> On 23 May 2018, at 18:45, WK <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/23/2018 7:57 AM, Sandro Bonazzola wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Please note that to fully mitigate this vulnerability, system administrators 
>> must apply both hardware “microcode” updates and software patches that 
>> enable new functionality.
>> At this time, microprocessor microcode will be delivered by the individual 
>> manufacturers.
>> 
>> 
> 
> Intel has been promising microcode updates since January when Spectre first 
> appeared and yet except for the very newest CPUs we haven't seen anything and 
> in the cases of older CPUs, I wonder if we are ever going to see anything 
> even if Intel has is on their “roadmap"

I believe they did release it[1], albeit late. SandyBridge for sure, and *some* 
Westmere and Nehalem.

> 
> Can someone shed some light on the vulnerability at this time given we have 
> no microcode update, but all Kernel/Os updates applied, which supposedly 
> handle the original Meltdown and some Spectre Variants.

it requires microcode update as well for optimal performance, though reading 
[2] the “big hammer” approach could work without it, but I do not believe 
anyone had run any benchmarks yet.
> 
> 1) Does the unpatched microcode exploit require "root" permissions?
> 
> 2) Do the existing libvirt/qemu patches prevent a user "root" or "otherwise" 
> in a VM from snooping on other VMs and/or the host?

libvirt/qemu patches are just propagating the new mechanism to guests, they do 
not implement anything in addition on their own
About exploitability - not sure at this point, I guess a proof of concept 
implementations will show up soon

Thanks,
michal

> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> -wk
> 
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[1] https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/27776?v=t
[2] 
https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/speculative-store-bypass-explained-what-it-how-it-works
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