Thanks for your response. Let me go through these details and will ping you in 
case of any query.

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________________________________
From: Ji, Kai <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, April 1, 2022 7:20:52 PM
To: Kusztal, ArkadiuszX <[email protected]>; ossama ahmed 
<[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Zhang, Roy Fan <[email protected]>
Subject: RE: OpenSSL Crypto Poll Mode Driver


FYI:  The support of Openssl 3.0 lib in Openssl cryptodev PMD is working in 
progress, the following API changes current made into RSA routine in PMD:



Deprecated RSA_private_encrypt() & RSA_public_decrypt()  replaced with 
EVP_PKEY_encrypt() & EVP_PKEY_decrypt() for rsa enc/dec ops

Deprecated  RSA_sing() & RSA_verify() replaced with  EVP_PKEY_sign() & 
EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() for rsa sign/verfy ops



The EVP APIs offer flexible configurations where digest algorithm/ padding can 
be defined. E.g:



EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)

EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, EVP_sha256()



Regards



Kai



From: Kusztal, ArkadiuszX <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, April 1, 2022 2:41 PM
To: ossama ahmed <[email protected]>; [email protected]
Cc: Zhang, Roy Fan <[email protected]>; Ji, Kai <[email protected]>
Subject: RE: OpenSSL Crypto Poll Mode Driver



Hi Ossama,



Please see answers inline with [Arek]



From: ossama ahmed 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Sent: Friday, April 1, 2022 1:18 PM
To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: Fw: OpenSSL Crypto Poll Mode Driver







Sent from Outlook<http://aka.ms/weboutlook>

________________________________

From: ossama ahmed
Sent: Friday, April 1, 2022 11:10 AM
To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Subject: OpenSSL Crypto Poll Mode Driver



Hello,



I would like to highlight following issues in OpenSSL Crypto Poll Mode Driver 
and OpenSSL vdev related to RSA Sign and Verify operations.



ISSUES:

ISSUE1 (RSA_private_encrypt and RSA_public_decrypt)



With respect to 
https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/RSA_private_encrypt.html .Both of 
the functions are deprecated. Applications should instead use 
EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex, EVP_PKEY_sign, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init, and 
EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.



Although I understand that due to compatibility reasons, DPDK is using native 
(in my case on Ubuntu 20.04.1 its 1.1.1f version of) OpenSSL but With respect

to OpenSSL's version 1.1.1f APIs "RSA_private_encrypt" and "RSA_public_decrypt" 
but in case of RSA_PKCS1_PADDING it is recomended that when generating or 
verifying

PKCS #1 signatures, RSA_sign(3) and RSA_verify(3) should be used.



POSSIBLE SOLUTION

1. Use RSA_sign, RSA_verify, EVP_DigestSignFinal, EVP_DigestSign etc instead.



[Arek] – RSA_sign and RSA_verify are now deprecated too.



2. Append algorithm identifier field to digest before signing. Details can be 
found in section EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 availbel on 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-9.2



For example in case if RSA is using SHA256 for digest generation then 
DigestInfo value is:

SHA-256: (0x)30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20 || H 
where H is the digest of data

Hence appropriate AIDs (i.e algorithm identifiers) must be appended to digest. 
Once this done then in case of RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, APIs RSA_private_encrypt and 
RSA_public_decrypt are compatible with RSA_sign, RSA_verify, 
EVP_DigestSignFinal, EVP_DigestSign and verify respectively.





[Arek] – yes, you are perfectly correct, this Is general Cryptodev API problem. 
Proposals to fix that were sent already:

https://patchwork.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/list/?series=22203.

When PKCS1 we should not worry about algorithmIdentifier from user perspective, 
although there was an option to do PKCS1 padding without it too (pre tls1.2 
PKCS1.5 padding was used with 36 bytes hash concatenation for example), 
discussion was started on dev mailing list. As for OpenSSL PMD simultaneously 
we are working to fix that.





ISSUE2 (OpenSSL Crypto Poll Mode Driver vs RSA PSS Padding)

Current DPDK's OpenSSL Crypto Poll Mode Driver fails to verify signature 
generated using RSA PSS Padding. Also with respect to latest version of DPDK 
there is no handling available in OpenSSL Crypto Poll Mode Driver for 
RTE_CRYPTO_RSA_PADDING_PSS. Current implementation handles only 
RTE_CRYPTO_RSA_PADDING_NONE and

RTE_CRYPTO_RSA_PADDING_PKCS1_5 for signing and verification.



[Arek] – yes, PSS should be implemented too. Registration of openssl random 
engine should allow us to check known answer tests too not only PWCT, could you 
resend your proposal to dev list?



1. EVP_DigestSignFinal, EVP_DigestSign etc instead.



2. As coded in OpenSSL (crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +268):

else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {

            int ret;

            if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))

                return -1;

            ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa, 
RSA_NO_PADDING);



            if (ret <= 0)

                return 0;

            ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, 
rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);

[Arek] – whole openssl low level api is deprecated now, these functions as well 
so we wont be using it.

            if (ret <= 0)

                return 0;

            return 1;

        }

However, in order to use above implementation changes are required in OpenSSL 
Crypto Poll Mode Driver (drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c +1945) for 
example



       case RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_OP_VERIFY:

                tmp = rte_malloc(NULL, op->rsa.sign.length, 0);

                if (tmp == NULL) {

                        OPENSSL_LOG(ERR, "Memory allocation failed");

                        cop->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;

                        break;

                }

                ret = RSA_public_decrypt(op->rsa.sign.length,

                                op->rsa.sign.data,

                                tmp,

                                rsa,

                                pad);



                OPENSSL_LOG(DEBUG,

                                "Length of public_decrypt %d "

                                "length of message %zd\n",

                                ret, op->rsa.message.length);

                //FIXME

                if(pad == RSA_NO_PADDING && ret)

                        memcpy(op->rsa.message.data, tmp, op->rsa.sign.length);

                else if ((ret <= 0) || (CRYPTO_memcmp(tmp, op->rsa.message.data,

                                op->rsa.message.length))) {

                        OPENSSL_LOG(ERR, "RSA sign Verification failed");

                        cop->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;

                }

                //FIXME

                rte_free(tmp);

                break;



                Complete details are availble in section 8.1.2 of 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.1.2





I have handled the above mentioned issues in DPDK using my own custom 
implementation. I would love to share details if required for further 
clarification



Regards,

Ossama Ahmed Mughal


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