I have been following this thread pretty closely and the one sentence summary of the current argument is: ovirt-guest-agent is already featureful and tested, so let's drop qemu-ga and have everyone adopt ovirt-guest-agent. Unfortunately, this track strays completely away from the stated goal of convergence. I have at least two examples of why the greater KVM community can never adopt ovirt-guest-agent as-is. To address this, I would like to counter with an example on how qemu-ga can enable the deployment of ovirt-guest-agent features and satisfy the needs of the whole community at the same time.
1) Scope: The ovirt-guest-agent contains functionality that is incredibly useful within the context of oVirt. Single Sign-on is very handy but KVM users outside the scope of oVirt will not want this extra complexity in their agent. For simplicity they will probably just write something small that does what they need (and we have failed to provide a ubiquitous KVM agent). 1) Deployment complexity: The more complex the guest agent is, the more often it will need to be updated (bug/security fixes, distro compatibility, new features). Rolling out guest agent updates does not scale well in large environments (especially when the guest and host administrators are not the same person). For these reasons (and many others), I support having an agent with very basic primitives that can be orchestrated by the host to provide needed functionality. This agent would present a low-level, stable, extensible API that everyone can use. Today qemu-ga supports the following verbs: sync ping info shutdown file-open file-close file-read file-write file-seek file-flush fsfreeze-status fsfreeze-freeze fsfreeze-thaw. If we add a generic execute mechanism, then the agent can provide everything needed by oVirt to deploy SSO. Let's assume that we have already agreed on some sort of security policy for the write-file and exec primitives. Consensus is possible on this issue but I don't want to get bogged down with that here. With the above primitives, SSO could be deployed automatically to a guest with the following sequence of commands: file-open "<exec-dir>/sso-package.bin" "w" file-write <fh> <buf> file-close <fh> file-open "<exec-dir>/sso-package.bin" "x" file-exec <fh> <args> file-close <fh> At this point, the package is installed. It can contain whatever existing logic exists in the ovirt-guest-agent today. To perform a user login, we'll assume that sso-package.bin contains an executable 'sso/do-user-sso': file-open "<exec-dir>/sso/do-user-sso" "x" exec <fh> <args> file-close <fh> At this point the user would be logged in as before. Obviously, this type of approach could be made easier by providing a well designed exec API that returns command exit codes and (optionally) command output. We could also formalize the install of additional components into some sort of plugin interface. These are all relatively easy problems to solve. If we go in this direction, we would have a simple, general-purpose agent with low-level primitives that everyone can use. We would also be able to easily extend the agent based on the needs of individual deployments (not the least of which is an oVirt environment). If certain plugins become popular enough, they can always be promoted to first-order API calls in future versions of the API. What are your thoughts on this approach? -- Adam Litke <a...@us.ibm.com> IBM Linux Technology Center _______________________________________________ vdsm-devel mailing list email@example.com https://fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/vdsm-devel