Zitat von Manuel Faux <[email protected]>:
The concept behind this is, that it is said, if one key is compromised, only a part of the whole "system" is affected. If someone compromises your signing-key hi is still unable to decrypt your mails. IPsec for example also has different key material for signing and different key material for encrypting packets. This is a security engineers philosophy. As far I remember this was a criticized point of WEP weaknesses, WEP uses the same cryptographic material for signing and encryption.I do not think the point behind this is to sell more certificates. If this principle is used, normally both certificates are issued the same time.
The key splitting only makes sense if - they are not stored at the same point - they might have different strenght eg. password protection and the like - they are at least typically not used at the same timeFor IPSEC this is true because the ciphers used for signing and encryption differ with potential weakness at one of them. With S/MIME at least as far as i understand this is not true because the key is not used directly in encryption so even choosing a waek cpiher will not lead to key compromise. So it looks like complicating a already hard to use system in favour of theoretical advanced security?
It is my impression that such things lead not to improved security but to non-usage of security.
But as always YMMV Regards Andreas
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
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