Allowing the unrestricted laundering of all calls placed through their network 
under their own “B” attestation, uncritically and without differentiation, and 
without regard to any already-present attestation, is becoming a common 
intermediate service provider decision.

> On Jul 5, 2022, at 3:02 PM, Calvin Ellison <calvin.elli...@voxox.com> wrote:
> 
> What are your opinions regarding intermediate carriers signing unattested 
> calls? Not to say they are the source of the call, but to facilitate 
> tracebacks and take accountability for transiting the call from whatever 
> upstream didn't sign or preserve the signature.
> 
> 
> Calvin Ellison
> Systems Architect
> calvin.elli...@voxox.com
> +1 (213) 285-0555
> 
> 
>    
> 
> The information contained herein is confidential and privileged information 
> or work product intended only for the individual or entity to whom it is 
> addressed. Any unauthorized use, distribution, or copying of this 
> communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication 
> in error, please notify me immediately.
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jul 5, 2022 at 11:47 AM Zilk, David <david.z...@cdk.com> wrote:
> Mark,
> 
>  
> 
> Agreed. I guess it comes down to how to decide who the originating carrier is 
> that should be doing the attestation.
> 
>  
> 
> As an intermediate carrier, Bandwidth should just pass through whatever 
> Identity header they get; but if there is no Identity header (stripped 
> header, TDM link in the path, originating carrier not attesting, etc.) then 
> the only assumption they can make is that the partner originated the call 
> (even if they didn’t) and ‘B‘ is the only proper attestation they can apply.
> 
>  
> 
> Bandwidth making the assumption that they are an intermediate carrier (and 
> the unattested calls came from some other (non-partner) service provider) 
> isn’t a reasonable assumption.
> 
>  
> 
> David
> 
>  
> 
> From: Mark Lindsey <lind...@e-c-group.com> 
> Sent: Tuesday, July 5, 2022 10:16 AM
> To: Zilk, David <david.z...@cdk.com>; voiceops@voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] [EXTERNAL] Identity Header Test Tool
> 
>  
> 
> The primary problem to fix, in this scenario, is that Term Provider 2 is 
> stripping the Identity header, and therefore violating 47 CFR § 64.6302(a). 
> So many engineers have configured SBCs to strip every header except the 
> handful they want to carry, but Identity needs to be added to those lists.
> 
>  
> 
> The secondary problem to fix is that 47 CFR § 64.6302(b) allows intermediate 
> providers to legally opt out of STIR/SHAKEN in any practical fashion. 
> 
>  
> 
> I am speculating in the example call flow shown below, but I wouldn't see 
> Bandwidth's behavior as a key problem. The ATIS destination of the C-level 
> attestation is for a situation that, like flying pigs, doesn't appear to 
> occur anywhere in reality. Nobody just accepts SIP traffic from random, 
> anonymous sources for termination. I'm glad Bandwidth is adding the 
> attestation that it can add.
> 
>  
> 
> Mark R Lindsey | SMTS | +1-229-316-0013 | m...@ecg.co
> 
> Schedule a meeting 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Jul 5, 2022, at 13:01, Zilk, David <david.z...@cdk.com> wrote:
> 
>  
> 
> If that is the case, a scammer that should be either attested C, or not 
> attested at all can game the system and upgrade their calls to any customer 
> of Bandwidth to B. Granted, B attestation isn’t much better than nothing, but 
> still it violates both the intent and the letter of the law.
> 
>  
> 
> David Zilk
> 
> CDK Global/IP Networked Services 
> 
>  
> 
> From: Mark Lindsey <lind...@e-c-group.com> 
> Sent: Tuesday, July 5, 2022 9:58 AM
> To: Zilk, David <david.z...@cdk.com>
> Cc: voiceops@voiceops.org
> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] [EXTERNAL] Identity Header Test Tool
> 
>  
> 
> I expect Bandwidth is attesting that they know the identity of the SIP 
> trunking provider that sent your call to Bandwidth. 
> 
>  
> 
> CDK Global -> [term provider 1]  -> [term provider 2, Strips Identity Header] 
> -> [term provider 3] -> [Bandwidth.com]
> 
>  
> 
> ...And term provider 3 is a customer of Bandwidth.com.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> Mark R Lindsey | SMTS | +1-229-316-0013 | m...@ecg.co
> 
> Schedule a meeting 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Jul 5, 2022, at 12:19, Zilk, David <david.z...@cdk.com> wrote:
> 
>  
> 
> I am getting results from a test to the Bandwidth number that are confusing. 
> It appears that our Identity header is not making it through to them, however 
> the call does have an Identity header, certified by Bandwith, with B 
> attestation. This is odd as we don't have any direct business relationship 
> with Bandwidth. How can they claim B attestation?
> 
> David Zilk
> CDK Global/IP Networked Services
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: VoiceOps <voiceops-boun...@voiceops.org> On Behalf Of David Frankel
> Sent: Sunday, July 3, 2022 8:05 AM
> To: voiceops@voiceops.org
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [VoiceOps] Identity Header Test Tool
> 
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the CDK organization. Exercise 
> caution when clicking links or opening attachments, especially from unknown 
> senders.
> 
> Last week I was forwarded a note from this list regarding tools to test and 
> debug SHAKEN Identity headers. That prompted us to stitch together some 
> modules we already had in an attempt to help.
> 
> What we have is at http://identity.legalcallsonly.org. You can call one of 
> the test numbers listed on that page, and if we receive your header, we'll 
> read you a six-digit code. Disconnect and then plug the code into the box on 
> the web form, and we'll show you details of that Identity header.
> 
> Perhaps most importantly, you'll be able to see if the header we received is 
> the one you sent. In addition, we parse the header and try to tell you if it 
> is correctly formatted and valid.
> 
> Currently we have a couple of geographic DIDs and three toll-free numbers 
> (each using different underlying providers). So far we aren't having a lot of 
> success getting the Identity headers on the TFNs; we're working to improve 
> that.
> 
> Suggestions welcome. We hope the tool provokes more discussion about best 
> practices regarding making the Authentication Framework as functional and 
> useful as possible.
> 
> Happy 4th of July!
> 
> David Frankel
> ZipDX LLC
> St. George, UT USA
> 
> 
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-- 
Alex Balashov | Principal | Evariste Systems LLC

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