Posted by Eugene Volokh:
Annoying Anonymous Speech Online:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2006_01_08-2006_01_14.shtml#1136923654


   People are [1]troubled by a just-enacted statute that extends part of
   telephone harassment law to the Internet. I think they're right to be
   troubled by it, and here's why.

   First, the statute, with deletions marked by strikeouts and insertions
   marked by underlines:

     47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C): Whoever ... in interstate or foreign
     communications ... makes a telephone call or utilizes a
     telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or
     communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and with
     intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the
     called number or who receives the communications....

     (h)(1) The use of the term �telecommunications device� in this
     section --
     (A) shall not impose new obligations on broadcasting station
     licensees and cable operators covered by obscenity and indecency
     provisions elsewhere in this chapter; [DEL: and :DEL]
     (B) does not include an interactive computer service [= any
     information service, system, or access software provider that
     provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
     server, including specifically a service or system that provides
     access to the Internet and such systems operated or services
     offered by libraries or educational institutions][DEL: . :DEL] ;
     and
     (C) in the case of subparagraph (C) of subsection (a)(1), includes
     any device or software that can be used to originate
     telecommunications or other types of communications that are
     transmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet ....

   What does this practically mean?

   1. This potentially criminalizes any anonymous speech on a Web site
   that's intended to annoy at least some readers, even if it's also
   intended to inform other readers. This is true whether the poster is
   berating a government official, a religious figure, a company that he
   thinks provides bad service, an academic who he thinks is doing or
   saying something misguided, a sports figure who he thinks is
   misbehaving, or what have you; so long as he's trying to annoy any
   recipient (whether the target, if the poster thinks the target is
   reading the blog, or the target's partisans or fans).

   2. How is this different from traditional telephone harassment law?
   The trouble is that the change extends traditional telephone
   harassment law from a basically one-to-one medium (phone calls) to
   include a one-to-many medium (Web sites).

   This is a big change. One-to-one speech that's intended to annoy the
   one recipient is rarely of very much First Amendment value; people are
   just rarely persuaded or enlightened by speech that's intended to
   annoy them. It has some value (see item 3 below), but to the extent
   that it's in some measure deterred, the loss to public debate isn't
   that great -- speakers are still free to speak to others besides the
   person they're trying to annoy.

   But one-to-many speech that is intended to annoy one or a few readers,
   but intended and likely to enlighten or persuade many other readers,
   is potentially much more valuable. Juan might think that the target of
   the speech deserves to be berated for his misconduct, and that the
   target's supporters deserve to be berated for siding with the target;
   but Juan might also want the rest of the public to hear about the
   target's misbehavior, and to be persuaded to think less of the target,
   or to act differently themselves.

   Though the desire to annoy may sometimes be petty (and I'm using Juan
   just because Juan is our one anonymous coblogger here, not because
   Juan generally tries to annoy people!), it shouldn't strip the speech
   of constitutional protection. "[2][I]n the world of debate about
   public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than
   admirable are protected by the First Amendment.... [E]ven when a
   speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill will his expression
   was protected by the First Amendment ...." And the same is true, I
   think, in discussion of consumer matters, of religion, of sports, and
   of other things, not just public affairs.
   
   3. [3]Orin suggests that this isn't a problem, because even
   traditional telephone harassment law has already been limited to
   exclude "speech [that] is protected by the First Amendment." Orin
   cites [4]United States v. Popa, a case that set aside as
   unconstitutional a conviction of Ion Popa, who made several racist
   calls to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia (the chief
   federal prosecutor in the District). The trouble, though, is that it's
   far from clear just what speech Popa protects.

   A. One possible interpretation of Popa is that it bars telephone
   harassment prosecution when the "speech is protected by the First
   Amendment." At some level, that's almost tautological -- of course
   when the speech is protected by the First Amendment, the First
   Amendment prohibits prosecution for that speech. But it also returns
   us to the underlying question: When is speech that's intended to annoy
   the recipient protected by the First Amendment? If someone calls not a
   prosecutor but a law professor and leaves an anonymous deliberately
   annoying racist message, is that protected? What if he calls a law
   student with such a message? What if he posts an anonymous blog post
   that says this? The poster would have little guidance about what he
   may or may not say.

   Of course, when prosecuted, the speaker can say "my speech is
   protected by the First Amendment." But given that the statute draws no
   distinction between what constitutes protected annoying anonymous
   speech and what constitutes unprotected annoying anonymous speech, the
   speaker doesn't know what he may safely say, and the prosecutor
   doesn't have much guidance about what he should prosecute. It's as if
   Congress enacted a whole bunch of speech restrictions but tacked on an
   "except if the First Amendment prohibits this" to them. The result
   would be speech restrictions that are technically not overbroad (since
   by their terms they don't bar First-Amendment-protected speech), but
   that are practically too vague, since they provide little guidance to
   people about what they may say.

   B. Another possible view is that the telephone harassment statute bars
   any prosecution for speech unless the speech falls within the
   traditional First Amendment exceptions, such as threats, obscenity
   (which means hard-core pornography), false statements of fact,
   fighting words, and the like. These exceptions are at least tolerably
   well-defined, and all of us already generally have to avoid speech
   that falls within these exceptions (since the federal and state
   governments have taken advantage of most of these exceptions to in
   fact outlaw or at least make tortious speech that fits in the
   exceptions).

   But if that's the interpretation of Popa, then most garden-variety
   telephone harassment, of the sort that most people assume is fully
   prosecutable, would be unpunishable. Calling someone anonymously
   simply to insult them wouldn't be covered (such insults don't fit
   within the "fighting words" exception, since the anonymity and
   distance of the speaker makes it unlikely that the speech will start a
   fight). Likewise for calling someone to make an indecent suggestion,
   except when the suggestion is an actual threat of violence or is so
   sexually explicit as to be obscene (which is a pretty high threshold
   to meet). The very premise of telephone harassment law, as it's
   generally understood, is that some such speech -- while protected in
   many media -- is unprotected when said with the intent to annoy (and
   perhaps said to a particular person). Harassment law thus rests on the
   theory that there should be a new First Amendment exception recognized
   for "telephone harassment" that goes beyond just threats, fighting
   words, and the like. So the "speech is protected unless it's threats,
   fighting words, obscenity, incitement, or false statements of fact"
   theory is thus almost certainly not what Congress has had in mind, and
   is unlikely to be adopted by the courts.

   C. Popa can easily be read, I think, as holding that speech that's
   "intend[ed] in part to communicate a political message" is protected
   from punishment by the statute. But it's far from clear that this
   would protect speech on a Web site that's intended to communicate a
   message about some company's allegedly mistreatment of its consumers,
   that's intended to criticize the performance of a sports figure,
   that's intended to express an annoying view about theology, or
   whatever else. What's more, it's often not easy to tell exactly what's
   a "political" message and what's not. The court in Popa held that
   racist insults of a high-level official are political. What about
   speech that criticizes law professors (whether racist speech, speech
   that casts aspersions on their intellect or teaching ability, or what
   have you)? What about speech that criticizes a particular student in
   racist terms, but implicitly conveys a message about school
   admissions? (Not that I would endorse such speech, of course; I just
   think that (a) it ought to be constitutionally protected, when posted
   on a Web site, even if it's intended to annoy, and (b) there's likely
   to be controversy about whether it's political.)

   D. Finally, Popa can also be read as holding that speech is protected
   from the statute when the speaker "intend[ed] to engage in public or
   political discourse." "Public discourse" is broader than just
   "political message," and would certainly include religion and probably
   consumer matters involving large businesses and the like. But it too
   is a pretty vague term. Is publicly distributed personal criticism of
   a particular professional's skills, for instance, a lawyer's or a
   professor's, "public discourse"? There's no well-established First
   Amendment test for this, and the Court's use of the related term
   "public concern" has proven to be unpredictable and, I think, often
   misguided (see [5]Part V.B of this article, starting with PDF page
   46).

   So on balance I think the extension of the telephone harassment
   statute to the Web is a mistake. The statute already has problems, and
   the extension risks substantially exacerbating those problems, by
   potentially covering one-to-many annoying Web speech as well as the
   somewhat less valuable one-to-one annoying telephone calls.

References

   1. http://news.com.com/2010-1028_3-6022491.html
   2. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=485&invol=46
   3. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2006_01_08-2006_01_14.shtml#1136873535
   4. 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=dc&navby=case&no=983017A
   5. http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/speechip.pdf

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