On Jan 31, 2014, at 7:00 AM, Reindl Harald <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Am 30.01.2014 17:32, schrieb James Peach: >> On Jan 30, 2014, at 8:29 AM, Reindl Harald <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Am 30.01.2014 17:05, schrieb James Peach: >>>> On Jan 30, 2014, at 6:38 AM, Reindl Harald <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Am 30.01.2014 15:19, schrieb Uri Shachar: >>>>>> On Thu, 30 Jan 2014 14:47:10 +0100 Reindl Harald wrote: >>>>>>> one remaining issue currently is that DHE/ECDHE seems not to be >>>>>>> supported >>>>>>> while httpd/openssl with the same environment do >>>>>> >>>>>> Added in 4.2.0 - Check out >>>>>> https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TS-2372 >>>>> >>>>> cool - thanks! >>>> >>>> Note that 4.3 only support ECDHE, TS-2417 is still open for other key types >>> >>> thanks for the information, good to know >>> >>> however, i am not sure if it should not simply pass >>> "proxy.config.ssl.server.cipher_suite" to the underlying >>> openssl layer and let it do the whole work >> >> It does, but that's not all that is needed for DHE to work > > OK, good to know > > i now have configured one website with optional TLS and checked state of play > trafficserver-4.1.2 with the ECDHE patch from yesterday > > https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ > ___________________________________________________ > > Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation Supported DoS DANGER > https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/10/31/tls-renegotiation-and-denial-of-service-attacks This is fixed in 4.2. https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TS-1467 > > OCSP stapling No This needs a contributor. https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TS-2367 > > The server does not support Forward Secrecy with the reference browsers Not sure what this one means. Do you need to use and EC key to get ECDHE? > ___________________________________________________ > > CONFIG proxy.config.ssl.server.cipher_suite STRING > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:!LOW:!MEDIUM > ___________________________________________________ > > order of cipher-suite above ignored - actually bad CONFIG proxy.config.ssl.server.honor_cipher_order INT 1 Also see https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TS-2370, which fixes the setting logic in 4.2. > Cipher Suites (sorted by strength; the server has no preference) > TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f) 128 > TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA (0x41) 128 > TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013) ECDH 256 bits (eq. 3072 bits > RSA) FS 128 > TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9c) 128 > TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc027) ECDH 256 bits (eq. 3072 bits > RSA) FS 128 > TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) ECDH 256 bits (eq. 3072 bits > RSA) FS 128 > TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xa) 112 > TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xc012) ECDH 256 bits (eq. 3072 bits > RSA) FS 112 > TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x35) 256 > TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x84) 256 > TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) ECDH 256 bits (eq. 3072 bits > RSA) FS 256 > TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x9d) 256 > TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028) ECDH 256 bits (eq. 3072 bits > RSA) FS 256 > TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030) ECDH 256 bits (eq. 3072 bits > RSA) FS 256 > ___________________________________________________ > > all in all that looks not too bad with the ECDHE patch, but the issues above > should be reviewed > is there a preferred bugreport where i should add the content of this message? >
