Hmm and what about nested forms?

Johan Compagner wrote:
hmm i will read the paper then
I stil dont get it how it is possible with 1 cookie, that then can never
change when it is first generated
and all the forms also just have that value right?

But it is also for double submit protection right? So the cookie has to
change right?
But how can you then have 1 cookie? for all the forms?
If i submit one and that is rerendered or redirected to another page.
(so it has a new cookie so the double submit cant happen)
But if a new cookie is set then all other forms are also suddenly invalid..
and that looks pretty wrong to me

johan


On Mon, Oct 20, 2008 at 12:44 PM, Jörn Zaefferer <
[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

No, the cookie is subject to the same-origin-policy, both in reading
and writing. The request is authenticated because the session cookie
is set, but its invalid when the form itself is missing the value.
Combining the attack with XSS would give access to the cookie, but
then he could just as well hijack the session directly.

In other words: With CSRF alone there is no way for the attacker to
read the cookie, therefore its enough to use just one.

Their whitepaper may do a better job of explaining the techniquie:
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/sites/default/files/csrf.pdf
Solutions are described on page 8ff.

Jörn

On Mon, Oct 20, 2008 at 12:33 PM, Johan Compagner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
what i dont get
if an attacker wants to submit the form. and it can get to the form it
can
do the post
but you say it cant access the cookie. But if the cookie value is just
compared to the form post value
we have to make sure that the name of the cookie cant be guessed right?
So
what should the name be?

Because if the name would be "wicket-form-uuid" then couldnt the attacker
also just generate that cookie?

I guess there is a cookie per form (there can be many forms on the same
page
or different active pages)
and that cookie must be regenerated/set on every form render?

johan


On Mon, Oct 20, 2008 at 11:27 AM, Jörn Zaefferer <
[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Hi,

my application currently uses CryptedUrlWebRequestCodingStrategy to
protect against CRSF attacks. Afaik 1.3.5 will include an update that
generates the key based on user sessions:
http://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/WICKET-1782
According to Johan Compagner, there are still issues with that
approach, though I don't know if that has been fixed:
http://www.nabble.com/Wicket-not-secure--to19556259.html#a19557593

Anyway, the point of this mail is to bring up a different strategy for
CSRF protection, the double-submitted-cookie. Discussion of that are
here http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/archives/001175.html which links
to this article, including a whitepaper:


http://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/wzeller/popular-websites-vulnerable-cross-site-request-forgery-attacks
The basic idea is:

"When a user visits a site, the site should generate a
(cryptographically strong) pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie
on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission
to include this pseudorandom value as a form value and also as a
cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request
should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value
are the same. When an attacker submits a form on behalf of a user, he
can only modify the values of the form. An attacker cannot read any
data sent from the server or modify cookie values, per the same-origin
policy. This means that while an attacker can send any value he wants
with the form, he will be unable to modify or read the value stored in
the cookie. Since the cookie value and the form value must be the
same, the attacker will be unable to successfully submit a form unless
he is able to guess the pseudorandom value."

For Wicket, this would mean: Generate a pseudorandom value and set is
as a session cookie, when the cookie doesn't yet exist. Insert a
hidden input into each form with the generated value. Validate that
the value equals the cookie when submitting a form. The input and
validation can be abstracted into a Form subclass (or even add it to
Wicket's Form class...).

That really easy to implement, is much more efficient (generate only
one value per user/browser session, store it on the client, not the
server) and is now the most common strategy to protect against CSRF
attacks. I've read a lot about CSRF, and this strategy seems the only
one both easy enough to implement and without holes.

What do you think? Should Wicket support that out-of-the-box?

Jörn



--
-Wicket for love

Nino Martinez Wael
Java Specialist @ Jayway DK
http://www.jayway.dk
+45 2936 7684


---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Reply via email to