iovec addresses coming from vhost are assumed to be
pre-validated, but in fact can be speculated to a value
out of range.
Userspace address are later validated with array_index_nospec so we can
be sure kernel info does not leak through these addresses, but vhost
must also not leak userspace info outside the allowed memory table to
guests.
Following the defence in depth principle, make sure
the address is not validated out of node range.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com>
---
drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
index 5dc174ac8cac..0ee375fb7145 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
@@ -2072,7 +2072,9 @@ static int translate_desc(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, u64
addr, u32 len,
size = node->size - addr + node->start;
_iov->iov_len = min((u64)len - s, size);
_iov->iov_base = (void __user *)(unsigned long)
- (node->userspace_addr + addr - node->start);
+ (node->userspace_addr +
+ array_index_nospec(addr - node->start,
+ node->size));
s += size;
addr += size;
++ret;
--
MST
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