Posted by Dale Carpenter:
Pragmatism, principle, and law in ENDA:
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_09_30-2007_10_06.shtml#1191697324


   There is no federal law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
   orientation in private employment, though such protection was first
   introduced by Bella Abzug in 1974. Courts have consistently read Title
   VII�s ban on sex discrimination to leave out protection from anti-gay
   discrimination. Currently, in 31 states, [1]including all of the South
   and most of the Midwest and West, there is no statewide protection for
   gays in private employment.

   A controversy has been brewing among gay-rights advocates over how
   expansive to make a new federal law, the Employment Non-Discrimination
   Act (ENDA), which would protect gay people from private employment
   discrimination. On one side of the controversy are activists,
   including [2]a large number of civil-rights and gay organizations, who
   want the new law to protect both gay and transgendered employees from
   discrimination. They fear that if trans protection is not included in
   ENDA, Congress will not act to protect transgendered people anytime in
   the near future. They argue this is a matter of principle: gay people
   should wait until �everybody� in the �GLBT community� can get
   protection � however long that might take. They vow to actively oppose
   any bill that does not include both groups.

   On the other side are various commentators (see, for example, [3]here
   and [4]here and [5]here and [6]here) and [7]Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA),
   who claim that ENDA cannot pass Congress if protection for
   transgendered employees is included. They support a new version of the
   bill that would protect gay employees, but leave protection for the
   transgendered for another day. They argue this is a matter of
   pragmatism: civil rights legislation proceeds incrementally, through a
   process of education and adjustment, and has never protected
   �everybody� and everything all at once.

   Enter Lambda Legal, the national legal outfit representing gay people
   in everything from immigration to marriage to employment. Lambda
   claims that, aside from the cruelty of leaving transgendered people
   out of ENDA, there is self-interest for gay people at stake in
   including protection for �gender identity� as well as �sexual
   orientation� in the bill. [8]In an open letter to Frank, Lambda
   argues:

     We have no doubt that, were the weaker version of ENDA to pass,
     some employers will claim they have nothing against lesbians, gay
     men and bisexuals per se, but that they do not want men whom they
     see as unmanly or women who they believe are not feminine enough,
     and loophole would be invoked against almost any lesbian, gay man
     or bisexual who sought protection against discrimination under
     ENDA.

   That is, according to Lambda, an employer might successfully argue
   that it did not object to gay people as such, but it didn't want any
   employee (gay or straight) who appeared to the employer to be gender
   nonconforming. So, under this hypothesis, an employer could get around
   the gay-only version of ENDA by claiming that it fired a lesbian for
   being �too mannish� rather than lesbian. Or it could claim that it
   fired a gay man for his effeminacy rather than his homosexuality.

   As a factual matter, it would be passing strange to see such a case,
   since almost every instance of discrimination for gender nonconformity
   is accompanied by direct and explicit evidence of anti-gay
   discrimination (e.g., calling an effeminate man a "fag"). It would not
   be hard for a court or jury, and certainly would not be hard for
   Lambda's skilled lawyers, to pierce the pretext that the employer was
   not really engaged in anti-gay discrimination and thus violating the
   "weak" version of ENDA.

   Indeed, we now have decades of experience with state laws that protect
   gay people from discrimination based on sexual orientation but not
   gender identity. If the inadequacy of sexual-orientation protections
   were a real problem -- as opposed to a hypothetical or theoretical one
   -- we should expect to see many such cases. But neither Lambda nor any
   other organization has yet produced a single instance in which an
   employer successfully argued around a gay-only employment protection
   law by claiming that it really fired the person for gender
   non-conformity.

   Lambda points to one such case in its letter to Frank:

     For example, just two years ago, a federal court of appeal ruled
     that a lesbian who claimed that she was discriminated against
     because she did not conform to stereotypical expectations of
     femininity did not to have a viable claim under New York state's
     Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act (SONDA), which fails to
     include an express prohibition on discrimination based on gender
     identity and expression.

   Curious about this example, I looked it up. The case Lambda refers to
   is Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2nd Cir. 2005). Sure
   enough, it does not support Lambda's argument and, if it's relevant at
   all, shows the opposite of what Lambda suggests. A "weak" version of
   ENDA would have helped the plaintiff's case.

   ([9]Click here to continue reading . . . )

   ([10]hide)

   In the case, a lesbian named Dawn Dawson worked in a hair salon full
   of gays, lesbians, gender benders, and general nonconformists. After a
   year, she was fired by her pre-op transsexual boss. As is common in
   employment-discrimination cases, the employer claimed she was fired
   for poor performance (rudeness and inconsistency) and the employee
   claimed illegal discrimination. Dawson asserted she was discriminated
   against based on her sex, her sexual orientation, and the fact that
   she was a masculine-appearing woman. She said this violated both
   federal and state law. She lost on summary judgment on both counts --
   but her loss had nothing to do with the failure to include "gender
   identity" in either state or federal law or with the hair salon�s
   ability to say it likes gays but not gender benders.

   (1) Federal claim in Dawson

   First, take the federal claim Dawson made. Under Title VII, federal
   law already generally forbids discrimination based on sex stereotyping
   (e.g., a woman perceived as too "mannish") under the Supreme Court�s
   1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. The problem is that
   courts are afraid to let gays claim such discrimination because they
   suspect it�s a way for gays to sneak sexual orientation protection
   into the law. Consider this passage from the opinion:

     [I]ndividual employees who face adverse employment actions as a
     result of their employer�s animus toward their exhibition of their
     behavior considered to be stereotypically inappropriate for their
     gender may have a claim under Title VII. When utilized by an
     avowedly homosexual plaintiff, however, gender stereotyping claims
     can easily present problems for an adjudicator. This is for the
     simple reason that �[s]tereotypical notions about how men and women
     should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about
     heterosexuality and homosexuality.� [citation omitted]. Like other
     courts, we have therefore recognized that a gender stereotyping
     claim should not be used to �bootstrap protection for sexual
     orientation into Title VII.� 398 F.3d at 218.

   If a heterosexual plaintiff claims gender stereotyping, she has a
   claim. But if an �avowed homosexual� plaintiff claims gender
   stereotyping, courts get very suspicious that it�s an attempt to sneak
   sexual orientation protection into Title VII under the guise of
   interpretation.

   Make of that concern what you will, but the sexual-orientation-only
   version of ENDA would have helped Dawson in two obvious ways. First,
   she could have made a straightforward sexual orientation claim (though
   that claim might have run into other problems particular to her case).
   Second, she might have a made a successful gender-stereotyping claim
   because, since federal law will now protect gay people from
   discrimination, courts will not have to worry about gender
   stereotyping claims "blurring" into sexual orientation claims. They
   will not be so anxious about letting gay plaintiffs sneak sexual
   orientation protection into federal law: it will already be there.

   In other words, Dawson lost on her federal claim precisely because
   federal law does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual
   orientation. Of course, a trans-inclusive ENDA that prohibits both
   sexual orientation and gender-identity discrimination would protect
   her as well. But so would the new version of ENDA that prohibits only
   sexual orientation discrimination since courts would no longer feel
   that they have to limit sex-stereotyping claims to heterosexuals.

   But it gets worse for Lamda's position. Dawson didn�t even present
   competent evidence that she was fired for gender nonconformity.

     [I]n contrast to the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, who proffered
     evidence that her promotion to partnership depended upon her
     changing her behavior to better conform to gender stereotypes, . .
     . Dawson has produced no substantial evidence from which we may
     plausibly infer that her alleged failure to conform her appearance
     to feminine stereotypes resulted in her suffering any adverse
     employment action at the hands of Bumble & Bumble. Thus, her Title
     VII claim based upon a gender stereotyping theory must fail. Id. at
     222-23.

   Thus, on the record, Dawson was not even fired for being a gender
   bender. How then could it be, as Lambda asserts, that she lost because
   her employer accepted gays but not gender-benders? There is nothing in
   the court�s opinion that comes even close to saying that.

   (2) State claim in Dawson

   Dawson also claimed that she had been discriminated against based on
   her sexual orientation in violation of New York state law (which
   explicitly protects gays, but not transgenders). She lost on this
   claim because the only evidence of any discrimination based on her
   sexual orientation came from statements made by two co-workers who
   apparently had no role in the decision to fire her. Thus, she
   presented no evidence that she had actually been fired for being a
   lesbian. Id. at 224-25.

   She did not lose this state-law claim, as Lambda suggests, because New
   York failed to include �gender identity� in its law and her employer
   successfully argued that it fired her based on her gender
   non-conformity and not her sexual orientation. Adding gender identity
   to New York law would not have saved this employee in a case where she
   produced no sufficient summary judgment evidence that she had been
   fired either for gender bending or for sexual orientation.

   (3) Will ENDA without "gender identity" impliedly overrule Price
   Waterhouse?

   Lambda also claims in its letter to Frank that if gender identity is
   deliberately stripped from ENDA, "increasingly conservative" courts
   might interpret this as signalling Congress' desire to eliminate
   gender-stereotyping claims of the type recognized in Price Waterhouse,
   thus exposing effeminate gay men and masculine lesbians to
   discrimination for gender nonconformity rather than sexual
   orientation. I suppose anything is possible, but this scenario builds
   wild speculation upon dubious hypothesis.

   First, nothing determinate about Congress's "intent" can be inferred
   from such drafting changes. Silence about "gender identity" might
   simply indicate an intent to leave out trangendered people (and most
   likely, the narrower class of transsexuals who are surgically altered
   or who live life fully as a member of the opposite sex) or it might
   indicate Congress thinks there's already sufficient protection for
   gender nonconformity in existing interpretation of Title VII (under
   Price Waterhouse) or it might mean there weren't enough votes for a
   more comprehensive bill or it might mean nothing at all.

   Second, the least likely judicial interpretation of congressional
   silence on gender identity is that Congress meant to overrule two
   decades of federal court precedent based on a standing Supreme Court
   decision. The reasoning of Price Waterhouse on sex stereotyping as a
   form of prohibited "sex discrimination" holds regardless of what ENDA
   includes. There will be no legislative history to suggest that
   Congress meant to overrule Price Waterhouse by excluding gender
   identity from the bill. Effeminate gay men and masculine lesbians
   would have potential claims under the "weak" ENDA for sexual
   orientation discrimination and would also likely have stronger claims
   for sex stereotyping under Title VII.

   Third, for reasons discussed above, even if courts strained to infer
   that Congress meant to overhaul sex-discrimination law silently by
   passing a "weak" ENDA, even that would not hurt gay plaintiffs making
   sexual-orientation discrimination claims under ENDA. There are no
   reported cases yet in which an employer successfully made the
   contorted we-like-gays-but-not-gender-nonconformists claim Lambda
   hypothesizes. Nor, as a factual matter, should we expect such cases.

   One thing is clear: federal law does not currently protect
   transsexuals (as opposed to manly women or effeminate men) from
   discrimination in private employment. ENDA is probably the best chance
   to protect transsexuals from private employment discrimination
   nationwide in the near future. But if Frank is right that the bill
   can't pass with gender identity included, it's hard to see what a
   trans-inclusive ENDA would accomplish for the transgendered until
   members of Congress are "educated" about the matter. Nobody knows how
   long that might take. Another uncertainty is whether, even if ENDA
   passes the Senate, President Bush would sign it. A trans-inclusive
   ENDA would make both Senate passage and presidential signature less
   likely than they already are.

   If Lambda and other groups want to insist that ENDA should be
   trans-inclusive no matter what the cost to gay people in 31 states who
   are now without statewide employment protection and aren't likely to
   get it anytime soon, that's fine. They can certainly do so as a matter
   of principle, or morality, or fairness, or political
   coalition-building. But their legal argument about the inadequacy of
   the "weak" ENDA for gay Americans is makeweight. They should stop
   trying to argue that laws protecting gay people from discrimination
   don't really protect gay people from discrimination.

References

   1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:US_LGBT_civil_rights_August_2007.svg
   2. http://www.thetaskforce.org/activist_center/ENDA_oct1_letter
   3. http://wockner.blogspot.com/
   4. 
http://www.baywindows.com/ME2/Audiences/dirmod.asp?sid=008EC9FBCFF24AD18614290016BE1303&nm=Current+Issue&type=Publishing&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle&mid=8F3A7027421841978F18BE895F87F791&AudID=0813BC739F2044E5A03DCF2DE3FDF7C9&tier=4&id=BDABC1E03FDF46C58E9356AFD1E2015E
   5. http://citizenchris.typepad.com/citizenchris/2007/10/enda-gay-rights.html
   6. http://www.americablog.com/2007/10/transgender-fiasco.html
   7. http://www.house.gov/frank/
   8. http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/ltr_enda_frank.pdf
   9. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/volokh/posts/1191697324.html
  10. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/volokh/posts/1191697324.html

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