Posted by Einer Elhauge, guest-blogging:
Sabermetrics and the Future of Legal Empirical Studies
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_05_20-2007_05_26.shtml#1179755443


   The book I have recently read that I think may offer the most insight
   into the future of legal studies is, of all things, a book on
   sabermetrics, called [1]Baseball Between the Numbers. Sabermetrics,
   for those of you not into baseball, is the advanced statistical
   analysis of baseball. With Bill James as its most famous pioneer, it
   raised all sorts of probing analysis about which statistics really
   best determined the value of a baseball player, and what sorts of
   strategies worked and which didn�t.

   So what does any of this have to do with law? Well, what this book
   does is compile, in a readable way, the major points this advanced
   statistical analysis has taught us over the last few decades about
   matters that were previously resolved by tradition, customs, and
   intuitive reasoning. Some of those traditional views turn out to have
   some basis, others none or only in a limited way.

   For example, advanced statistical analysis shows that batting averages
   are a useful statistic, but much less important to winning than
   on-base-percentage. RBIs are largely a distraction, and hot streaks
   and clutch hitting are stories we tell ourselves to describe
   statistical clumps that are really just random. Pitchers vary in their
   ability to strike out batters and avoid walks and home runs, but have
   little effect on the odds that balls hit in play will become outs, so
   their ERAs are worse predictors of their future performance that their
   rates of strikeouts, walks and home runs. The bunt is hugely overused,
   and generally reduces the odds of victory, other than in a few
   instances that can be specified with precision.

   And it occurred to me that in law we now are largely where
   sabermetrics was in the early days when Bill James began cranking out
   his seminal [2]Baseball Abstracts. The bulk of what we teach our
   students reflects tradition, customs, and intuitive reasoning. Little
   of it has been subject to rigorous statistical analysis.

   In Contracts class, for example, I regularly teach that we can
   understand all contract law largely as default rules that either
   reflect what most parties would want or are thought most likely to
   trigger an explicit contract provision. Then we explore how courts and
   scholars have resolved such issues, which is largely through armchair
   reasoning. The issue cries out for rigorous statistical analysis, and
   we have little to offer.

   In Antitrust, much turns on how we think firms are likely to behave.
   After a merger, will firms engage in Bertrand competition by pricing
   down to cost, Cournot competition by setting output in a way that
   depends on the output of others, or oligopolistic coordination on
   price or output? The traditional approach considers various factors
   that theoretically bear on this issue in particular cases, but the
   weighing of them generally turns on unavoidable judgment calls. It
   would be better to rely on the growing statistical analysis of how
   firms actually behave (often, it turns out, in ways that lie in
   between these models). It would be even better to have rigorous
   statistical data about what the price effects were of a particular
   method for deciding which mergers to approve or condemn. Right now we
   choose our merger law methodologies based on theory and never gather
   and analyze the data to see whether the theory worked.

   We are probably even further behind in empirical analysis of basic
   legal strategy. What sorts of arguments are most effective with
   judges? Which with juries? Which sorts of contract design are most
   likely to avoid disputes latter? Which settlement offers are most
   likely to be successful? These are important things to teach our
   students, but all we can do is either tell them the received wisdom
   (which may well be wrong) or avoid discussing these issues (so as not
   to expose our ignorance).

   In short, in law, we are currently still largely in the position of
   the baseball scouts lampooned so effectively in [3]Moneyball for their
   reliance on traditional beliefs that had no empirical foundation. But
   all this is changing. At Harvard Law School, as traditional a place as
   you can get, we now have by my count 10 professors who have done
   significant statistical analysis of legal issues. We just hired our
   first JD with a PhD in statistics. The movement is not at all limited
   to Harvard, and seems to be growing at all law schools.

   So we are hardly devoid of empirical analysis of law. We are just,
   rather, in our early Bill James era, and can expect the analysis to
   get more sophisticated and systematic as things progress. I expect
   within a couple of decades we will have our own book distilling the
   highlights of things we will know then that conflict with what is now
   conventional legal wisdom.

   None of this means this new empiricism will replace traditional legal
   theory, much like sabermetrics has not eliminated the need for
   scouting. Indeed, it is clear to me that a lot of legal empirical
   analysis misses the boat because it has a poor or thin understanding
   of legal theory. Many empiricists are good at providing useful input
   to policy analysis, but surprisingly terrible at doing policy analysis
   about the implications of their own findings. There will also be some
   growing pains because it is not clear that empiricists are the best
   placed persons to teach law students, given that the students
   themselves need not learn how to do statistical analysis to become
   excellent lawyers.

   But I have no doubt that empirical analysis of law will provide the
   biggest contributions to our understanding of law over the next few
   decades. That is where the low-hanging fruit is. The decline of
   doctrinalism will only accentuate this trend. Because
   anti-doctrinalist law professors can no longer persuade lawmakers with
   claims about what the law inherently must mean, they will find it more
   promising to try to influence lawmakers with findings about what
   effects particular laws would have. This brings us to my next topic,
   the death of doctrinalism, which will be the subject of my post
   tomorrow.

References

   1. 
http://www.amazon.com/Baseball-Between-Numbers-Everything-About/dp/0465005470/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/103-2958820-6390219?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1179754072&sr=1-1
   2. 
http://www.amazon.com/Bill-James-Baseball-Abstract-1984/dp/0345311558/ref=sr_1_3/103-2958820-6390219?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1179754108&sr=1-3
   3. 
http://www.amazon.com/Moneyball-Art-Winning-Unfair-Game/dp/0393324818/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/103-2958820-6390219?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1179754152&sr=1-1

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