Posted by Ilya Somin:
Butler v. Perry and the Constitutionality of Forced Labor Under the Thirteenth 
Amendment:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_09_23-2007_09_29.shtml#1190700994


   In my earlier posts discussing the constitutionality of the draft and
   other forced labor programs under the Thirteenth Amendment, I made a
   mistake in failing to consider the 1916 case of [1]Butler v. Perry. I
   thank Georgetown law professor Marty Lederman for drawing my attention
   to this important and unduly ignored decisoin.

   Butler provides a much stronger defense of a narrow interpretation of
   the Thirteenth Amendment that would uphold the constitutionality of
   many forced labor programs than did the more famous case of [2]Arver
   v. United States, which I criticized [3]here.

   The decision upheld the constitutionality of a Florida law that
   required all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 21 and 45
   to either do road repair work for six days each year, provide a
   substitute, or pay a $3 tax. The option of paying a small tax ($3 was
   only a modest sum of money even back in 1916) prevents this program
   from being a true forced labor provision. According to [4]the CPI
   inflation calculator, $3 in 1916 is equivalent to $57.69 in 2006
   dollars. After all, there would be no Thirteenth Amendment issue had
   Florida simply required all male citizens to pay an annual $3 tax for
   road upkeep without giving them the option of performing labor
   instead. Allowing the men to do labor instead of paying the tax just
   gave them a chance to pay in kind rather than in cash.

   However, Justice McReynolds' opinion for the Court doesn't rest on any
   such narrow ground. Instead, it strongly suggests that the law would
   have been constitutional even if the options of paying $3 or hiring a
   substitute. According to McReynolds, "the term 'involuntary servitude'
   was intended to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African
   slavery which, in practical operation, would tend to produce like
   undesirable results. It introduced no novel doctrine with respect of
   services always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended
   to interdict enforcement of those duties which individuals owe to the
   state."

   There are several problems with this formulation. First and most
   important, if the term "involuntary servitude" really does not apply
   to traditional "duties" to the state, there would have been no need
   for the Amendment's exception for the use of forced labor as
   punishment for a crime. As I explained more fully in [5]this post,
   using forced labor to punish criminals was a longstanding tradition,
   and was surely not considered "akin to African slavery." Second,
   McReynolds' argument elides the hard question of determining what
   evils really were "akin to African slavery" and likely to "produce
   like undesirable results." The "free labor" ideology underpinning the
   Thirteenth Amendment was based on a broad opposition to all forms of
   forced labor as inimical to a free society, not merely those based on
   racial categories or those that involved lifelong slavery (for details
   see historian Eric Foner's classic work [6]Free Soil, Free Labor, Free
   Men). Finally, McReynolds' argument seems to elevate the supposed
   subjective intentions of the framers over the plain text of the
   Amendment, which is clearly not limited merely to those forms of
   "involuntary servitude" that are "akin to African slavery" but instead
   bans all such servitude with the sole exception of forced labor used
   to punish convicted criminals.

   McReynolds' best originalist argument is the evidence he presents
   showing that, prior to the Civil War, federal territories governed by
   laws that banned involuntary servitude in terms similar to those of
   the Thirteenth Amendment still had road labor laws similar to
   Florida's. Ultimately, my main reply is that such evidence still
   cannot trump the plain text of the Amendment. When the two conflict,
   textualism takes precedence over originalism because only the text,
   not subjective intentions of the framers or ratifiers, is law.

   On a less grandiose theoretical plane, McReynolds' historical argument
   ignores the possibility that antebellum road service laws were enacted
   at a time before the rise of the antislavery "free labor" ideology
   that underpinned the Thirteenth Amendment. The latter involved a much
   broader opposition to forced labor than the relatively narrow
   opposition to slavery that probably underpinned the antislavery
   provisions in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance and other much earlier laws
   that McReynolds cited. Furthermore, the institution of judicial review
   was relatively weak in the antebellum era, and state and territorial
   governments could quite often get away with unconstitutional laws and
   practices. The fact that a given statute or practice wasn't struck
   down in the antebellum period is only weak evidence of its
   constitutonality, and is not enough to outweigh clear constitutional
   text. As judicial power became more institutionalized in the years
   after the Civil War, road labor laws started to be challenged in the
   courts, aprocess culminating in the Butler case itself.

   Finally, although it is not directly relevant to the issue I want to
   address, it is worth pointing out that McReynolds' opinion ignored
   (probably deliberately) the likely racial context of the Florida law.
   In 1913 Florida (the year when the law was enacted), it is highly
   likely that such a statute would be enforced primarily against poor
   blacks, and might even have been enacted for the specific purpose of
   conscripting black labor under the guise of a facially neutral law.

   Because of its civilian (as opposed to military) context and because
   of the suspicious racial background to the case, I doubt that the
   modern Supreme Court would rely on Butler to uphold mandatory national
   service today; quite possibly, today's Court actually would strike
   down a modern law similar to that upheld in Butler. For these reasons,
   the precedent-based argument for a pro-forced labor interpretation of
   the Thirteenth Amendment probably rests on the Progressive Era Court's
   much more poorly reasoned 1918 opinion in Arver.

References

   1. http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/ButlervPerry.html
   2. http://supreme.justia.com/us/245/366/case.html
   3. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_09_23-2007_09_29.shtml#1190681955
   4. http://www.westegg.com/inflation/
   5. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_09_23-2007_09_29.shtml#1190681955
   6. http://www.amazon.com/Free-Soil-Labor-Men-Introductory/dp/0195094972

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