Mirja Kühlewind has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-uta-email-deep-09: Yes

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COMMENT:
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The document reads like a BCP to me. Was it discussed in the group to go for
BCP? If yes, why was it decided to go not for BCP? If no, I would strong
recommend for BCP.

Nits:
1) sec 4.1: "The specific means employed for deprecation of cleartext Mail
Access
   Services and Mail Submission Services MAY vary from one MSP to the
   next..."
I guess this should rather be lower case "may" but the RFC editor might have
caught that as well.

2) Also sec 4.1:
"It is RECOMMENDED that new users be required to use TLS version 1.1
   or greater from the start. "
Should this be TLS1.2 or maybe a MUST? Just double-checking.

3) This document should probably have a reference to DNSSEC, I guess that's
rfc4033...

4) sec 5.2:
"The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new
   accounts SHOULD be at least use of TLS version 1.1 or greater, and
   successful validation of the server's certificate."
Given this sentence defines the default minimum, I would have expected a MUST
here? Or should this maybe be "MUST use TLS1.1 or greater" and "SHOULD do
certificate validation"? However, what's the case were you wouldn't do it as
the default minimum?

5) s/were not met by the connecting/were not met by the connection/

6) In section 5.4, should there maybe be a recommendation that a MUA should
also offer a way for a user to remove the pinning, e.g. if it was detected
later on that a wrong cert had been pinned?

7) sec 6: is there a useful reference to the milter protocol that can be
provided?


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