On Wed, 27 Sep 2017, James McCoy wrote:

Except the ability to put arbitrary files on your computer. If someone can get arbitrary content onto your system, then you've already lost.

The "vulnerability" here is that the user put a untrusted file into a location that Vim executes. That has nothing to do with Vim and everything to do with the user.

Exactly.

There are so many ways you could do something similar with sudo without using Vim. Requiring all user-space programs to be "secure" against an attack like this is unreasonable.

As far as I know, the two most common use cases for sudo are:

- Grant non-root users the power to run specific commands (with
  specific arguments) that require root privileges.
- Grant root privileges to some users without having them all use a
  common password.

In the second case, once the user account is compromised all is lost, with or without Vim.

In the first case, the system administrator should never allow the user to invoke Vim (or Emacs, or many other applications) as root.

If the original security report is somehow leveraging an attack vector with Vim and sudoedit it might be an issue, but it's still not Vim's fault--nor is it necessarily sudo's fault.

- Christian

--
Christian J. Robinson <[email protected]>
It's not how much an item costs, it's how much you save.

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