Report: Full Disclosure mailing list, 2026-11-01,
https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/7
Disposition: VALID-HARDENING, deny-list gap closed as WW-5838; the request
path is application-owned (THREAT_MODEL.md sections 9, 13)
TLP:CLEAR
In short
This is not a vulnerability in Apache Struts. The proof of concept requires
the application to pass a request value to OGNL evaluation itself, which
the security guide names as the one thing an application must never do. The
gap in the default exclusion list that the post uses is real and has been
closed.
What the report describes
The post shows an OGNL expression that wraps a call in
java.beans.Expression to reach reflection and run a command. It states that
the expression must be delivered by application code that evaluates user
input as OGNL, for example a request parameter handed to the expression
evaluator or reflected into a template with forced evaluation.
What the framework does with that input
- Struts does not evaluate request parameter values as OGNL expressions.
The parameters interceptor treats a value as data to assign to an accepted
property; evaluation of a request value as an expression happens only when
application code performs it (THREAT_MODEL.md section 9; security guide,
"Do not use incoming, untrusted user input in forced expression
evaluation").
- OGNL member access is restricted by an allow-list in 7.x and by the
excluded classes and packages lists on both lines; java.beans was not in
the default excluded packages.
- WW-5838 adds java.beans, java.lang.reflect and java.lang.invoke to the
default excluded packages (struts-excluded-classes.xml), on both maintained
lines.
Why this is not a vulnerability
The threat model (section 9) provides no defence once the application
itself feeds OGNL untrusted input; the security guide documents forced
evaluation of request values as a prohibited pattern. The framework-owned
part, a missing entry in the default exclusion list, is hardening and has
been done.
What the project is doing
WW-5838 extends the default excluded packages as described above.
What users should do
Review application code and templates for any place a request value reaches
OGNL evaluation, for example %{} around request data or getText with a
request value, as the security guide describes. Keep the default exclusion
lists and the allow-list enabled.
References
- https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/WW-5838
- https://struts.apache.org/security/
- https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md
- https://github.com/apache/struts/blob/main/SECURITY.md
New evidence goes to [email protected]; questions about this
notice go to this list.
on behalf of the Apache Struts PMC
Ćukasz