Christian, What you say is of course true, but ultimately will end up as cost (pound notes, dollar bills, RMBs). The cost will end up with the end user - either as taxation - or in costs to use the service.
I speak for myself typically in these debates, and I am very cautious about what I infer other people may think. I think I know as many people who are passionate about this topic as dispassionate, I also know that a lot of people may value certain aspects of surveillance. And I re-iterate for every person making it more expensive there will be three making it cheaper (both in real numeric terms but also in the terms you lay out below). I don’t believe there is a technical solution to this problem unfortunately (and if there was, there would be an equal good solution to getting around the problem - technology is a double edged sword. Regards, Neil. On 17/01/2014 13:02, "Christian de Larrinaga" <[email protected]> wrote: >I expect you are talking about "cost" from the narrower operator >perspective. That is a very small subsection of the overall impact of >those using Internet networks. > >In my view the debate on surveillance needs to appreciate the cost of >surveillance is not just about money. It is both much higher in money >terms than what an operator might be asked to spend (and be reimbursed >for) and also carries broader societal costs. Societal costs include >such issues as degradation of trust (privacy) across societal >institutions and relationships that constitutionally require privacy. > >That is the very institutions required to monitor and oversee such >activities as "surveillance" are themselves weakened. > > > >Christian >Neil J. McRae wrote: >> On 17/01/2014 11:18, "Christian de Larrinaga" <[email protected]> >>wrote: >> >>> not equal steps ... not even close to being equal. >>> >>> The challenge is to define what is going on. Some operators will have a >>> perspective "in the network" that differs from their users. So if you >>> see an attack as a user you are seeing damage to your own privacy and >>> security over any number of operator networks and services. As an >>> operator you see an attack as damaging your network assets and >>>business. >>> >>> IETF is coming down on a definition which is describing "an attack on >>> the Internet". The use of the word "attack" in that context does not >>> coincide with "war" though. It is carefully framed. The aim that is >>> emerging is not to prevent surveillance but to make the current conduct >>> of pervasive monitoring much more expensive to undertake. >>> >>> With a significant figure of $35 billion annually being flashed around >>> as the likely damage just to US Cloud services from the revelations of >>> pervasive monitoring there is cost on all sides that is not being taken >>> into account currently in the actual economics of current surveillance >>> practice. Again how those "damages" are apportioned are not going to >>>be >>> equally distributed. >> >> >> Whilst I applaud the goal I seriously doubt that this will be a >>successful >> undertaking. To make it more expensive will ultimately cost vendors, >> operators and ultimately end users - end users won¹t pay so I question >>the >> realness of this at all. It has long been established that technical >> solutions to political and social problems do not work. For every guy >> making something more expensive there will be three making it cheaper. >> >> Cheers, >> Neil. >> >>
