Agree with everything Ryan said, with the caveat that TLS for TLS's sake is, in my own humble opinion, a terrible idea from a troubleshooting and general complexity perspective. Use where absolutely necessary and nowhere else.
On August 8, 2018 7:37:13 PM EDT, Ryan Delgrosso <[email protected]> wrote: >OK so to expand on my previous smug-ness > >Upsides: > > * No more signaling nat issues. Literally zero. If you want to be > super-sneaky run your edge over TLS port 443 and most things wont > touch you. > * No retransmission's or registration avalanches. They simply cannot > happen since you need a tcp session first. > * No packet fragmentation issues. Send massive bloated SDP's and never > worry about pruning headers again. If you are doing sip SIMPLE send > mime bodies in messages if you want. Its all good. > * Faster convergence (if you reset the TCP connections to your devices > it will usually trigger an instantaneous proxy advance) > * Real-HA on carrier grade SBC's works just fine and TCP state is > maintained across pairs (Acme, Perimeta etc) > * Never chase lost signaling > > >Downsides: > > * Conventional HA doesnt work so well. Your reg/subscription etc will > all be in the context of a single TCP session (with or without TLS). > This means for that second when you restart your proxy the session > is lost and MUST be re-establised by the client. > * SIP Outbound support, which would basically be the answer here > basically doesn't exist in a usable fashion for reliable dual-reg. > Device support is partial and broken. Its not good. There are > potential solutions but it involves real commitment to this right > now and the gulf of experience between having and not isnt huge. > * Moderately more load since TCP state must be retained, but on modern > hardware this is so trivial its almost not worth mentioning. > * Need to re-learn KPI's for network. The entire signaling profile > changes. Its just a different animal. > * Most of your sniffer-based diagnostic tools become useless (for tls) > since packets wont be readable. This is dodged with an edge that > will feed encrypted traffic to a collector. > > >Suggestions: > >STRONGLY recommend terminating TCP/TLS at the edge and still running >core in straight UDP with jumbo frames. You dont want a cascde of tcp >session reestablishments > >I have a growing SP network today doing this with great success and >also >advise my consulting clients to take this path. > > > >On 8/8/2018 12:36 PM, Alex Balashov wrote: >> On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 12:21:09PM -0700, Carlos Alvarez wrote: >> >>> So...who else on the list uses TCP and has any comments about it? >> We are not an ITSP and are Polycom-only with a trivial number of >> endpoints, but we do use it and it works just fine. >> >> However, we have numerous customers, some of whom use TCP >predominantly >> for thousands of endpoints. It works just fine. >> >> In terms of downsides: >> >> In addition to a historical lack of (RFC 3261-mandated) support, >there >> are of course theoretical trade-offs involved in using TCP. There's >> more overhead, and connection state to be maintained on the server >side, >> which of course consumes resources — resources considered trivial >> nowadays, but once upon a time, when RFC 3261 was ratified (2002), >> perhaps not. As with all things TCP, it can also present a DoS vector >if >> you don't limit the number of connections somewhere. >> >> The congestion control/end-to-end delay aspects of TCP are certainly >not >> as important now as they were at a time when the public IP backbone >and >> was in an entirely different place in its evolution. Also, nowadays >the >> congestion/windowing algorithms used in TCP can be tweaked to >something >> more efficient. >> >> I think the most damning thing about using TCP is perceived to be the >> relative difficulty of failing over TCP session state to a different >> host. UDP does not require connection state, so as long as you have >some >> means of handling requests in a relatively stateless fashion, things >can >> just carry on as they did before in the event of an IP takeover >without >> anyone having to "reconnect". This is one area where the big >enterprise >> boxes certainly trump the open-source ecosystem, where transparent >TCP >> failover *for SIP* doesn't really exist, although in my opinion the >> whole issue is getting a bit moot with the way cloud infrastructure >and >> virtualisation networking is evolving. >> >> -- Alex >> -- Alex -- Sent via mobile, please forgive typos and brevity. _______________________________________________ VoiceOps mailing list [email protected] https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/voiceops
