On 2020-06-18 00:29, Halil Pasic wrote:
On Wed, 17 Jun 2020 12:43:57 +0200
Pierre Morel <pmo...@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
[..]
I'm still not really satisfied with your commit message, furthermore
I did some thinking about the abstraction you introduce here. I will
give a short analysis of that, but first things first. Your patch does
the job of preventing calamity, and the details can be changed any time,
thus:
Acked-by: Halil Pasic <pa...@linux.ibm.com>
Thanks,
Connie already answered the other points you raised and I have nothing
to add on it.
Regards,
Pierre
--
Pierre Morel
IBM Lab Boeblingen
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