Posted by Orin Kerr:
Summary of the Opinions in Scott v. Harris
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_04_29-2007_05_05.shtml#1177949512
Here's a run-down of the opinions in [1]Scott v. Harris, the
high-speed car chase case handed down by the Supreme Court today. (To
repeat my interest in the case, I was co-counsel for petitioner Scott,
the police officer who was sued.)
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, joined by all but Justice
Stevens. Scalia's first step is to clarify the facts applicable at the
summary judgment stage. He sees a major conflict between what the
videotape shows and what the lower courts said, and he concludes that
the videotape governs. Scalia writes:
When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the
facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . .
. Respondent�s version of events is so utterly discredited by the
record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court
of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it
should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the
videotape.
Scalia next turns to the Fourth Amendment standard. He agrees with
Scott's argument that this case is not governed by [2]Tennessee v.
Garner's specific rule, but rather must be governed by a general
reasonableness standard. However, whereas Scott's brief tried to
distinguish Garner on whether it was clear that deadly force was used,
Justice Scalia distinguishes it on the ground that car chases are just
very different from shooting fleeing felons:
Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers
rigid preconditions whenever an officer�s actions constitute
�deadly force.� Garner was simply an application of the Fourth
Amendment�s �reasonableness� test, Graham, supra, at 388, to the
use of a particular type of force in a particular situation. . . .
Whatever Garner said about the factors that might have justified
shooting the suspect in that case, such �preconditions� have scant
applicability to this case, which has vastly different facts.
�Garner had nothing to do with one car striking another or even
with car chases in general . . . . A police car'�s bumping a
fleeing car is, in fact, not much like a policeman�s shooting a gun
so as to hit a person.� Nor is the threat posed by the flight on
foot of an unarmed suspect even remotely comparable to the extreme
danger to human life posed by respondent in this case.Although
respondent�'s attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the
Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must still
slosh our way through the factbound morass of �reasonableness. �
Whether or not Scott�'s actions constituted application of �deadly
force,� all that matters is whether Scott'�s actions were
reasonable.
That brings Justice Scalia to the general reasonableness balancing,
and he has "little difficulty" concluding that Scott's conduct was
reasonable. "[I]n judging whether Scott�'s actions were reasonable, we
must consider the risk of bodily harm that Scott�'s actions posed to
respondent in light of the threat to the public that Scott was trying
to eliminate." Weighing the risks of acting and not acting, and
factoring in the culpabillity of the different people who might be
harmed, Scalia concludes that Scott acted reasonably.
Near the end of the opinion, Scalia offers a rule to give guidance
to police officers in future cases:
A police officer'�s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car
chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not
violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or death.
Notably, that's a significant broader rule than Scott had asked for
in his brief (to repeat my interest in the case, I co-wrote Scott's
brief). Whereas Scott had argued that reasonable efforts to minimize
harm make the seizure reasonable, the Court's rule is that if a
high-speed car chase threatens the lives of innocents, the police can
terminate the chase under the Fourth Amendment even if it puts the
fleeing motorist at serious risk of death. (Exactly what it means to
"threaten the lives of innocent bystanders" may be someowhat unclear,
though; perhaps this is simply a recasting of the probable cause
requirement of Garner? I'm not sure.)
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined the majority, but each wrote
short concurring opinions. Ginsburg added her 2 cents that the issue
was case-by-case reasonableness, and that she didn't understand the
court to be offering a mechanical, per se rule; Breyer adds that to
him the video is the key to the case. (They also both address the
Saucier v. Katz question of the order of addressing Fourth Amendment
and qualified immunity issues, but they weren't really raised in the
case.)
Justice Stevens wrote a spririted solo dissent that essentially
adopts the 11th Circuit's view of the case. Justice Stevens looks at
the videotape and concludes that the lower court judges were right:
Harris didn't pose that much of a threat to the public, and reasonable
jurors could conclude that Scott acted unreasonably in stopping him.
Stevens accuses the majority of acting as "jurors" who are engaging in
"de novo factfinding" rather than deferring to the views of lower
court judges "who are surely more familiar with the hazards of driving
on Georgia roads than we are." Stevens concludes:
In my view, the risks inherent in justifying unwarranted police
conduct on the basis of unfounded assumptions are unacceptable,
particularly when less drastic measures �in this case, the use of
stop sticks or a simple warning issued from a loudspeaker� could
have avoided such a tragic result. In my judgment, jurors in
Georgia should be allowed to evaluate the reasonableness of the
decision to ram respondent�s speeding vehicle in a manner that
created an obvious risk of death and has in fact made him a
quadriplegic at the age of 19.
In footnote 5 of the majority opinion, Scalia responds to Stevens:
JUSTICE STEVENS suggests that our reaction to the videotape is
somehow idiosyncratic, and seems to believe we are misrepresenting
its contents. We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for
itself.
Scalia then posts a link -- er, rather, cites the URL -- of the video,
which is [3]here.
References
1. http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/05-1631_All.pdf
2. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=471&invol=1
3. http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scott_v_harris.rmvb
_______________________________________________
Volokh mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.powerblogs.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/volokh
