On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 11:18:13PM +1000, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote: > Sure, but all of this is just the configuration of the iommu. But I > think we agree here, and your point remains valid, indeed my proposed > hack: > > > if ((flags & VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM) || arch_virtio_wants_dma_ops()) > > Will only work if the IOMMU and non-IOMMU path are completely equivalent. > > We can provide that guarantee for our secure VM case, but not generally so if > we were to go down the route of a quirk in virtio, it might be better to > make it painfully obvious that it's specific to that one case with a different > kind of turd: > > - if (xen_domain()) > + if (xen_domain() || pseries_secure_vm()) > return true;
I don't think it's pseries specific actually. E.g. I suspect AMD SEV might benefit from the same kind of hack. > So to summarize, and make sure I'm not missing something, the two approaches > at hand are either: > > 1- The above, which is a one liner and contained in the guest, so that's > nice, but > also means another turd in virtio which isn't ... > > 2- We force pseries to always set VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM, but with the > current > architecture on our side that will force virtio to always go through an > emulated > iommu, as pseries doesn't have the concept of a real bypass window, and thus > will > impact performance for both secure and non-secure VMs. > > 3- Invent a property that can be put in selected PCI device tree nodes that > indicates that for that device specifically, the iommu can be bypassed, along > with > a hypercall to turn that bypass on/off. Virtio would then use > VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM > but its DT nodes would also have that property and Linux would notice it and > turn > bypass on. For completeness, virtio could also have its own bounce buffer outside of DMA API one. I don't see lots of benefits to this though. > The resulting properties of those options are: > > 1- Is what I want because it's the simplest, provides the best performance > now, > and works without code changes to qemu or non-secure Linux. However it does > add a tiny turd to virtio which is annoying. > > 2- This works but it puts the iommu in the way always, thus reducing virtio > performance > accross the board for pseries unless we only do that for secure VMs but > that is > difficult (as discussed earlier). > > 3- This would recover the performance lost in -2-, however it requires qemu > *and* > guest changes. Specifically, existing guests (RHEL 7 etc...) would get the > performance hit of -2- unless modified to call that 'enable bypass' call, > which > isn't great. > > So imho we have to chose one of 3 not-great solutions here... Unless I missed > something in your ideas of course. > > Cheers, > Ben. > > _______________________________________________ Virtualization mailing list Virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization
