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Daniel,

On 8/31/20 11:36, Daniel Savard wrote:
> Le lun. 31 août 2020 à 11:13, Christopher Schultz <
> ch...@christopherschultz.net> a écrit :
>
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>>
>> Daniel,
>>
>> On 8/28/20 20:46, Daniel Savard wrote:
>>> Le ven. 28 août 2020 à 17:19, Darryl Philip Baker <
>>> darryl.ba...@northwestern.edu> a écrit :
>>>
>>>> I am having an issue that I don’t understand.  On
>>>> RHEL6/CentOS and earlier my predecessors would put
>>>> self-signed certificates they wanted to trust in
>>>> /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/java/cacerts and it was good for
>>>> the life of the machine. On RHEL7 and I assume CentOS7 that
>>>> file is part of a package that is getting updated as part of
>>>> the regular patches. That wipes out our self-signed
>>>> certificates. The way I understand the directions from Red
>>>> Hat we should put the certificate in pem format in the
>>>> directory /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors and run
>>>> update-ca-trust extract and that will update the all the
>>>> appropriate files. Including the cacerts file. That does not
>>>> seem to happen. What is the proper way of handling
>>>> self-signed certificates you want tomcat to trust?
>>>>
>>>> Off topic but you are folks who might know: On a related note
>>>> I have the same issue with Java applications not running in
>>>> Tomcat that use the same file /etc/pki….java/cacerts. Am I
>>>> understanding the PKI update process correctly? Am I putting
>>>> the self-signed certificate pem format file in the correct
>>>> place?
>>>>
>>>> Darryl Baker, GSEC  (he/him/his) Sr. System Administrator
>>>> (...)
>>>>
>>>>
>>> You can put your certificates and truststore wherever you want
>>> as long as you tell Tomcat where they are in the
>>> conf/server.xml configuration file when you configure the
>>> connector using them.
>>>
>>> Self-signed certificates should never be used on a production
>>> server, they are not secure.
>> What makes you say that?
>>
>> - -chris (...)
>
>
>
> https://www.venafi.com/blog/self-signed-certificates-cyber-criminals-a
re-turning-strength-into-a-vulnerability

This
>
article is talking about securing miscreants' communications. It
really has nothing to do with self-signed certificates. It has to do
with users blindly "trusting" anything which claims to be trustworthy
just because it's encrypted.

Self-signed certificates by definition are not signed by a CA, so they
are not globally-trusted (or even semi-globally-trusted). "Trusting
All" certificates is a terrible mistake and the only way that
self-signed certificates can be a problem, whether used on an
"internal" network or exposed to the outside network.

> Never may be exaggerated in my post. But in general, you should
> avoid them.
Meh.

> But it all depends on your organization as well, mine is signing
> internal certificates and managing to include itself in the
> browsers of all the thousands employees.
This is a good technique IMO.

> In a small business, it may not be possible and the number of
> self-signed certificates may be low. In our organization, in the
> past we have seen people setting up their own self-signed
> certificates with too short keys to be secured by today's
> standards.
Well, that's obviously a mistake.

Especially if you aren't talking about browser-trust, I think
self-signed (or local-CA-signed) certificates are a good thing.
Services ought to be individually-trusting service certificates and
not even accepting all globally-recognized CAs because a compromised
CA or middle-box can intercept communications without a problem.

Self-signed certificates offer isolation from CAs and can therefore be
*more* secure for service-level certificates precisely because they
require special deployment.

- -chris
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