In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within gbr. Inferred improvements during Jun 2019: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2019: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 42004 ULGRP 2016-11-07 2019-06-21 5089 NTL 2016-11-16 2019-06-24 31655 ASN-GammaTelecom 2017-05-09 2019-06-17 16082 SPITFIRE 2017-07-10 2019-06-25 44684 MYTHIC 2018-02-25 2019-06-30 202012 AS-DANTE 2018-12-20 2019-06-06 29009 UKBROADBAND 2019-05-08 2019-06-20 209500 2019-05-19 2019-06-23 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=gbr&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected]
