In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within gbr. Inferred improvements during Jan 2019: ASN Name Fixed-By 21320 GEANT_IAS_VRF 2019-01-08 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jan 2019: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 60339 H3GUK 2016-09-01 2019-01-17 42004 ULGRP 2016-11-07 2019-01-18 5089 NTL 2016-11-16 2019-01-30 31655 ASN-GammaTelecom 2017-05-09 2019-01-16 12222 AKAMAI 2018-02-14 2019-01-30 44684 MYTHIC 2018-02-25 2019-01-27 30740 EXA-NETWORKS 2018-04-25 2019-01-13 202012 AS-DANTE 2018-12-20 2019-01-29 57099 BCL 2019-01-18 2019-01-18 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=gbr&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected]
