> > On Mar 22, 2018, at 3:59 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <d...@fifthhorseman.net> > > wrote: > > > > can't they opt-out by re-sending to their submission agent without the > > REQUIRETLS SMTP command? or is the fear that their submission agent > > will invoke REQUIRETLS on the next hop without the user's permission?
> No, the user is opting out of a TLS security policy he did not request, > one published by the receiving domain via DANE or STS. Clearly if you > don't want secure delivery, don't ask for it. > > fwiw, i think troubleshooting alone might be sufficient reason to > > document the "RequireTLS: NO" message header, but i'm pretty unclear on > > any sane UI/UX story for how a troubleshooter manages to introduce it -- > > it's pretty much expert feature territory (e.g. those of us who edit our > > message headers by hand). > When this becomes an RFC MUAs could add the feature. Also MTAs running > milters or similar content processing could implement a content > transformation from: > Subject: [insecure-delivery]: actual subject > to (easy with e.g. Postfix header_checks): > Require-TLS: NO > Subject: [insecure-delivery]: actual subject > or (not easy with header_checks, but hides the subject tag): > Require-TLS: NO > Subject: actual subject Also trivial to do with Sieve. Ned _______________________________________________ Uta mailing list Uta@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta