On 2014-08-01 15:43, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> Here are some attacks that don't seem to be covered (maybe because
> these aren't relevant):
>
> - Not properly checking certificates.
>
> (E.g. the "The Most Dangerous Code in the World"-paper)
>
> Either completely omitting certificate validation, or using it in
> completely insecure way (not checking hostnames, not checking for
> proper anchors, etc...)
>
> Sadly common in various non-browser applications (bad programming),
> extremely common with SMTP (due not being able to propely apply PKI).
>
> - Relying on broken channel binding
>
> Channel-binding with TLS-EXPORTER or TLS-UNIQUE is broken (issues
> are closely related to THS). The proposed THS fix would fix this issue
> if using (EC)DHE.
>
> - Triple Hanshake
>
> The THS itself.
>
>
> Regarding DTLS, DTLS 1.0 should behave like TLS 1.1 w.r.t. attacks,
> except that RC4 attacks aren't applicable because the whole algorithm
> is disallowed.
Can you suggest specific text for these? This helps the WG judge the
merit of your proposal.
Cheers Leif
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