On 20-09-2024 12:25, Christian Mack ([email protected]) wrote:
Hello

Am 19.09.24 um 16:13 schrieb Kees van Vloten ([email protected]):

On 19-09-2024 15:56, qhivert ([email protected]) wrote:
To add my 2cents by reading the code, in the case of SOGoTrustProxyAuthentication = YES; Sogo will check the presence of the header
"x-webobjects-auth-type" : "Basic"
If yes, it will use the Basic access authentication -> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_access_authentication to get the password.

I don't know how you make apache retrieve the password and put it in this header though...

I would not know how to do that either, but Sogo **will** get the username from Apache. Since Apache has done the authentication and the user has passed it, we trust the user. Another check that the user can pass authentication will render the same result, hence it has no added value.

[cut]

As you are having all on one server, that is true.
Well, the statement below is also true if everything is on one server.

But if you have a seperate IMAP + SMTP server, and someone compromises the SOGo server, in your setting that person has complete access to all postboxes from the SOGo server and can send as whoever he likes. If you have to authenticate against IMAP and SMTP, then he only can misuse those postboxes currently logged in.

It is good to point this out!  Basically it is a assessment question: is it a problem (for your organization) to make it one risk domain?

Going the risk path leads me to another observation: Sogo provides multiple services: webmail-server, calendar-server (caldav), addressbook-server (carddav), active-sync-server. If any of those are compromised, all are compromised.  It would be nice to run those services independent of each other and have the option to put them on different servers and separate the risk domains.


- Kees.



Kind regards,
Christian Mack

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