 2.2. What are typical causes of the incidents (e.g. misconfiguration (please 
be more specific, if possible), malicious intent)?

        Your prefix is hijacked:

        Your customerÕs prefix is hijacked somewhere in the Internet:

        Customer hijacks prefix of another customer:

 2.3. What are typical measures that were taken to mitigate or resolve the 
incidents (e.g. closed mailinglists, IXP mailinglist, peer contacts, contacts 
from whois databases)?

        Your prefix is hijacked:

        Your customerÕs prefix is hijacked somewhere in the Internet:

        Customer hijacks prefix of another customer:

3. If you use the following routing security controls, please provide
an indication of how often the following exceptions are captured:

 3.1. A number of prefixes received from a BGP neighbor exceeds the 
maximum-prefix limit

 3.2. An update from a BGP neighbor is rejected due to violation of your 
routing policy
  - prefix origin violation
  - AS-PATH violation
  - prefix announcement violation (e.g. announcement of your peer networks by 
your customer)

 3.3. Alerts received by routing monitoring tools (e.g. BGPmon)

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