Posted by Todd Zywicki:
WINE WARS, PART 9�THE 21ST AMENDMENT §2:

   At last, we get to the 21st Amendment. As noted in [1]Part 8, the
   problem with Prohibition was that it tried to nationalize alcohol
   prohibition by imposing it on communities that didn't want it. In
   other words, not only was alcohol regulation traditionally a local
   affair, but there was good reasons why. The 21st Amendment essentially
   amounted to a "do over"--it was intended to restore the constitutional
   and political balance that had been upset by the 18th Amendment by
   removing the federal government from interfering in local affairs
   regarding alcohol and reinstating state police power authority over
   alcohol regulation.
   In addition, the 21st Amendment also constitutionalized the Wilson and
   Webb-Kenyon Acts, thereby assuring dry states that the public
   sentiment that led to the repeal of Prohibition wouldn't sweep within
   it a repeal of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts which had provided
   assurance to dry states that they wouldn't be forced to accept
   interstate alcohol shipments. By contrast, there is nothing in the
   history that led up to the ratification of the 21st Amendment to
   suggest that there would have been any reason to give the states
   plenary power over interstate commerce regarding alcohol. This Part
   will discuss �2, which was intended to reinstate the regime that
   prevailed prior to the 18th Amendment. The next entry will discuss
   proposed but never enacted �3, which as will be seen, was rejected
   because it was inconsistent with the purpose of the 21st Amendment to
   restore the constitutional balance that had been interrupted by
   national prohibition.
   Section 2, therefore, was designed aid dry states in the valid
   exercise of their police power "constitutionalizing" the statutory
   protections previously afforded by the national government to the
   states. "The wording of �2 ... closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and
   Wilson Acts, expressing the framers' clear intention of
   constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established under
   those statutes." Craig, 429 U.S. at 205-06. In particular, dry states
   were concerned about the continued political and constitutional
   validity of Webb-Kenyon following the repeal of Prohibition, so dry
   states desired that their ability to remain dry be written into the
   Constitution to prevent against backsliding by Congress or the Supreme
   Court.
   Although the constitutionality of Webb-Kenyon was upheld in Clark
   Distilling, at the time of its enactment there were serious questions
   about its validity. Indeed, President Taft initially vetoed the law
   because he considered it unconstitutional, 49 Cong. Rec. 4291 (1913) a
   view that was shared by Attorney General Wickersham at the time, 30
   Op. Att'y Gen. 88 (1913). It was also noted that the Supreme Court's
   opinion in Clark Distilling was a "divided opinion," that there had
   been changes in the membership of the Court that cast further doubt on
   the vitality of Clark Distilling, in that Justice Sutherland had been
   in the Senate when Webb-Kenyon was passed and had argued against its
   constitutionality at that time. 76 Cong. Rec. 4170 (Statement of Sen.
   Borah), and that there was continuing debate about the
   constitutionality of Webb-Kenyon, see id. (expressing dry states' fear
   that Webb-Kenyon "might very well be held unconstitutional upon a
   re-presentation of it"). Senator Borah also noted that from its very
   inception, there had been aggressive legislative and litigation
   efforts to overturn Webb-kenyon.
   Senator Blaine expressed nearly identical sentiments in his remarks:
   "In [Clark] there was a divided opinion. There has been a divided
   opinion in respect to the earlier cases, and that division of opinion
   seems to have come down to a very late day. So to assure the so-called
   dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those
   States, it is proposed to write permanently into the Constitution a
   prohibition along that line." 76 Cong. Rec. 4141 (Statement of Sen.
   Blaine).
   Senator Borah similarly explained that he was "rather uneasy about
   leaving the Webb-Kenyon Act to the protection of the Supreme Court of
   the United States," Id. at 4171, nor was he comfortable "rely[ing]
   upon the Congress ... to maintain indefinitely the Webb-Kenyon law "
   76 Cong. Rec. 4170 (Statement of Sen Borah). To remove these
   constitutional and political uncertainties, the Amendment's sponsor
   Senator Borah explained that �2 would "incorporat[e Webb-Kenyon]
   permanently in the Constitution of the United States." 76 Cong. Rec.
   4172 (statement of Sen. Borah). As Judge Easterbrook wrote in
   Bridenbaugh, "Like the Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act before
   Prohibition, �2 enables a state to do to importation of
   liquor-including direct deliveries to consumers in original
   packages-what it chooses to do to internal sales of liquor, but
   nothing more." Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
   Finally, the legislative history is rife with references to the fact
   that what this was about was the power of the states to effectuate
   their police power. Borah states, for instance, "We hear a great deal
   in these days about the eighteenth Amendment destroying the police
   powers of the states. I venture to say that anyone who has taken the
   trouble to familiarize himself with the destruction of the police
   powers of the States relative to the liquor question will have to
   conclude that the police powers had been destroyed prior to the
   adoption of the eighteenth amendment, taken away from the States prior
   to that time through the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
   States and the constant and persistent attack of the liquor interests
   upon the rights of the States to be dry and to exercise their police
   powers to the end that they might be dry."
   There is no indication that �2 was intended to anything more than
   assist dry states in the exercise of their police powers by treating
   interstate liquor the same as in-state. It was well-established by
   this time that the state police powers did not provide a license to
   discriminate, and there is no indication that �2 was intended to give
   wet states new, unprecedented, unmentioned, and illogical powers to
   erect protectionist barriers against other states' products.

References

   1. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2004_08_21.shtml#1093273065

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