In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within gbr. Inferred improvements during Dec 2019: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Dec 2019: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 13213 UK2NET 2016-07-27 2019-12-27 42004 ULGRP 2016-11-07 2019-12-18 5089 NTL 2016-11-16 2019-12-16 42689 Cablecom 2017-03-25 2019-12-08 44684 MYTHIC 2018-02-25 2019-12-29 60257 Origin 2019-12-23 2019-12-23 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=gbr&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected]
