In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within gbr. Inferred improvements during May 2018: ASN Name Fixed-By 41495 FAELIX 2018-05-08 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during May 2018: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 20860 IOMART 2016-02-10 2018-05-20 60339 H3GUK 2016-09-01 2018-05-24 42004 ULGRP 2016-11-07 2018-05-11 5089 NTL 2016-11-16 2018-05-14 42689 Cablecom 2017-03-25 2018-05-14 44684 MYTHIC 2018-02-25 2018-05-27 21320 GEANT_IAS_VRF 2018-03-15 2018-05-25 15830 TELECITY-LON 2018-05-24 2018-05-24 57230 Ariawebco 2018-05-26 2018-05-26 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=gbr&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected]
