Hi Will,
I think FLAME should be out of scope, because it is an attack on PKI
rather than SSL. Besides, MD5 has been beaten to death elsewhere.
Also, a recommendation on GCM nonce usage belongs to the BCP draft and
not to this one.
Other than that, I am fine with your comments.
Thanks,
Yaron
On 08/13/2014 09:58 PM, Will Sargent wrote:
Also, I think if this is discussing current attacks on TLS, then it
should mention Flame as an in the wild attack on MD5:
https://www.trailofbits.com/resources/flame-md5.pdf
Will Sargent
Consultant, Professional Services
Typesafe <http://typesafe.com>, the company behind Play Framework
<http://www.playframework.com>, Akka <http://akka.io> and Scala
<http://www.scala-lang.org/>
On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 11:27 AM, Watson Ladd <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Aug 13, 2014 10:30 AM, "Will Sargent" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>
> There's a typo on "Triple Hanshake" and "the are" instead of
"there are".
>
> The mention of AES-GCM is only optimal if using hardware and
counters (see the router link below), otherwise the random nonce is
too small. I'm not sure if this is a practical issue for
implementations.
It is: don't use a random nonce with GCM, because it turns into an
ntwice.
>
> I would like if the implementation issues section had a section
on libraries not filtering out obsolete signature algorithms and
cipher suites, and not checking small key sizes (even on the root
certificate):
>
>
http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2013/11/a-roster-of-tls-cipher-suites-weaknesses.html
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:MD5and1024
> http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/policy.html
>
> Additionally, the URL to Georgiev2012 is to
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2382196.2382204 which is a paywalled
site: it would be more effective for readers if it pointed to the
accessable URL http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_ccs12.pdf
>
> Will Sargent
> Consultant, Professional Services
> Typesafe, the company behind Play Framework, Akka and Scala
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 1:55 PM, Yaron Sheffer
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>
>> Dear UTA folks,
>>
>> This version incorporates feedback from shortly before, during
and following the Toronto meeting. The changes are:
>>
>> o Added implementation issues ("most dangerous code"),
>> renegotiation, triple handshake.
>>
>> o Added text re: mitigation of Lucky13.
>>
>> o Added applicability to DTLS.
>>
>> Please review and comment on the list.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Yaron
>>
>> -------- Forwarded Message --------
>> Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02.txt
>> Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 04:25:18 -0700
>> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
>> To: Yaron Sheffer <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>, Ralph Holz <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>, Peter Saint-Andre <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>, Ralph Holz <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>, Peter Saint-Andre <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>, Yaron Sheffer <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by Yaron Sheffer and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
>>
>> Name: draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks
>> Revision: 02
>> Title: Summarizing Current Attacks on TLS and DTLS
>> Document date: 2014-08-12
>> Group: uta
>> Pages: 10
>> URL:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02.txt
>> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks/
>> Htmlized: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02
>> Diff: http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02
>>
>> Abstract:
>> Over the last few years there have been several serious
attacks on
>> TLS, including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and
modes of
>> operation. This document summarizes these attacks, with the
goal of
>> motivating generic and protocol-specific recommendations on
the usage
>> of TLS and DTLS.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time
of submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at
tools.ietf.org <http://tools.ietf.org>.
>>
>> The IETF Secretariat
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Uta mailing list
>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta
>
>
>
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