Zitat von Martijn Brinkers <[email protected]>:

On 10/08/2013 05:57 PM, [email protected] wrote:
Hello,

today we had a problem that one customer send us encrypted mail with a
certificate/key pair which was already expired. Therefore the encrypted
data passed the Djigzo gateway to the clients not able to handle it. As
the certificate/key pair is still present it would be nice to get the
mail decrypted without manually whitelist the certificate/key pair.
Thinking about it, this also might be a side effect of using
strict-mode, no?

I'm 99.9% certain that this is a side-effect of strict-mode. In strict
mode, a check is done to see whether the key belongs to the user and is
valid. If the key expired, than the key is no longer valid for the user
and therefore the message is not decrypted for the user. I'll need to
check this to be 100% certain.

Is this intended or even useful behaviour and the only fix to add it to
the CTL with expired allowed?

Good question whether this is expected behaviour or not. I'm not sure
whether it is easy to add an "allow expired" cert just for strict mode.
Let me think about this. Currently the only work around is I think to
add it to the CTL with expired allowed (or disable strict mode)

Kind regards,

Martijn

As it is allowed by RFC for a mail to be 5 days in transit it would be useful to consider expired certificates/key-pair for decryption. This would be compatibel to what MUA already do.

If a key should not get used anymore for decryption it can be deleted without problem.

The only downside i see is that invalid behaviour of remote sites (sender) will not be detected that easy ;-)

Regards

Andreas


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