The selection is not based on "best", but rather on the order of algorithms at the initiator side first and the responder side second.  AFAIK, strongSwan accepts  the first  proposed algorithm that is also configured configured locally. The first algorithm proposed by windows and also accepted at your server is

Windows: "IKE:AES_GCM_16_128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024"
strongSwan:   proposals = aes256gcm16-aes128gcm16-sha384-sha256-prfsha384-prfsha256-modp1024

If you want the better algorithm, then move it first in your windows configuration, or  change strongSwan to only accept the algorithms you prefer, i.e drop "-aes128gcm16"

proposals = aes256gcm16-sha384-sha256-prfsha384-prfsha256-modp1024

Regards,
Jafar

On 5/1/2018 4:59 PM, Christian Salway wrote:
*version: strongSwan 5.6.2*

When I connect from Windows 10, strongSwan replies with a different policy than requested, causing a policy mismatch

```
connections {
   default {
      version = 2
      send_cert = always
      encap = yes
      pools = pool1
      unique = replace
      proposals = aes256gcm16-aes128gcm16-sha384-sha256-prfsha384-prfsha256-modp1024
      local {
         id = vpnserver
         certs = vpnserver.crt
      }
      remote {
         auth = eap-mschapv2
         eap_id = %any
      }
      children {
         net {
            local_ts = 10.0.0.0/20
            inactivity = 1h
         }
      }
   }
}
```

When Windows connects, strongSwan gives it the wrong policy and hence Windows 10 reports a*policy match error*

May  1 21:53:12 08[CFG] *received proposals*: IKE:3DES_CBC/HMAC_SHA1_96/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/MODP_1024, IKE:3DES_CBC/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024, IKE:3DES_CBC/HMAC_SHA2_384_192/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_CBC_128/HMAC_SHA1_96/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_CBC_128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_CBC_128/HMAC_SHA2_384_192/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_CBC_192/HMAC_SHA1_96/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_CBC_192/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_CBC_192/HMAC_SHA2_384_192/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA1_96/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA2_384_192/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_GCM_16_128/HMAC_SHA1_96/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_GCM_16_128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_GCM_16_128/HMAC_SHA2_384_192/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_GCM_16_256/HMAC_SHA1_96/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_GCM_16_256/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024, IKE:AES_GCM_16_256/HMAC_SHA2_384_192/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/MODP_1024 May  1 21:53:12 08[CFG] *configured proposals*: IKE:AES_GCM_16_256/AES_GCM_16_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024 May  1 21:53:12 08[CFG] selected proposal: IKE:*AES_GCM_16_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024*

Expected response (I'm guessing) *AES_GCM_16_128/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024 *(although I dont know why it doesnt chose the better ciphers).




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