Umsebenzi Online

 


Volume 16, No. 11, 12 June 2017



In this Issue:

.         What we need is maximum unity to defend and further develop our
democracy, not peevish attacks - Response of Mukoni Ratshitanga by Jeremy
Cronin

 


 

 


Red Alert

What we need is maximum unity to defend and further develop our democracy,
not peevish attacks - Response of Mukoni Ratshitanga by Jeremy Cronin

http://www.sacp.org.za/pubs/umsebenzi/images/umsebenzi_hand.gif

The current avalanche of Gupta related e-mails provides a more granular
understanding of what has been obvious for some time. There has been an
insidious, large-scale parasitic looting of public resources. The recent
study by leading academics, "Betrayal of the Promise", aptly describes it as
a "silent coup". 

In these circumstances we need to ask: "What is to be done?" Part of the
answer is the forging of the broadest possible patriotic front across
ideological divides in defence of our constitution, democracy, and national
sovereignty. This includes the wide-spread call (first suggested by the
SACP) for the establishment of an independent judicial commission to look
specifically at the role of the Gupta family and its parasitic political and
corporate network. 

Particularly those of us in the political space need to ask two additional
questions. "How did we get here?" and, an awkward but necessary: "What, if
any, has been our individual and organisational contribution to the mess?"

Mukoni Ratshitanga, previously former President Mbeki's spokesperson,
entered this discussion but effectively dodged all three questions ("Men who
make their own history, as they please", Sunday Times 4 June 2017). As often
happens in pupil-mentor relationships, the tone, the prose style and the
prickliness of Ratshitanga's intervention suggest the continued inspiration
of his mentor. 

Ratshitanga's intervention is a peevish attack on the SACP in general, and
most especially on our general secretary, Blade Nzimande. Ratshitanga's
irritation appears to be largely with the prominent role the SACP has been
playing in the critique of state capture. More specifically his irritation
seems to have been sparked by an SACP statement that the recent Seriti
Commission into the arms deal was a "white wash" and that any judicial
commission into state capture must not follow similar lines. 

There is plenty of personal history behind Ratshitanga's ire. It would be
unrealistic, I guess, to simply suggest bygones should be left as such.
Certainly, there are self-critical lessons that the SACP needs to draw, as
last (2-4 June 2017) SACP central committee (CC) emphasised. Although the
SACP never formally endorsed Jacob Zuma for the ANC presidency at the ANC's
2007 Polokwane conference, much of the SACP organisational apparatus was
actively involved in supporting him. A mini-cult of the personality was
created at the time, and leading SACP voices were among those involved.
Going into the future the SACP must vigorously avoid any
"great-man-as-saviour" temptation.

More substantively, as the past weekend's CC noted, back in 2007 the SACP
was very much involved in an alignment of forces best described as a
"Polokwane marriage of convenience". 

>From at least 1996, the SACP and COSATU, along with many others, were in
open opposition to the neo-liberal turn engineered by a leading group within
the ANC in which Mbeki was undoubtedly a key factor. In essence, this
project was an implicit pact between established big capital and the new
political elite, consummated in highly-leveraged black economic empowerment
deals for the politically connected in exchange for policies that allowed
established monopoly capital to largely evade developmental disciplining by
the new democratic state. Additionally, key parastatals (among them Eskom
and Transnet) were corporatised with a view to privatisation as a new source
for private BEE accumulation.

This project also had a political dimension, borrowed substantially from the
now discredited "Third Way" current associated with European politicians
like Tony Blair. In the South African reality this meant eviscerating the
popular movement character of the ANC and transforming it into a supposedly
"modernised", narrow parliamentary electoral formation controlled by a
presidential centre in the state and funded by BEE money.

Despite GDP growth in the Mbeki years, the underlying structural features of
our apartheid-colonial political economy persisted and the triple crisis of
unemployment and racialised inequality and poverty was reproduced. Terrible
blunders were also made in this period, notably AIDS denialism. 

This was the context in which the ANC's 2007 Polokwane Conference took
place. On the eve of conference, the SACP issued a statement calling on
delegates to insist on "either a change of direction, or a change of
leadership". SACP and COSATU aligned ANC delegates were joined by another
grouping - essentially a right-wing, narrow nationalist tendency that
expressed the frustration of aspirant BEE players who felt excluded from the
magic, inner-BEE circle of the Mbeki years. The ANC Youth League was a key
point of focus for this tendency with Julius Malema among its more outspoken
agitators.

The SACP-COSATU left axis on the one hand and the ANC YL and its BEE backers
on the other constituted the "Polokwane marriage of convenience".
Programmatically the two sides were nominally united around the call to
re-establish the ANC and its alliance as the "strategic political centre",
as opposed to the narrow, state-centred and technicist Mbeki presidential
centre. In practice, however, two very different agendas lay behind the
notion of rebuilding the ANC.   

For the left it meant rebuilding the popular movement character of the ANC
and its alliance, anchoring branch activity in the daily concerns of
communities facing crises of poverty, unemployment and endemic violence. For
the narrow nationalist tendency, as it has clearly turned out, the ANC was
identified as the soft-underbelly which, through money and patronage-based
networks, the Mbeki BEE beneficiaries could be replaced by a new wave of
accumulation, grounded less on debt-leveraged share acquisition and
privatisation proceeds, and more on the parasitic looting of state
(particularly SOE) procurement. 

>From the first (2009-2014) Zuma administration an uneasy balance of forces
has existed between these different and contradictory tendencies in both
government and the ANC alliance. Important advances were made, notably in
the massive roll-out of anti-retrovirals, but also in key areas like
industrial policy, state-led infrastructure build, and the re-calibration of
competition policy to address collusive monopoly capital behaviour. But
progress was always constrained by the suborning of key institutions in the
criminal justice system (notably the NPA and the Hawks), and increasingly by
corporate capture of SOEs, notably via board appointments.

So how does this all relate to Ratshitanga and, more importantly, mapping a
way forward?  Let's pretend, as Ratshitanga would have it, that the Seriti
commission was an exhaustive, no stone left unturned process. Let's pretend
that the arms deal was entirely corruption free, apart from the pesky
"secondary contracts" in which Shabir Shaik and Tony Yengeni became
collateral damage. Pretending all of this, a broader set of questions still
arises. Was the massive multi-billion rand arms deal the right strategic
priority for a society facing multiple developmental challenges? Has the
arms deal left our armed forces more appropriately equipped for the
strategic challenges of our country? Did the procurement process advance
national sovereign interests, or surrender them to foreign multi-nationals
interests?

If we are to defend our democracy we all need to be thoughtful about lessons
to be learnt from the recent past. While we lament the apparent capture of
key institutions like the NPA, we shouldn't forget the earlier
politicisation of the institution and how in the run-up to Polokwane, a
former NPA head announced there was a prima facie case against then deputy
president Zuma, but no charges would be pressed. This laid the basis for
much of the political turmoil that was to follow.

However, not all lessons from the past are negative. One of which is the
dignified manner in which President Mbeki resigned in 2008 when it was
apparent that he had lost support within the movement that had nurtured him.


.         Cde Jeremy Cronin is SACP First Deputy General Secretary, a
shortened version of this response was first published by the Sunday Times,
11 June 2017

 

          

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