Posted by Randy Barnett:
On the Legitimacy of a Legal System:  
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_05_01-2005_05_07.shtml#1115481072


   Over on [1]Positive Liberty, Jason Kuznicki raises some interesting
   concerns about the theory of constitutional legitimacy I develop in
   [2]Restoring the Lost Constitution. I thought I would offer some
   clarifications of my approach which might address some of the issues
   he raises.
   (1) The concept of "legitimacy" I am considering concerns whether laws
   that are imposed on the people create a prima facie (i.e. rebuttable)
   duty of obedience because they are laws, or (another formulation) are
   presumptively binding on conscience.
   (2) The concept I am considering is objective, not subjective. By this
   I mean that I am not discussing the perception that there is a prima
   facie duty to obey the law, but whether any such perception is valid
   or justified.
   (3) One route to legitimacy is the consent of the governed, but in the
   absence of the sort of unanimous consent enjoyed by such institutions
   as schools, churches and other voluntary associations, the consent of
   some can never explain how nonconsenting persons come to be bound in
   conscience. This is the challenge to constitutional legitimacy made
   famous by Lysander Spooner in his [3]No Treason: The Constitution of
   No Authority. If it counterintuitive to you, then I urge you to read
   Chapter 1 of Restoring the Lost Constitution where I explain this
   challenge in detail. (Don't write to me about this particular issue
   unless you are contesting the analysis I present in this chapter,
   rather than merely this brief summary paragraph.)
   (4) In Chapter 2 of Restoring the Lost Constitution, I try to meet
   Spooner's challenge by positing an alternative route to legitimacy.
   (a) No one can complain about the imposition of a law if it does not
   violate his natural (prepolitical) rights; (b) because one has a duty
   to respect the rights of others, one also has a duty to obey a law
   that is necessary to defining and protecting the rights of others. A
   coercive command that meets these two requirements is "just" and
   binding in conscience. Therefore (c) a law is legitimate (in the sense
   defined above) if it is produced and enforced by procedures that make
   it more likely than not that it to not (a) respect the rights of the
   persons on whom it is being imposed and (b) is needed to protect the
   rights of others. In this sense "constitutional legitimacy" is
   procedural in nature, though the procedures must be assessed with a
   background theory of substantive rights in mind.
   (5) By this account (and here I am addressing Jason's concerns),
   legitimacy does not depend on people's perception of their rights,
   which people may disagree about. Agreement on rights is not necessary
   for legitimacy. Legitimacy (in the objective sense) is a means of
   analyzing particular legal systems. Each of us may disagree on this
   assessment, of course, but we then must debate the claims underlying
   our different assessments. As with any other moral disagreement, the
   existence of disagreement itself does not imply that neither of us is
   correct, or that there is no right answer. That would be a position of
   moral skepticism that, while a serious argument, would need to be
   addressed in other ways. So while different opinions about rights will
   surely exist, legitmacy (like rights claims themselves) will depend on
   who is correct in their opinion about rights and also about whether
   adequate procedures exist to protect them. The existence of
   disagreement itself, however, does not prove that no one is correct.
   (6) Legitimacy is a matter of degree. Given that is it based on the
   likelihood that a law is just (in the sense defined above) this
   likelihood can vary greatly depending on the procedures in place, from
   no likelihood, to barely more likely than not, to strongly likely.
   This is in sharp contrast to consent theories of legitimacy which
   yield all-or-nothing conclusions.
   (7) Laws can be legitimate for some and not for others. Unlike consent
   theories, by this approach a law could be legitimate for one person or
   group while illegitimate for others. The original Constitution
   provides an example of this. Laws enacted pursuant to its procedures
   could have been legitimate for white males (perhaps only white
   property-holding males) while completely illegitimate for slave. Woman
   and nonvoting men might be somewhere in between. The absence of the
   vote does not go to lack of consent, but lack of assurances that the
   laws imposed upon the unrepresented group does not respect their
   rights because they were not able to protect themselves effectively in
   the political process. If for example, the procedures that were good
   enough to protect male voters was equally applied to nonvoting males,
   but not to women, then these laws could be legitimate for all males,
   though not for women. In addition, some of the laws enforced by a
   legal system could be legitimate and others of the procedures in place
   clearly permit certain types of unjust laws, while protecting against
   others. In practice, then, assessing the legitimacy of a real-world
   nonconsentual legal system will be pretty messy.
   (8) A further advantage of this approach is that, assuming that a
   procedure has been devised that imparts legitimate laws on one group,
   legitimacy for others can be obtained by extending the same
   protections equally to other groups as well, whether or not these
   groups participated in the original framing of these procedures.
   There is much more that can be said about this approach to legitimacy,
   and I say more about it in my book where I consider, for example, the
   objection that this form of legitimacy is far too narrow or confining.
   Part of my response is that unanimous consent governing institutions
   like schools, churches and other voluntary associations can impose
   many more restrictions on their consenting members than can a
   government legal system that seeks to impose laws on nonconsenting
   persons.
   But this post is already much longer than I intended. It provides a
   perfect example of what my old friend, George Smith, used to call
   "creative evasion": what we can accomplish when avoiding some task we
   would rather not do--like grading exams.

References

   1. 
http://www.positiveliberty.com/2005/05/barnett-on-problem-of-legitimacy.html
   2. 
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0691115850/randyebarnetbost/002-6604625-3081621
   3. http://www.lysanderspooner.org/bib_new.htm

_______________________________________________
Volokh mailing list
[email protected]
http://highsorcery.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/volokh

Reply via email to