On Wednesday, February 8, 2006 at 2:00:54 AM Jeremy wrote:
> On Tuesday 07 February 2006 09:39, Tom Collins wrote:
>> On Feb 7, 2006, at 12:25 AM, ??? wrote:
>> > exec /usr/local/bin/softlimit -m 2000000 \
>> > /usr/local/bin/tcpserver -v -R -H -l 0 0 110 \
>> For starters, try a higher softlimit (like 10000000).
>> You should also include the user and group to run as (add -u89 -g89 to
>> your tcpserver parameters)
> even for pop3? doesn't vchkpw setuid() to the vpopmail user after
Sure. But the earlier root privileges are dropped the more secure.
Every process running as UID 0 is a potential security problem, every
process not being run as root ever gives an attacker a little more
distance to the aimed root-shell.
And if you *know* your POP3-Daemon will always suid() to user
'vpopmail' *and* if you know pop3d doesn't need anything more then
vpopmails permissions to authenticate all incoming requests: why risk
the (admitted: very low) possibility somebody becoming root through
Never try to outstubborn a cat... The cat will win!
P.S.: I don't intend to say pop3d is insecure or has potential to
become remotely hacked. But you never know the future and if you
get used to run as less processes with UID 0 as possible chances
raise you don't forget about this *when* is is necessary ;-)